Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–1354: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

New York, May 13, 1954—6 p.m.
[Received 7:36 p.m.]

721. For the Secretary. Reference Department’s Tosec 143, May 12, last paragraph Bangkok’s 2255, May 11, Saigon’s 2277, May 8 and your Secret letter to me of May 10.¹ Regarding Indochina. I can see following advantages in United States taking immediate initiative in United Nations to set up POC subcommittee on Indochina and sending POC observers there:

1. It would lay the basis for possible future United Nations action, such as determining who the aggressors are in Indochina and getting more troops from other countries than would otherwise be the case if we have to fight there. It would expedite future United Nations action if and when time comes for it.

2. American people think principal reason for United Nations is to prevent World War III. In present Indochina crisis, they are expecting their government to take all the steps that practically can be taken, not merely some of them. They would welcome administration leadership and initiative in making at least some use of United Nations in present crisis. Proposed action would be responsive to views of members of Congress of both parties, and would provide for a demonstration of bipartisanship.

3. Proposed action would have at least some deterrent effect on Communist aggressive plans. It would contribute at least something to morale of Indochinese people and to their political stability. It would help lay the ghost of “Colonialism.”

4. American people see no good coming out of Geneva Conference. They do not see any good reason why we are failing to take all the practical political action we can elsewhere merely because Geneva Conference is going on. We could avoid doing anything in the United Nations that would conflict with Geneva. We would be doing something in the United Nations that cannot be done at Geneva, or anywhere else. Proposed action would strengthen our hands at Geneva by keeping Communists guessing as to our tactics and strategy and forcing them to meet us on another front.

5. American people realize France has primary responsibility now, but fear United States in one way or another will be left holding the bag later. They are afraid that American boys will be sent overseas again, to fight somebody else’s war. They do not understand why we continue for so long to defer to weak French leadership when our own vital interests are so much at stake. Proposed action would tend to strengthen French strategic position.

6. United Nations action now would supplement and support your efforts to build up regional Southeast Asian arrangement which will take a long time to complete. It would reassure American people and world opinion that we mean what we say about regional arrangements in the framework of the Charter and that we are not in any sense bypassing United Nations, but are making use of it to extent it can be useful in present circumstances.

7. It was morally and politically invaluable to have reports from UNCURK on the outbreak of aggression in Korea in June 1950. It would be morally and politically invaluable to have reports from a United Nations POC group in Indochina in order to establish beyond any doubt the utter authenticity of the facts about Communist aggression. At present, there is no authoritative body which could, for example report on arrival of large number of so-called “Chinese volunteers” if such should occur. Existence of “handbook for [Chinese] political workers for going to Vietnam”² and the presence of Soviet advisers with the Viet Minh rebel forces is another valid argument for alerting POC.

8. From propaganda viewpoint it would be advantageous, in light of vicious attacks on United Nations by Molotov and Chou En-lai at Geneva, for United States to take an initiative in the United Nations. Their attacks indicate they fear the United Nations. We should, therefore, use it and not let them frighten us from using it.

9. There are some nations, such as India, that we want to get and keep on our side, but which very properly have not been invited to participate in Geneva, or the regional arrangements negotiations. By the proposed United Nations action they would have a sense of participation in what is going on and we would have a chance to educate them. The same is true of many other United Nations members, e.g., the Latin Americans. We might even consider making India a member of a POC sub-committee, or ask her to contribute observers. In this way, we would be getting her in on things on our side.

10. If French Government falls and/or Geneva breaks down, proposed United Nations action will help allay feelings of despair that nothing has been done or can be done.

11. Referring particularly to your letter of May 10, would point out that while you are right in your belief that it would be very difficult to obtain a two/three vote on a call for troops, the prospects for getting a two/three vote on the matter of alerting the POC are certainly more favorable.

12. Referring to the suggestion in your letter of May 10 that Vietnam be excluded, I would point that under the terms of the “uniting for peace” resolution of November 1950 the activities of the POC are not limited to cases of external aggression, but to “observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security”. There certainly is no difficulty in showing that such condition does exist in Vietnam.

13. One method which could be used is to introduce in the Security Council a resolution to utilize the POC. Such a resolution would be subject to the veto. The other method would be a resolution calling for an emergency meeting of the General Assembly, within 24 hours. This would not be subject to the veto and could be passed on the vote of any seven members. We might do both seriatim. It is noteworthy that all of the top-flight Russians are away from New York at the present time which makes it rather an auspicious time from our viewpoint to try such tactics.³

Lodge

1. For text of telegram Tosec 143 to Geneva, May 12, 1954, regarding a possible UN role in Indochina, see vol. xvi, p. 786. In telegram 2255 from Bangkok, May 11, not printed, Ambassador Donovan warned of the danger that the Communists might attempt to take over Laos and Cambodia before the United Nations could act. In the final paragraph, he emphasized the risk of awaiting the outcome of the Geneva Conference before taking action. (751H.00/5–1154) For text of telegram 2277 from Saigon, repeated to Geneva as 66, May 8, regarding the Viet Minh peace proposals set forth at Geneva, see vol. xvi, p. 727. For the Secretary’s letter of May 10, see p. 1529.
2. Brackets in the source text. The document under reference, purporting to be a Chinese Communist guidebook for “volunteers” in Indochina, was published in Far Eastern Notes, No. 8 (May 7, 1954), pp. 7–11.
3. Ambassador Lodge made the following additional point in telegram 724 from New York, May 14: “In addition to the Security Council and the General Assembly, there is a third body which can instruct the Peace Observation Commission and that is the Interim Committee. It is noteworthy that on the committee neither the Soviet Union nor any of the Iron-Curtain countries are represented.” (751G.00/5–1454)