Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–1354: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Saigon, May 13, 1954—1 p.m.
[Received 1:42 p.m.]

2374. Repeated information Paris priority 831, Geneva priority 98. I have no recourse but to dissent, with great respect, from concept set out in Department telegram 2238 (sent Paris 4007)¹ that “United States must push rapidly for development of Southeast Asia community, probably without Vietnam, but hopefully with Laos and Cambodia”. Thought is added that such a community, including Burma, might offer fair chance to insulate remainder of Southeast Asia against possible loss of Vietnam.

Most regrettably there is no human resource in Cambodia nor Laos, on which to build a bulwark against Communist infiltration or aggression. Furthermore, in case of Cambodia, there is no geographic barrier against such aggression. Furthermore, once Communists have possession of complex of modern airfields in Vietnam, there is no barrier to the successful use of airpower against all of Southeast Asia. It will be recalled that Singapore was taken in 1940 by Japanese using Saigon as a base.

Only warlike people in Southeast Asia are the Vietnamese and particularly those residing in Tonkin. To leave this manpower base in hands of triumphant Communists and with nucleus of victorious Viet Minh troops, is merely to invite disaster.

Much as I am opposed to partition of Vietnam, I would rather resort to that desperate recourse, retaining above-all, important airbase at Tourane, than to contemplate building ramparts of sand in Cambodia and Laos.²

McClintock

1. Telegram 2238 to Saigon, May 10, inter alia, repeated the text of Tedul 48 to Geneva, May 9. For text of Tedul 48, see vol. xvi, p. 745.
2. A contrasting viewpoint was expressed by Charlton Ogburn, Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, in a memorandum to Acting Assistant Secretary Drumright dated May 11. Ogburn contended that Vietnam had been clearly beyond saving for 3 or 4 years. Should the proposed regional grouping undertake to defend Vietnam, the inevitable collapse of the latter would destroy the effectiveness and credibility of the regional organization. Furthermore, the regional security grouping should properly be directed toward defending Southeast Asian countries against armed invasion by Communist forces, not against indigenous Communist movements. (611.90/5–1154)