751G.00/5–1054: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
[Received May 11—5:08 a.m.]
2311. Repeated information Geneva 76, Paris 803, Hanoi unnumbered. I had a general conversation with De Jean this morning on situation we now confront following fall of Dien Bien Phu and in light of current conference at Geneva.
De Jean showed me his lengthy telegram of May 3 to Bidault outlining in geographic terms minimal conditions for a military armistice. I suggest that USDel Geneva can secure these recommendations from French delegation and post them on a map of Vietnam. If not I shall telegram summary of text with De Jean’s permission. In essence his proposals are that most of Tonkin delta remain in French-Vietnamese hands but with a corridor which would link area north and west of delta to Viet Minh-held territory in Central Annam. Thai country would go to Viet Minh. Most of central plateau region in vicinity of Kontum and Banmethuot would be in Vietnamese-French hands and all of Cochin China. However, De Jean recognized extreme difficulty of separating sheep from goats in areas heavily infiltrated by Viet Minh such as Transbassac and southern tip of Cochin Chinese peninsula.
De Jean showed me Bidault’s draft of terms for an armistice dated April 30 and revised as of May 3, which are more complicated and on [Page 1531] whole less satisfactory than those set out Secto 143 amended as indicated Secto 152.1 Particularly dangerous in these drafts is Bidault’s suggestion that political fate of Vietnam be left to negotiation between Vietnamese and Viet Minh. This would simply result in absorption of former by latter. De Jean is aware of this danger and is cautioning Bidault against any such provision.
De Jean will recommend that military terms of armistice agreed upon, be entrusted to a mixed commission made up of former belligerents. He fears that an international commission could only be formed after months of haggling and that British would insist on incorporating “undesirable elements” such as Burmese or Indians.
I said that if Geneva powers decided on a mixed commission Communist side might demand a seat for Red China. In that case I thought it would be useful if there were a US representative on armistice commission.
De Jean said that mixed commission should devote its attention only to enforcing strictly military provisions of an armistice. Political aspects of armistice might well be entrusted to an international commission appointed by UN Security Council.
De Jean then discussed more basic problems. He said, “There are three issues: First, should there be an armistice at all? Second, if there is no armistice, how to continue war successfully? Third, if there is an armistice, what powers will provide effective guarantees for compliance with armistice agreement?
De Jean said he felt time had come for very frank talking between US and French Governments. He said loss of Dien Bien Phu by no means signified loss of war. There were still some very powerful trump cards which would be played and which if played correctly could result in victory. French still have a powerful military force in Indochina and are able to use that force to contain Viet Minh. However, as was instanced in tragic miscalculation of Navarre at Dien Bien Phu, character of war had now changed and overt participation by China in form of sending modern artillery and other weapons would no doubt be stepped up if hostilities continued. Under such a postulate it would not be possible for French and Vietnamese forces alone to meet such a strengthened adversary. However, if US Government were willing to contemplate use of overwhelming air strength against Communist China, situation might be radically altered.
Some overall considerations apply to readiness of US to undertake a military guarantee of an armistice agreement. De Jean did not think British could be brought into such an arrangement and said that French alone could not provide an effective guarantee.
[Page 1532]These considerations made it necessary that there be a frank stocktaking of our joint assets and a candid reappraisal of where we stood. If for constitutional reasons or climate of feeling in Congress or fact of elections this year, it was not possible for US to come in either in guaranteeing an armistice or in backstopping renewed hostilities with something more than end-item support, at least we should face the facts calmly and draw necessary conclusions.
De Jean asked if I had no other than Secretary’s latest statement which reached us in USIA Wireless File so badly garbled that I was not yet sure what Secretary had actually said. It seemed from such fragments as had reached us that Secretary was advocating speedy negotiation of some form of collective security pact but I had had no other word on this subject.2
- For text of telegram Secto 143 from Geneva, May 8, see vol. xvi, p. 730. Regarding telegram Secto 152, see footnote 1 to Secto 143.↩
- Reference is presumably to the Secretary’s speech of May 7; see footnote 5, p. 1496.↩