751G.00/5–854
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs ( Bonbright )1
Subject:
- Indochina Situation
Participants:
- Mr. Munro, New Zealand Ambassador
- Mr. Laking, New Zealand Minister
- Secretary of State
- Mr. Murphy, Acting Under Secretary
- Mr. Bonbright—EUR
The Ambassador began by expressing the hope that the Secretary would continue as in the past to speak to him with complete candor [Page 1513] concerning what we thought of the attitude of the New Zealand government as well as what we have in mind in the way of future actions to deal with the situation in Southeast Asia. The Secretary stated that the speech which he gave last night2—which the Ambassador said he had heard—gave perhaps the clearest picture of our present thinking. It had been discussed with our Defense people and had the approval of the President.
The Secretary went on to say that a few days ago we had received suggestions from Mr. Eden, with which the Ambassador was familiar. Speaking frankly, we were not entirely happy about the form of these suggestions. Our feeling was that if action was limited to military discussions within the framework of the existing Five-Power Staff Agency (US, UK, France, New Zealand and Australia) this would have too “Western” a flavor. The exclusion of any Asians would have bad repercussions particularly in Vietnam where they would consider that they were being abandoned. We had no objection to five-power military discussions as such and we were prepared to take part in such discussions if our other partners so desired although we would prefer to have them take place in Washington rather than in Singapore. But in addition we believed that we should continue to plan and exchange views with regard to a broader political association.
The Secretary then said that there was another slight difference between us and the UK. We are prepared and desire to talk during the present period with representatives of the Associated States in order to show them that we are not abandoning them. The United Kingdom on the other hand feared that such discussions would have undesirable implications and that they might suggest the possibility of involvement in the Indochina war. In short we thought the five-power military talks would be fine but this should not stop the continuation of our exploratory talks with Thailand, the Philippines and the three Associated States. It was also desirable to include Burma and to keep the Indonesians informed so as to ensure at least their benevolent neutrality.
The Secretary then said we should now be making concrete studies in order to see what all of us might agree on together. Should we have an organization like NATO or should the arrangement be more informal? What countries should be included in it? He felt that if Indochina went down the drain it would be difficult to insulate the rest of the area unless we had plans in advance of what we would do. We intended to work as closely as possible with the British but we would reserve our right to talk with the Associated States for the reasons already given.
The Secretary then said that, as the Ambassador may have gathered from his speech last evening, we do not exclude in our thinking a [Page 1514] possible participation in the Indochina war if the proper conditions existed. Mr. Munro interjected that he had so interpreted the Secretary’s speech. The Secretary indicated that he had not wanted to say flatly that if “so and so” were done we would come in. He had preferred to advance the suggestion by analogy with the Korean situation. In other words it would have to be on the basis that not only the French but the people of the Associated States would want us in; we would have to take part in helping to train the indigenous forces; the independence question would have to be clarified; the United Nations would have to be drawn into some aspects of the problem, etc. Up to now the French had not been in the mood to think in these terms and in the Secretary’s view they would not unless and until they are faced with tough Communist demands. If the Communist conditions at Geneva are humiliating to the French, as we suspect they will be, the French may reconsider their position on internationalization of the conflict. The French are playing a dubious game as indicated by Laniel’s statement of yesterday that they have been left alone.3 The fact was that we had given them practically everything, supported the French franc and poured in equipment. Actually the French had never really asked us to come into the war for the reason that they would not face up to the implications of such a request which would involve a negotiation and relationship similar to that which had existed between us and the United Kingdom when the British burden became more than they could bear in Greece. The French had followed a different line. They had wanted to draw on us for everything but they had not been willing to sit down with us and discuss the situation in terms which would have given us the voice of a partner. Perhaps the French will change when they are faced with harsh reality. If they do we will indicate to them the conditions of our participation. In any event the Secretary said that through his speech last night he wanted the French to know that there were conditions under which we would be prepared to consider participating.
The Ambassador then asked if we had any information or had reached any conclusions concerning the impact on the French and people of the Associated States of the fall of Dien Bien Phu. The Secretary replied that we did not as yet have reports on this.
Mr. Munro inquired whether we had given thought to what areas must be held if the situation in Indochina deteriorates rapidly. The Secretary replied that he regarded Thailand as being of the greatest importance and that the Thais should be brought in fully. General Smith [Page 1515] had talked to them prior to his departure for Geneva. At present they have about 60,000 troops of pretty good quality. We think that this figure should perhaps be built up to around 90,000.
The Ambassador inquired what we would do if we were not faced with Chinese intervention but were faced with increased efforts at subversion in the area. The Secretary thought that if the Thai government has our military and financial support they are not nearly as vulnerable to this type of attack. They were fully independent and were not a colonial state. Perhaps they had not been too bold in the past in the face of adversity but with our help we thought they could be bolstered. This would be worth doing even if it only resulted in a delaying operation although the Secretary did not want to leave the impression that he thought Thailand would be lost.
The Ambassador then asked if we would support or guarantee a French proposal which would be tantamount to turning over Indochina to the Communists. The Secretary replied that we certainly would not. If such a proposal were made we would maintain our full liberty of action and would encourage and assist such indigenous forces as might remain.
The Ambassador said he was not quite clear whether we contemplated military talks with the Associated States. The Secretary replied that we did not contemplate military talks with them since we did not think they would be worthwhile although military talks with the Thais and the Filipinos would be useful. The only purpose of our talks with the Associated States would be for the purpose of maintaining contact with them and making them feel that we had not written them off.
The Ambassador then referred to the speech which Mr. Webb had made at Geneva yesterday.4 The Secretary said he had seen accounts of it in the papers but wished to read it in the full text. He asked the Ambassador to invite Mr. Webb down to Washington to have a further talk with him when Mr. Webb passes through this country on his way home from Geneva. The Ambassador said he would be glad to do so and was sure this would be useful.
Finally Mr. Laking said he would like to have clarification on one point: Were we and the British in accord with regard to the five-power military talks. The Secretary said that we were not yet in accord. The matter had been discussed at the National Security Council meeting this morning. We expect to get our views to General Smith today with the thought that he will shortly convey them to Mr. Eden.
- This meeting was summarized in telegram 155 to Wellington (Tosec 121 to Geneva), May 10; for text, see volume XII. A related conversation occurred on May 7 when Assistant Secretary Merchant discussed Indochina and regional defense arrangements for Southeast Asia with Minister F. J. Blakeney of the Australian Embassy and Minister G. R. Laking of the New Zealand Embassy. The memorandum of that conversation is in file 751G.00/5–754.↩
- See footnote 5, p. 1496.↩
- For the text of Prime Minister Laniel’s announcement of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, see France, Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, 1954, Débats, p. 2223 (session of May 7).↩
- Reference is to the address by T. C. Webb, Minister of External Affairs of New Zealand, at the Eighth Plenary Session on Korea, May 7; see telegram Secto 138, May 7, vol. xvi, p. 223.↩