Office of the Historian

751G.00/5–754: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret
Paris, May 7, 1954—5 p.m.
[Received 7:22 p.m.]

4258. Repeated information Geneva 190, Saigon 503. Embassy wishes point out that near unanimity of Assembly opinion manifested May 4 and 61 on desirability concluding negotiated settlement Indochina conflict at Geneva underscores Embassy’s conclusion as result Assembly debate Indochina March 5 and 9. It will be recalled re latter that Embassy stated that desirability reaching negotiated settlement Indochina conflict was not at issue, the fundamental division taking place on question whether try reach settlement with Viet Minh immediately or first wait and see whether a settlement could be reached within Geneva framework (Embassy despatch 2398, March 18).2 As indicated yesterday, latter view continues prevail. However, as in March, government’s victory of yesterday was again clearly subject implicit caveat: let government beware if settlement not reached within [Page 1503] Geneva context. As consequence, Embassy feels its conclusion March 9 should be reiterated with emphasis, i.e., if government fails find solution Geneva along lines indicated by Laniel March 5, French Government will then be faced by almost insurmountable pressure to reach immediate settlement with Viet Minh on best terms obtainable (and presumably on considerably less than Laniel’s March 5 conditions). Embassy recognizes this in contrast view expressed Department’s IE 63 of March 263 to effect that impact on France of a failure at Geneva will not be serious and will not notably diminish will of France to continue war (to which reference made Embassy despatch 2563, April 8).4

On balance, in absence alteration basic character Indochina war, Embassy of opinion that area maneuverability present French Government (and in turn its delegation Geneva) as regards Indochina rapidly narrowing and that domestic pressures particularly evident France since advent Geneva conference may soon force whatever French Government in power to accept a settlement with Viet Minh on basis most palatable face-saving formula and without regard longer term implications. This seems indicated since few in France currently appear disposed continue Indochina war along present lines, only remaining alternate in their view to achieving settlement on best terms obtainable.

Dillon
  1. For the record of the debate on Indochina in the National Assembly on May 4 and 6, culminating in a vote of confidence for the Laniel government on a motion to postpone discussion of the subject until after the Geneva Conference (311 to 262 with about 50 abstentions), see France, Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, 1954, Débats, pp. 2092–2100 and 2144–2155.↩
  2. See footnote 1, p. 1103.↩
  3. Intelligence Estimate IE-63, “Probable French Position on Indochina at Geneva,” Mar. 26, 1954, is not printed. (INR files, lot 58 D 528)↩
  4. See footnote 3, p. 1295.↩