751G.00/5–754: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
[Received 8:28 a.m.]
2261. Repeated information Paris 778, Tokyo 91.1 Tokyo for General Partridge. DeJean this morning went over ground we had covered yesterday re military strategy to be followed following fall of Dien-Bien-Phu. He said Cogny had told him that he was optimistic on chances of holding delta “provided the three Viet Minh divisions now at Dien-Bien-Phu are prevented from reaching delta.” DeJean who seems to have received this concept from Cogny, is urging on [garble] need to interdict route 41 from Tuangiao to Delta by heavy aerial bombardment. He told me this morning that he had yesterday inquired of Paris if there were any possibility of training French crews for [Page 1495] B–29s if in fact US Government could loan these aircraft for this purpose.
I told DeJean that we should not be misled by wishful thinking that airpower alone was an easy way out. I said that in impending rainy season most of territory through which Viet Minh divisions will march will be covered by impenetrable clouds and mist. B–29s with French crews would not under such conditions be able to find suitable targets. I likewise cautioned DeJean from listening to General Lauzin’s over-simplified description of how Shoran bombing works, and added that in my opinion Lauzin had no concept of this highly technical operation.
If—as we may expect—French Government makes another last minute appeal to US for B–29s, I think we could contemplate loaning these aircraft only on condition that Shoran stations are established here (see paragraph 2 Embtel 2122)2 and if competent US Shoran specialists were added to French B–29 crews to handle Shoran bombing. Such specialists could wear French uniforms and act in capacity as military advisors to French Air Force. We know that Chinese military advisors are already operating in field with Viet Minh forces, and I see no reason why we cannot apply same concept in case of Shoran bombing.
Even if foregoing suggestion should commend itself to Department of Defense, we should be under no illusions that B–29s and Shoran bombing will mean deliverance in this war. I have discussed this telegram with General O’Daniel who quite rightly observes that ultimate military decision will depend upon use of ground troops with properly coordinated air support.