Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 195th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 6, 1954, 10 a.m.¹

top secret
eyes only

Washington, May 6, 1954, 10 a.m.

[Extracts]

The following were present at the 195th meeting of the National Security Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; General Ridgway for the Secretary of the Army; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the White House Staff Secretary; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

1. Report on the Geneva Conference and the Indochina Situation (NSC Actions Nos. 1086–b and 1104–b)²

Mr. Cutler pointed out that since the President had already heard directly from Secretary Dulles most of his report,³ he had asked the Vice President to preside over the Council meeting until discussion of Secretary Dulles’ report commenced, at which time the President would join the meeting.

Secretary Dulles said that he would begin his report in narrative form. The first point was the familiar position agreed upon among the British, the French and ourselves at London and Paris on April 12, 13 and 14. This agreement, to examine the possibility of establishing a collective defense of Southeast Asia against Communist aggression, said Secretary Dulles, had been agreed at the highest levels by both French and the British Governments. Indeed, Secretary Dulles had gone over this agreement personally with Sir Winston Churchill.⁴

After Secretary Dulles’ return, as he told Mr. Eden he would, he proceeded to call a meeting of the Ambassadors of the nine nations who were to take part in the proposed regional grouping for the defense of Southeast Asia. However, on Easter Sunday,⁵ just prior to the Secretary’s meeting with the nine Ambassadors, the British Ambassador called on Secretary Dulles at his house, to say that Mr. Eden had informed him that he was not to take part in the meeting with the other Ambassadors. This had been a shock to Secretary Dulles, in view of Eden’s previous agreement with Dulles. In order to prevent a public airing of Anglo-American differences, Secretary Dulles hastily arranged a meeting under a different formula. He undertook to call together the representatives of the sixteen nations which had taken part on our side in the Korean war. This device was chosen to fuzz up the British failure to proceed as planned, with the other nine nations on the Southeast Asia problem.

Later in the week Secretary Dulles went to Paris to attend the NATO meeting. There Mr. Eden explained his shift of position as resulting from overlooking the meeting of the Colombo powers. Eden said he believed it would have been a mistake to try to hold the scheduled nine-power meeting until after the conclusion of the Colombo Conference. He had therefore pulled Sir Roger Makins out of the Washington meeting. By this time, Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that the British had decided not to join in any conference at all with respect to the defense of Southeast Asia. It was not, therefore, a postponement but a repudiation of any action at all at the present time or any action in the future which might lead to armed intervention by British forces in Indochina.

The next step was Admiral Radford’s arrival in Paris. As he has already reported to the National Security Council, Radford talked at once upon arrival with Secretary Dulles and Mr. Eden. As a result of these talks, Mr. Eden changed his plans to go directly to Geneva, and instead returned to London for a Saturday meeting with Churchill and a Sunday meeting with the whole British Cabinet. Thereafter he went to Geneva.

Despite the conversations which Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford had with the British prior to Geneva, the British adhere to their position—that is, no involvement in any military action in Indochina and no planning for any other kind of action in Indochina until after the conclusion of the Geneva Conference.

After Eden reached Geneva, Secretary Dulles said he had frank talks with him.⁶ Secretary Dulles’ irritation had been increased by the fact that when the Korean phase of the Conference opened and the United States was subjected to vicious attacks by Molotov and Chou En-lai, not a single representative of a Western power undertook to stand up and defend the policy of the United States or even to keep the historical record straight.

At this point Secretary Dulles read several paragraphs of the memorandum of his conversations with Eden at Geneva. Eden did not undertake to reply to Secretary Dulles’ complaints at this time, but subsequently sent a memorandum which constituted a reply to that of Secretary Dulles. The Secretary read portions of the Eden memorandum to the Council. In it Eden made much of India’s position and of the desirability of inducing Nehru to take a cooperative attitude, and set forth a proposal for the defense of Southeast Asia.

To this Eden memorandum Secretary Dulles replied on May 2, stating that he would bring to the President’s attention Eden’s proposal for the defense of Southeast Asia. There was much in the Eden proposal with which we could agree, said Secretary Dulles; but we clearly believe the danger to Southeast Asia to be more immediate than Eden does.

Secretary Dulles then said that he would say no more about the British phase of this problem until the President came into the meeting, since subsequent British developments had not been told to the President. While awaiting the President’s appearance, Secretary Dulles said that he would go back and describe the French phase of the negotiations.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that before he had gone to Europe there had been a series of talks with the French in Washington, both on the political and on the military level. General Ely, for example, had talked with Admiral Radford.⁷ Secretary Dulles noted that there had been a great deal of talk in the newspapers about French requests for additional U.S. military assistance, but no formal requests had ever come from the French Government for any U.S. military intervention in Indochina. What had occurred were two separate suggestions for U.S. air strikes, specifically in aid of Dien Bien Phu. The first of these informal suggestions had been made by Bidault and Laniel to Ambassador Dillon in Paris on April 4.⁸ It called for carrierbased air strikes, and the suggestion, thought Secretary Dulles, had originated from an erroneous impression brought back to Paris by General Ely that the United States would be receptive to a request for an air strike. Secretary Dulles insisted that there could have been no reasonable basis for such a presumption on the part of the French, for he had made it clear in his talks with the French, as had Admiral Radford in his talks with General Ely, that military intervention by the United States in any form would be impossible unless the French met certain fundamentals and conditions. Despite this, Ely evidently thought that the United States would respond to the French suggestions on a crash basis.

The second informal French request for a U.S. air strike came somewhat later in Paris when Bidault showed Secretary Dulles a message from Navarre which stated that Dien Bien Phu would be lost in 48 hours without an air strike by the United States.⁹ On this occasion, said Secretary Dulles, he repeated to Bidault and Laniel the arguments he had used on the occasion of the earlier French request. Bidault took the position that everything depended on Dien Bien Phu. If the fortress were saved, then there would be time to think of the fundamentals and the conditions which Secretary Dulles advanced. If the fortress were lost, there would be no point in discussing these fundamentals. France would be through in Indochina. By this time, added Secretary Dulles, the French undoubtedly knew that the British were running out on their April 13 commitment to join in a nine-power examination of an arrangement to defend Southeast Asia.

There is a very sharp difference of opinion in France, continued Secretary Dulles, with respect to internationalizing the conflict in Indochina. The Cabinet is divided. The Chamber of Deputies and the public are divided. There is a strong belief that if France agreed to internationalize the conflict her hands would be tied and she would be unable to achieve a settlement at Geneva which would allow her to get out of Indochina. There is an overwhelming sentiment in France to get out. Furthermore, there was no real government in France. France was just drifting. The French don’t dare to have a full Cabinet meeting. Bidault has a relatively free hand at the Geneva Conference simply because the French Cabinet cannot agree on what instructions to send him. Laniel, predicted Secretary Dulles, would probably secure a slender vote of confidence from the French Chamber this afternoon, thanks to massive abstentions by the Deputies.¹⁰ In view of all this, it is of course very difficult for the United States to deal with France on any responsible basis.

Secretary Dulles then stated his conviction that whether or not the British would act with us initially to try to save Indochina, it was a sine qua non that we have a satisfactory agreement with France on the following fundamentals:

1. Genuine independence for the Associated States.

2. A division of responsibility with the French which would enable the United States to play a much more active part in training the indigenous armed forces of the Associated States.

3. A sharing of responsibility for planning military operations between France and the United States so that U.S. forces would not be mere tools of a French Chief of Staff.

4. French agreement to stay in the fight in Indochina.

It had not been possible as yet to discuss with the French any of the above conditions, although Secretary Dulles had hinted his willingness to do so. The French had not risen to the bait, and Secretary Dulles doubted the wisdom of any U.S. belligerency in Indochina until the French agreed with us on these fundamentals. If they could be prevailed on to do so, we might go into Indochina on the gamble that the British would also ultimately join, if for no other reason than pressure by the ANZUS powers. The British were trying hard to please Nehru on the one hand and the ANZUS powers on the other. Foreign Minister Casey had told Secretary Dulles that if the present government was reelected Australia would take a strong line, but it could do nothing until after the May 29 elections.¹¹ Secretary Dulles thought it likely that the Menzies¹² government would be reelected. If this happens and the French have a government, Secretary Dulles thought that the United States might well consider armed intervention in Indochina without the British. But thus far there was no French government with which this matter could be effectively discussed. The situation was just the opposite of that in 1947 when the British, feeling unequal to their commitments in Greece, had paved the way for an orderly take-over of their commitments by the United States. The United Nations had supervised this replacement, and Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that such UN supervision would also be desirable in the case of Southeast Asia. France, however, was opposed to getting involved in the UN lest a precedent be set which would prove embarrassing in Morocco.

Secretary Dulles stated that he had got a distinct impression from Molotov and Chou En-lai at Geneva that the Communists felt much greater confidence in the strength of their position than we had earlier estimated. If the United States intervened in Indochina and the UK stayed out, Secretary Dulles believed that there was a much greater chance of Chinese overt intervention than would be the case if the British were in it with us.

At this point Secretary Dulles said that he had covered for the Council the ground which he had already gone over with the President. Mr. Cutler went to the President’s office, and the President entered the meeting at 10:45 a.m.

Secretary Dulles then informed the Council of the latest developments. Yesterday afternoon he had received a message from Under Secretary Smith at Geneva, outlining a proposal by Anthony Eden along the lines of Eden’s earlier proposal to Secretary Dulles in answer to the Secretary’s letter to Eden of May 2, which had been mentioned earlier.¹³ This memorandum of Mr. Eden to Secretary Smith was read by Secretary Dulles to the Council. Eden said that he would agree to recommend that the UK take part at once with the U.S., France, Australia and New Zealand in an examination by the Five-Power staff agency (Singapore) of the Indochina and Southeast Asia situation. These talks would take place in the light of the Prime Minister’s statement that the UK would not give any undertakings about military action in Indochina until after the Geneva Conference. Eden’s memorandum added that it would be understood that the Colombo Conference powers (Pakistan, India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia), plus Thailand, would be kept advised of the progress of the work of the five powers and, where appropriate and agreed, they would be invited to take part with the five powers. A joint public announcement of intentions was also suggested by the Eden memorandum. Secretary Smith had added the comment that this new proposal represented a considerable British concession, and recommended that the U.S. concur in this proposal and agree to a joint announcement. Secretary Dulles also agreed that the new five-power proposal represented an advance in the British position and placed the UK in approximately the same position which it had occupied before it had backed out of the agreement to take part with the nine other powers in an examination of the possibilities of defending Southeast Asia. Thus the British would now agree at least to include Indochina in their planning, and also agree to do something prior to the conclusion of the Geneva Conference. If this represented an advance, the new British proposal entailed certain difficulties. One of them was the proposal to bring in the Colombo powers. Secretary Dulles said that he had already informed Eden that bringing these powers in would raise serious problems for the United States if we could not likewise bring in South Korea and Formosa, which the British opposed. Secretary Dulles thought that the proposal to include Thailand and Burma was excellent. The British also hoped to keep India benevolently neutral.

At this point the President strongly reaffirmed his anxiety over any arrangement which was confined to the five white nations and left out the Asian states. Secretary Dulles commented that at yesterday’s briefing of the Congressional leaders¹⁴ he had likewise indicated his own opposition to entering into arrangements only with these five powers and not with any of the Asian states themselves. The President suggested, however, that we might cast the purpose of such a five-power examination in such fashion that it would seem to be conferring voluntary aid on a group of Asian states which sought such aid cooperatively.

Secretary Dulles said that he would discuss a reply to this British proposal, at luncheon today following the meeting with Admiral Radford and Secretary Wilson.¹⁵ On that occasion he said he would also point out the need for machinery which would provide prompt replies to the messages which were flowing in from Geneva. He was going to suggest perhaps that he and Radford and Wilson each designate individuals to work together to get quick action on the Geneva messages. From now on out the Conference must largely be run from Washington.

With respect to the joint public announcement of the five-power arrangement, the President stated that it should be phrased along the lines of the suggestions he had made a few minutes ago with respect to the purpose.

Mr. Cutler asked about the possibility of including the three Associated States and the Philippines in the five-power talks. Secretary Dulles replied that the British would undoubtedly oppose associating Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the talks, for fear of getting the UK involved in the hostilities in Indochina.

Secretary Dulles then announced that the State Department had likewise got further information on the French position.¹⁶ Bidault, he said, had asked the French Cabinet for permission to make the following proposal when the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference began:

1. The problem in Vietnam is purely Vietnamese, and there is no question of partition, but only a military struggle for control of the government.

2. The situation is different in Laos and Cambodia, which are victims of external aggression.

3. There should be a cease-fire guaranteed by adequate military and administrative controls under the supervision of international control machinery.

4. The cease-fire would take effect only when guaranties had been embodied in the armistice conventions and when the control machinery had been established and was in place.

5. The controls would be based on the conditions publicly announced by Laniel on March 5.

6. After peace had been established by the cease-fire, political and economic problems could be examined.

After reading the above French proposal, Secretary Dulles gave Under Secretary Smith’s commentary on the Bidault proposal, which was in effect that unless or until we have firm support in the U.S. for some other solution, we simply cannot prevent the French from making such a proposal at Geneva, even though it is far below a successful prosecution of the Navarre Plan.¹⁷ If accepted by the French Cabinet, the Bidault proposal would at least be a better French initial position than we might have feared. We ought to urge the French to accept UN auspices for the control machinery. Secretary Smith doubted whether the French would actually remain firm in insisting on satisfactory controls, but believed that they would slide rapidly toward the expected Communist demand for an immediate cease-fire without controls. The important element in forestalling French capitulation will be the degree to which we can strengthen their hand by increasing Communist uncertainty as to possible U.S. intervention and by achieving success in organizing some kind of Southeast Asian coalition.

The President stated that he had no objection to the French making use of the idea of U.S. intervention as a means of influencing the Communists, but our own people at Geneva should not discuss the possibility of intervention. Secretary Dulles expressed agreement with the President’s view, and the President went on to point out that if U.S. officials began talking of U.S. unilateral intervention, such talk would be completely inconsistent with our whole foreign policy. The President concluded by stressing that there could be no U.S. belligerency in Indochina without Congressional agreement.

The Vice President then addressed the following question to the Secretary of State: “Am I to understand that we intend to go along with the new British suggestion to use the Five-Power staff agency as the sole vehicle for concerted action in Southeast Asia? Or do we propose, parallel with exploration in the Five-Power staff agency, to continue to explore the possibility of a regional grouping with Asian nations and not merely with the five white powers?”

Secretary Dulles replied by stating his feeling that while he favored accepting the British proposal with respect to the Five-Power staff agency (whose terms of reference would be enlarged and its personnel upgraded), he thought this should only be done as one element in a broader political framework which would include more than the five powers. The Vice President commented that in his opinion the five-power arrangement would be almost as bad for the United States as would be unilateral U.S. intervention, since it would be interpreted by the Asian nations as sheer colonialism.

After the Vice President had repeated his question in slightly different wording, Secretary Dulles again assured him that the Five-Power staff agency would not be the top body, but would be merely a mechanism through which to try to create a broader grouping including Asian states. The broader grouping would be in a position to draw on the intelligence information which was available to the Five-Power staff agency. This, in short, would be a subsidiary body rather than the heart of a coalition. The great question, said Secretary Dulles, was whether the British would accept this view of the function of the Five-Power staff agency.

The Vice President then inquired whether anyone had given thought to bringing General Templer or Mr. MacDonald to Geneva as advisers. The Vice President thought both these men had a keen understanding of the realities of the Communist threat to Southeast Asia.

Secretary Dulles then asked Admiral Radford for his views with respect to the British five-power proposal. Admiral Radford replied that of course the proposal would require a careful appraisal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At first glance, however, he thought the British were laying the groundwork for a set-up which would be very much in their favor but not in ours if the proposal excluded Asian nations. Furthermore, he predicted that it would take a very long time to work out the British proposal—so long, in fact, that it would be of no use in meeting the current emergency in Southeast Asia. The Five-Power staff agency was already pretty well agreed on the military requirements for the defense of Southeast Asia, but if it was now proposed to add the political and economic problems, these would take months to resolve.

The President said that he well understood the points Admiral Radford had made, but he nevertheless felt that the psychological appeal of the British proposal was important, despite the substantive difficulties. The Five-Power staff agency would at least provide a good facade behind which the real work could be done by the others.

Secretary Wilson queried whether our real difficulty didn’t result from the lack of participation of any Asian nations of large size. Thailand, for example, was too small to carry much weight. The President pointed out that small or not, such nations as Thailand at least provided the semblance of Asian participation.

Secretary Dulles reminded the Council that in Molotov’s Geneva speech,¹⁸ referring to the proposed Southeast Asian regional grouping, he had charged that not a single respectable Asian nation would agree to join the coalition. The President replied by asking why no one ever took such occasions as this to stand up and blast Russian colonialism. In any event, said the President, the new British proposal represented such a significant advance from their previous position that the United States should certainly follow it through.

Dr. Flemming then inquired as to the nature of the U.S. attitude toward the French proposal regarding a cease-fire. The President replied that initially we would have to wait and see what precisely this Bidault proposal really means. We would have to look at all the possible alternatives, but we certainly wouldn’t get anywhere if all we did was to tell the French to keep on fighting. On the other hand, if the French and the Associated States eventually agreed that the Communist terms for an armistice were hopeless, perhaps we could really get somewhere and induce other Asian nations to follow our objectives.

Mr. Cutler then inquired as to the length of time the United States would have to reply to the Eden and the Bidault proposals. Secretary Dulles said that the British proposal must be answered today, at least in a preliminary fashion. There was not the same urgency for a reply on the French cease-fire proposal, since the French Cabinet in any event would drag its feet. This would allow time for a more careful analysis of the implications of the Bidault proposal.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that he was inquiring whether the Planning Board could be useful in either of these two matters. He said he assumed that the preliminary response to the British would be along the lines of the President’s statements. Should the Planning Board therefore go on to consider the French proposal at its meeting this afternoon? The President agreed that the latter would be desirable, and when Secretary Wilson observed that there wasn’t very much we could do about the French cease-fire proposal in any case, the President pointed out to him that the French would certainly want to know whether we would support them if they presented their proposal at Geneva, and so, for that matter, do we.

Mr. Cutler then said that this seemed an opportune moment to brief the Council on the report which was being made by the Operations Coordinating Board with respect to the possibility of setting up an international volunteer air group for combat operations in Southeast Asia. While, said Mr. Cutler, he thought that the creation of such a volunteer air group came within the existing U.S. policy on Southeast Asia, he felt, nevertheless, that the progress of study of this problem should be reported to the Council. Mr. Cutler said he believed that the air group was to be equipped with three squadrons of F–86 planes.

The President commented that the volunteer air group ought to have in it a certain number of multi-trained pilots so that if, for example, the question of using B–29’s ever came up again, such planes could be provided without involving us in the danger of having to use U.S. Air Force pilots in combat operations.

Mr. Cutler then inquired whether it was advisable to ask CIA to provide an intelligence estimate as to the probable Chinese Communist reaction to the creation of such an international volunteer air group. U.S. citizens, of course, might volunteer for combat action, and the question whether this was feasible would presumably be studied by the Department of Defense. Mr. Allen Dulles agreed to provide such an intelligence estimate.

Secretary Dulles inquired whether the proposed volunteer air group would be under the ultimate control of the President. Mr. Cutler replied in the negative, indicating that we would have no responsibility for the group, which would be developed along the lines of General Chennault’s “Flying Tigers” in the second World War. This would mean, said Secretary Dulles, that our volunteers could join the air group without Congressional approval. The answer seemed to be in the affirmative.

With respect to Chinese Communist reaction, Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that the Chinese Communists would intervene if they wanted to, but the use of a volunteer air group rather than regular U.S. combat forces would enable the Chinese, if they wanted to, to avoid intervention without loss of face.

. . . . . . .

The National Security Council:¹⁹

a. Discussed the situation with respect to Indochina in the light of an oral report by the Secretary of State on the Geneva Conference and the Indochina situation.

b. Agreed that the United States should be willing, in response to a British proposal, to participate in an examination by the existing Five-Power staff agency (US, UK, France, Australia and New Zealand) of the situation in Southeast Asia (including Indochina); provided that:

(1) The purpose of such examination is to explore means by which these participating governments may assist the countries of Southeast Asia in a cooperative effort to defend themselves.

(2) It is made clear that such an examination is supplementary to continued efforts by the United States to organize a regional grouping pursuant to NSC Action No. 1086–b or 1104–b, and is neither a substitute for nor the nucleus of such a grouping.

c. Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, would recommend to the President means for promptly answering questions raised by developments at the Geneva Conference.

d. Directed the NSC Planning Board to study urgently the implications of the latest proposal on Indochina which the French are contemplating presenting to the Geneva Conference.

e. Agreed that the Operations Coordinating Board should proceed with its proposed further study of an international volunteer air group for combat operations in Southeast Asia for consideration by the Council, including an estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency of probable Chinese Communist reaction.

. . . . . . .

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate action. The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense. The action in e above subsequently transmitted to the Operations Coordinating Board.…

2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence said that there was very little new information on the situation at Dien Bien Phu. However, four more French positions had been lost since his last report to the Council. As a result of the heavy rains the river which ran through the French positions was flooding, with the result that water was seeping into all the low points. In due course the river may reach a point which will completely separate the French positions on either side of its banks.

Admiral Radford interrupted to state that the French had actually lost yet another position, making five. He estimated that there were about 4000 effective troops left. Since April 25,450 additional men had been dropped in, and the French were still trying to drop in additional volunteers.

The President commented in admiration on the great gallantry of General de Castries’ men. This would be something like the siege of Carthage in historical retrospect, and he was at a loss to understand why the French had not taken advantage of the magnificent performance that these men were giving.

Admiral Radford pointed out that the relief column actually appears to be en route to the relief of the fortress, but it was being so badly handled that the French were likely to lose the relief force as well as the Dien Bien Phu garrison. It was a matter of too little and too late. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that he had heard a report this morning that the attempt to relieve Dien Bien Phu had been abandoned.

Mr. Dulles then warned the Council that it was vitally important to watch the military situation in the delta area. General Navarre was refusing to reinforce General Cogny there, and the situation is very dangerous.

. . . . . . .

1. Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on May 8.
2. For NSC Action No. 1086, see memorandum of discussion at the 192d Meeting of the National Security Council, Apr. 6, p. 1250; for NSC Action No. 1104, see memorandum of discussion at the 194th Meeting, Apr. 29, p. 1431.
3. Secretary Dulles left Geneva on May 3 for Washington. The President’s appointment book indicates that Dulles had breakfast with the President on May 5, presumably briefing him on the Geneva Conference and the Indochina situation at that time. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower records, “Daily Appointments”)
4. No record of a Dulles–Churchill discussion on Indochina during the Secretary’s visit to London, Apr. 11–14, has been found. The memorandum of the Dulles–Churchill dinner meeting of Apr. 12 contains no indication that the subject was discussed. For text of the memorandum, see volume VI. For records of the Secretary’s discussions with Foreign Secretary Eden at London, see pp. 1307–1323 passim.
5. Apr. 18.
6. For records of the Dulles–Eden conversations at Geneva, see vol. xvi, pp. 553 ff.; for records of their discussions with regard to the formation of a collective security organization for Southeast Asia, see volume xii.
7. For documentation on General Ely’s conversations with Admiral Radford and other U.S. officials at Washington, Mar. 20–25, see pp. 1137–1158 passim.
8. See telegram 3710 from Paris, Apr. 5, p. 1236.
9. See telegram Dulte 7 from Paris, Apr. 23, p. 1374.
10. Regarding the action of the French National Assembly, see telegram 4258 from Paris, May 7, p. 1502.
11. Reference is presumably to remarks by Foreign Minister Casey at the May 2 meeting at Geneva between Dulles, Casey, and Foreign Minister T. C. Webb of New Zealand. For text of the memorandum of that conversation, see vol. xvi, p. 654.
12. Robert G. Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia.
13. Eden’s latest memorandum was transmitted to Dulles in telegram Dulte 51, May 5, vol. xvi, p. 698.
14. For a record of the briefing of 25 Congressional leaders by Secretary Dulles on May 5, see p. 1471.
15. No record of the luncheon meeting has been found in Department of State files.
16. The U.S. Delegation at Geneva received this additional information on the French position from the French Delegation on May 5. It was transmitted to Washington in telegram Secto 106 of the same date. For text of Secto 106, see vol. xvi, p. 694.
17. The views of the U.S. Delegation on the French position were contained in telegram Secto 110 from Geneva, May 5; for text, see vol. xvi, p. 696.
18. Reference is to the speech delivered by Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Soviet Delegation, on Apr. 29 at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference. Telegram Secto 41, Apr. 29, summarized the proceedings of the session; for text, see vol. xvi, p. 157.
19. Points a-e below constituted NSC Action No. 1106, May 6, 1954. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”)