Office of the Historian

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Indochina”

Record of the Secretary of State’s Briefing for Members of Congress, Held at the Department of State, May 5, 1954, 5:30 p.m.1

top secret
personal and private
Washington, May 5, 1954, 5:30 p.m.
  • The Secretary
  • G—Mr. Murphy
  • H—Mr. Morton
  • EUR—Mr. Merchant
  • C—Mr. MacArthur
  • Senators
    • Knowland—R. California
    • Ferguson—R. Michigan
    • Millikin—R. Colorado
    • Saltonstall—R. Mass.2
    • Johnson—D. Texas
    • Clements—D. Kentucky
    • Wiley—R. Wis.3
    • Smith—R. New Jersey
    • George—D. Georgia
    • Bridges—R. N.H.
    • Russell—D. Georgia
    • Green—D. Rhode Island4
    • Mr. Francis Wilcox, Chief of Staff of Foreign Relations Committee
  • Representatives
    • Speaker Martin—R. Mass.
    • Halleck—R. Ind.
    • Rayburn—D. Texas5
    • McCormack—D. Mass.
    • Chiperfield—R. Ill.6
    • Vorys—R. Ohio
    • Judd—R. Minn.
    • Gordon—D. Ill.7
    • Lanham—D. Georgia8
    • Vinson—D. Georgia9
    • Short—R. Missouri10
    • Arends—R. Ill.
    • Mr. Boyd Crawford, Staff Admin. and Com. Clerk of Foreign Affairs Committee

The meeting lasted an hour and a half with a good part of the time taken up by the Secretary’s exposition of events at the Geneva Conference and before and after it. However, there were numerous questions [Page 1472] from the Congressmen present and the Secretary was frequently interrupted in his presentation.

The Secretary opened the meeting by saying that he thought the matters to be discussed fell under two headings, namely Korea and Indochina. The Korean phase of the Conference was quickly organized at Geneva and we were successful in preventing it from being established as a five-power conference.11

[Here follows additional discussion of the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference.]

The Secretary went on with his exposition by turning to the Indochinese phase of the Geneva Conference. This was by far the tougher problem, as we could “insulate” the loss of Korea but it would be hard to do so for Indochina. When we had initially begun our massive aid program for Indochina we had set up three prerequisites as far as the French were concerned. There had to be a firm understanding that the Associated States would become independent; there had to be agreement for rapid and effective development of the indigenous forces of the area; and there had to be a good military plan for victory. All three of these prerequisites, which would lead to our desired objectives, had seemed to be met at the time, and we had therefore agreed to this massive aid program. The Navarre plan had envisaged few offensive accomplishments during the first year of operation, but by the end of the second year it was hoped that the war would be brought to a stage of guerrilla warfare handled by the native troops. This plan had developed satisfactorily and was still sound, but the French will for offensive action and even their ability to govern themselves have disintegrated.

By the time of the Berlin Conference the Laniel Government felt it must seek some means to achieve peace or it would fall; if this should happen, a peace-at-any-price government would probably succeed it. We therefore had agreed at Berlin to go along on a Geneva Conference, but the Secretary had warned Bidault of the strong possibility of Communist military attacks for political purposes. This prediction has come true with the action at Dien Bien Phu and the increased pressure in the rest of the area, with serious consequences for the French position. In order to bolster the French will and to help to insulate Indochina should it be lost the Secretary had conceived his “united action” approach. This was presented in his March 29 speech, the essence of which was first communicated to the British and the French and discussed with members of the Congress. After the speech we had held several talks with the various ambassadors from the interested countries of the area to sound out their thinking. As the French military [Page 1473] situation deteriorated we began to think more actively about U.S. military intervention. In an April 3 meeting with members of the Congress, the conclusion was reached that U.S. military intervention required that the objectives outlined in our three pre-conditions set up earlier for our aid program should be met to an increased degree and that other states with interests in this area, particularly the UK and also Australia and New Zealand, should also agree to join in.12 On April 4 after a conference with the President,13 the latter sent a message to Churchill14 explaining our views and asking whether the Secretary should go to London to confer. It was on the same day that we received the first informal request for military intervention from the French.15 The Secretary then described Dillon’s meeting with Bidault and Laniel late that Sunday night.16 The Secretary said he thought this request was inspired by General Ely who had returned from his visit to the US and had given the French the impression that we would agree to intervene with air power. The Secretary then read part of his reply to this French request.

Senator Johnson asked whether Ely had gotten his impression from the Pentagon or from the Secretary. The Secretary replied that he had definitely not gotten it from him and that he didn’t believe he could accurately say from whom he had gotten it.

The Secretary continued that Churchill had replied to the President’s letter by saying that he would like the Secretary to come to London, and the French had also said they wanted him to go. The British were at first opposed to any action in Southeast Asia along the lines of our plans, but after two days of discussion agreed with the Secretary on a communiqué.17 The Secretary read the pertinent parts of this communiqué. He said that he had then gone to Paris to see Laniel and Bidault, and he read from the communiqué agreed upon with the French.18 On his return the Secretary, in accordance with his agreement with Eden, called a meeting of the 10 nations for April 20 to discuss “united action”. At the last moment Ambassador Makins said Eden had instructed him not to attend, which was quite embarrassing to us. We had therefore changed the meeting to one of the 16 nations involved in Korea plus the Associated States, and the Secretary reported to them on his London and Paris conversations.19

Representative Vorys asked whether the 10 knew why and on what basis the meeting was called. The Secretary said they did, but that they [Page 1474] had had to go along in helping us to cover up. Representative Lanham asked whether Eden had given the Secretary anything in writing on their agreement to go ahead with 10-power talks, and the Secretary referred to the communiqué he had read. The Secretary said that Eden explained subsequently that he had forgotten about the Colombo Conference when he made the agreement and was afraid of the bad impression which a meeting of the 10 would have on the Asian Dominions. The Secretary’s personal view was that Nehru had urged the British to suspend action and that the British had given in to this pressure.

The Secretary continued that while he was attending the NATO meeting in Paris he received the second oblique request from the French for US intervention in the form of a cable that Bidault showed to him regarding the imminent fall of Dien Bien Phu.20 The Secretary replied to this request by reiterating our earlier stand that the political conditions in the area must first be met, other countries must join in and Congress must give its approval.21 The general mood of the French was that something must be done immediately but Bidault did recognize some value in the united action concept and agreed to try to bring the British along with us.

The Secretary and Admiral Radford talked to Eden in Paris but by then the British position had frozen against us. There were several reasons for the British views. The British, including Churchill, were almost pathological in their fear of the H-bomb and seemed almost in a panic over it. They therefore did not dare to get into any line of activity which might bring on H-bomb devastation. Secondly, there was increasing pressure from Nehru on the British, who felt that since they had given up their control of India there was little reason for them to fight to help the French keep Indochina. Thirdly, the British gave a much higher rating than we did to the risk that open Western intervention in Indochina would lead to Chinese intervention and global war. The Secretary said the British had always been reluctant to take chances in Asia although they would in Europe.

The Secretary said that Eden had gone back to London on April 24 where he had talked to Churchill and attended a Cabinet meeting which confirmed the reversal of the British position as expressed in the earlier Anglo-American communiqué. The Secretary said that he had taken Eden to task for this at Geneva and he read at length from a memorandum of a conversation he had had with him there.22

Senator Smith inquired when Eden had begun to hedge on his agreement with the Secretary, and the Secretary replied that it was somewhat [Page 1475] before the Cabinet meeting referred to. The Secretary agreed that this was weak of the British and unfortunate for us and Representative Judd referred to a speech Eden had made in the House of Commons in which he almost reached the point of lauding the Communists. The Secretary said that the British liked to use the strategy of the carrot and the stick; that they had a long tradition of holding the balance of power and in being the middle man in resolving disputes on the continent. Representative McCormack agreed and said he had long thought that the UK had aspirations of being a middle man in settling the East-West dispute. Representative Judd referred to a conversation he had had with a Britisher in which the latter had said that the British were trying to save the Soviet Union and not destroy it because otherwise Britain would be at the mercy of the United States. Mr. Judd said he agreed with this interpretation.

The Secretary said he would like to finish his discussion by explaining certain conclusions he had reached from the events of the past few weeks. In the first place we should not intervene in Indochina unless the preconditions he had enumerated earlier had been fulfilled. The French have not even made a firm or formal request for United States intervention or the internationalization of the war. In fact there was much opposition in France to do such action because it would mean the loss of French influence in Asia, the Colonialism issue would be again raised as it was in North Africa if the action should take the form of UN intervention, and some Frenchmen felt that internationalization was merely a scheme to keep France in the war. Laniel had almost apologized yesterday before the French Assembly for his earlier request for US intervention.23 In the Secretary’s view the French have not yet fulfilled the prerequisites we need from them. Further, if we do intervene, conditions must exist for a successful conclusion of the war. The French might be able to work out the preconditions of independence for the Associated States, effective training of the native troops and a sensible and offensive military plan; but we should not intervene until they do.

We also have a hostile or disinterested attitude on the part of other nations regarding participation, particularly on the part of the UK and Australia. After the Australian elections the Australians will quite probably come along with us and will pressure the British to the extent that they also may have to join in. However this aspect of intervention is largely academic until the other preconditions are met. The Secretary said that this in essence was the Administration’s position on intervention.

[Page 1476]

The second conclusion which the Secretary had reached was that we should proceed as fast as we can to build up a Southeast Asian community, which would probably not include Vietnam, although we would hope to include Laos and Cambodia. Parenthetically, the Secretary remarked that the most hopeful formula for peace in Vietnam was for an agreement with the Vietminh on the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the establishment of a coalition government, and the holding of elections in six months, all of which would probably result in the loss of Vietnam to the Communists. Partition was not a likely solution because either side agreeing to partition of the country would lose the support of the people of the area.

The Secretary said that we may get the help of the British and other governments to strengthen the defense of Southeast Asia. The British may want to bring in Burma, to which the US agrees if it is possible to do so, and also India. The Secretary felt that this plan for a Southeast Asian Community might offer a fair chance to insulate the rest of Southeast Asia against the possible loss of Vietnam.

The Secretary’s third conclusion was that in spite of the weakness of the British and French, we should not write them off. Although they were weak in Asia, they, and the UK in particular, had the possibility for strength in Europe. The Secretary said we have had to take a licking at Geneva because of British and French press briefings there which resulted in false and harmful interpretations of our position. In spite of our disappointment, however, he would agree with the President’s remark to him this morning24 that you would never win a battle if you got rid of all those who are timid, because 90 per cent of all troops were afraid under fire.

Senator Bridges asked what would be the effect on those countries who do faithfully stand by us if we continue to pat on the back those who will not stand by us. The Senator referred to India in particular and the testimony which Ambassador Allen and Mr. Stassen gave on the appropriations for aid to India. The Secretary replied that we must regard these problems from the viewpoint of the cold-blooded long range interest of the US. India would be much less satisfactory to us should it swing over to the Communists, and we therefore are trying to prevent that. However, our view of US security interests had led us to feel that military aid to Pakistan was desirable in spite of Indian objections and we had gone ahead with it. In sum, the Secretary was inclined to agree with the point of view Ambassador Allen had expressed in the appropriations hearings.

Senator Saltonstall asked whether we should not soon stop our aid to Vietnam since we apparently believed that it would be soon lost to the Communists. The Secretary said he would agree with this view-point [Page 1477] in general. Senator Knowland asked what steps we could take to recover the arms we have given the Vietnamese to prevent the Communists from capturing them and using them against Thailand, et cetera. The Secretary said this was one of the things he had taken up with Secretary Wilson this morning and that he was having lunch with Admiral Radford and Secretary Wilson tomorrow to discuss the problem. He personally saw no reason why we could not simply remove our arms from Vietnam if a peace settlement were agreed to.

Representative Vorys asked whether it was likely that the Vietnamese people might throw over Bao Dai, form a new government and ask for US assistance without the French. The Secretary said that the problem was that there was little effective leadership in Vietnam and although he would agree that Bao Dai was not an impressive leader there was no one else whom the French had developed who could take over.

Representative Judd asked whether there was any chance the French might pull out of Indochina and whether this would be good or bad for us. He said he did not think the military situation was too bleak because the rains would save us by stopping the fighting. The Secretary stated he was not so sure that the rains would stop the fighting and said in response to Representative McCormack’s question that it would be quite hard for the French to pull out without first making a peace settlement.

[Here follows discussion of Southeast Asia security arrangements.]

  1. The identity of the drafting officer has not been determined. For an additional summary of this meeting, see telegram Tedul 37 to Geneva, May 6, vol. xvi, p. 706. Regarding the matter of security arrangements for Southeast Asia, which was discussed by Secretary Dulles during this briefing, see volume xii.↩
  2. Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.↩
  3. Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.↩
  4. Theodore Francis Green of Rhode Island, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.↩
  5. Sam Rayburn of Texas, Democratic Floor Leader, House of Representatives.↩
  6. Robert B. Chiperfield of Illinois, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.↩
  7. Thomas S. Gordon of Illinois, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.↩
  8. Henderson Lanham of Georgia, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.↩
  9. Carl Vinson of Georgia, ranking minority member of the House Armed Services Committee.↩
  10. Dewey Short of Missouri, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.↩
  11. For documentation on the Korean phase of the Conference, see vol. xvi, pp. 1 ff.↩
  12. Regarding the meeting of Apr. 3, see memorandum for the file, p. 1224.↩
  13. Regarding the conference of Apr. 4, see editorial note, p. 1236.↩
  14. For text of the message, see telegram 5179 to London, Apr. 4, p. 1238.↩
  15. See telegram 3710 from Paris, Apr. 5, p. 1236.↩
  16. Apr. 4.↩
  17. See telegram Secto 2 from London, Apr. 13, p. 1321.↩
  18. See footnote 3, p. 1336.↩
  19. Regarding the meeting of Apr. 20, see memorandum of conversations by Merchant, Apr. 18, p. 1349.↩
  20. See telegram Dulte 7 from Paris, Apr. 23, p. 1374.↩
  21. See telegram Dulte 1 from Geneva, Apr. 24, p. 1398.↩
  22. For records of the discussions between Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Eden at Geneva, see vol. xvi, pp. 553 ff.↩
  23. Regarding the debate on Indochina in the National Assembly on May 4 and 6, see telegram 4258 from Paris, May 7, p. 1502.↩
  24. For the memorandum of the morning meeting, see p. 1466.↩