Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, White House Office, “Project ‘Clean Up’”

Memorandum of a Conference at the White House, Wednesday, May 5, 1954, 8 a.m.¹

top secret

Washington, May 5, 1954, 8 a.m.

1. The President spoke of the consistent policy of the U.S. since World War II in furthering collective arrangements for the security of freedom-loving nations. The proposal of a Southeast Asian regional grouping was accordingly not only nothing new, but fully consistent with U.S. policy.

2. Dulles said that before he made his March 29 speech, he had furnished advance copies of the portions dealing with the regional grouping to the British and French, and they had made no adverse comment. Later, when he made his trip to England and France, there had been agreement, as the communiqué[s] showed, to examine a regional grouping which would be applicable in an attempt to preserve the areas of Indochina, as well as the rest of Southeast Asia, from further communist aggression.

3. Later developments affected the position of England, as originally affirmed by Eden, Churchill, and the British Cabinet. After Dulles returned from his short trip to England and France, the British began to change their position. The British instructed Makins not to attend the first meeting of the nations to participate in the regional grouping. Dulles thinks the British were motivated by a sudden recollection that the Colombo Conference was beginning at this time, and by the views of Admiral Radford, which they interpreted as belligerent.

4. Dulles found the British, and particularly Churchill, scared to death by the specter of nuclear bombs in the hands of the Russians, and also beguiled by the soft talk of the Russians to the effect that East–West trade could be greatly developed. Churchill had referred to the desire of the UK not to be under obligation to the US for further assistance. There was also a desire to get Nehru to preserve neutrality toward the regional grouping, in advance of proceeding. Dulles thought Burma might come in, if India would remain neutral on this subject.

5. Dulles spoke of how galling it was to the US to be the center of the Red attack at Geneva, without any of our Western friends speaking up in general debate in our defense in order to set the historical record right. The Communists accused us of seizing Formosa, and of starting the Korean war. Eden refused to participate in the debate on our side. As a result, Dulles told Eden how disappointed we are in British repudiating the position they had taken in the communiqué. He asked Eden to remember that the US held back, when charged with imperalism and colonialism, in order to protect the UK and France. However, in return, neither the British nor the French were willing to cooperate and speak up on our behalf when we were unjustly attacked at Geneva. Such conduct on Britain’s part would make it very difficult vis-à-vis the Congress. He suggested to Eden that perhaps the US might be playing the wrong game, if the UK was unwilling to give us moral and positive backing. To cap this very frank talk, Eden had the gall to come to the airport to bid Dulles farewell, and be photographed with him, although he never said a word in defense of the US at the Conference.

6. Dulles believes the UK’s position is as follows:

a. Prepared to work out jointly with the US a grouping which would have the purpose of preserving Southeast Asia, except that the only part of Vietnam to be covered would be what might be salvaged at the Geneva Conference, and probably Laos and Cambodia (which the British figure the Communists do not mean to take over at this time).

b. Thinking of a division of Vietnam, roughly at the 16th parallel. Dulles doubts whether the Russians would be willing for such a division, and the Vietnamese are strongly opposed.

7. Dulles thought the proposal of the Beds would be along these lines:

a. Evacuate foreign troops.

b. Mixed commission to set up elections.

c. That the Government resulting from these elections would take over. In such an event, all of Vietnam would be lost, except perhaps some enclave.

8. The great difficulty the US faces at this time, so far as Britain is concerned, is that we cannot openly say that the British went back on the arrangement which Dulles had made with them, and that their security plan for Southeast Asia would include, as far as Indochina was concerned, only what was left of Indochina after the Geneva Conference. To publicize this fact would of course be fatal.

9. The President suggested that Dulles give a chronology of the US actions to Congress in his bipartisan briefing,² to show that throughout we had adhered to the principle of collective security—Korea, NATO, bringing Turkey and Greece into NATO, Pakistan–Turkey, Inter-American pact, Pacific pacts. He stated no unilateral intervention by the US, overtly, would be tolerable, because it would place a colonial stigma on the US, and because it would exhaust the US eventually. The President did not want Dulles to undercut or repudiate the UK publicly, but merely show the factual record.

10. In view of what Dulles said, the President was puzzled as to whether WC should be allowed to come or not. Maybe we have got so far apart that it would be necessary to have one final talk with him. As to the French position, matters have so deteriorated that there is no longer any government in France capable of effective dealing. Bidault has some discretion, because the Cabinet is too divided to give him instructions. The Deputies meet today, and the Government may be defeated at any time, because it has no solid majority. On the other hand, there is no one on the horizon who seems capable of taking Laniel’s place.

11. Dulles made plain the French had resisted all efforts by the US to internationalize the war, and still do so. The French refused to let the case go to the UN from Cambodia or Thailand, and also refused to give Vietnamese independence at this time, on the ground that a detailed economic treaty must first be worked out. He had repeatedly told the French that the success of the struggle in Indochina depended on certain basic things, such as the freedom and support of the native people. But the French only came to the US for help to France in a time of crisis; they never came to the US, as the British did, when forced to withdraw from Greece, to try to work out a peaceful solution for the free world of a difficult situation. Actually, Laniel was publicly denying that France had ever tried to internationalize the war.

12. There is no French policy at the present time. Bidault individually would like to internationalize the war, but he has no sufficient support. The French never formally asked the US for air strikes at Dienbienphu. There were one or two oral and informal requests. What the French fear is if the US is brought into the struggle, France will not have a free hand to “sell out and get out”.

13. Dulles states that conditions did not justify the US entry into Indochina as a belligerent at this time. The President firmly agreed. The President commented that our allies are willing to let us pull their chestnuts out of the fire, but will let us be called imperialists and colonialists.

14. We then went over the draft of the statement the President was to make at his press conference,³ prepared by Dulles. After breakfast, we adjourned to the President’s office, and made a considerable number of modifications in it.

15. The President wanted to get in the statement his convictions that the policy of the US in Southeast Asia was consistent with its actions elsewhere in the world, and with UN principles: to establish the peaceful security of areas by collective action with the indigenous peoples. He said again the US had never considered unilateral intervention solely to help France.

16. Dulles again spoke of how hard it was to sit by, while the British and to some extent the French were now telling other people falsehoods about our position. If the truth were known, Congress would be angry with the British and French.

17. In response to a question by me, Dulles said the US should now proceed to organize the regional grouping as rapidly as we can, and to include as many nations as possible. He commented on the fact that the UK wanted to go ahead jointly with the US in planning on political and military matters secretly. He thought this was not an adequate basis for proceeding. The President intervened to say possibly it should be as follows:

a. We should find out secretly the areas in which the British and Americans can agree.

b. We should then proceed to carry out talks with a wider grouping against that background. Dulles agreed with this procedure.

18. Great disappointment was expressed in Eden’s current behavior. The only explanation would seem to be that he was treading water, and playing a cagey game, so as not to upset his succeeding Churchill. Dulles said he certainly hoped Butler would be made the successor.

19. After the conference broke up in the President’s office, I mentioned that the Planning Board, with the approval of Smith and the President, had not taken any action with relation to the regional grouping, lest matters be further confused through some leak of its activities. Dulles agreed that the time was now appropriate for the Planning Board to begin giving consideration to all aspects of regional grouping, on a highly restricted basis, of course.⁴

20. Dulles also mentioned that the President wanted brought up at the Council Meeting tomorrow the question of a moratorium in the H bomb tests.⁵

1. The source text indicates that the President, the Secretary of State, MacArthur, and Cutler attended this meeting. This memorandum was prepared by Cutler. It bears a number of handwritten changes which have been incorporated into the text.
2. For the record of the briefing held on the afternoon of May 5, see p. 1471.
3. Regarding the press conference, see the editorial note, infra.
4. For documentation on planning for the Southeast Asian regional grouping, see volume xii.
5. For documentation on this subject, see volume ii.