Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/12–3054: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

top secret

Paris, December 30, 1954—8 p.m.

2762. Deptel 2324² and Embtel 2697.³ Inasmuch as Deptel 2324 asks for review basic factors Vietnam problem, the following comments which represent a projection of Embtel 2080 November 15⁴ and which bear essentially on French approach Vietnam problem, and which are submitted:

8. Problem succession Diem government.

(A) It is obviously outside competence this Embassy to comment on relative merits individual Vietnamese personalities except those residing in Paris whom we see; and whether one or any given combination of them more capable than Diem to achieve political stability in South Vietnam. It is evident, however, that any alternate to Diem will be subject to same basic limitations as regards the factor of time, the absorptive capacity South Vietnam, and the complexity of the problems inherent in the South Vietnamese political situation.

(B) From French standpoint solely, it is evident that U.S. agreement to replace Diem or relegate him minor role, may be expected lead to a marked increase in French cooperation in regard to Vietnamese affairs. On other hand U.S. refusal to accept an alternate to Diem at time forthcoming top-level Franco-American review will most certainly lead to a deterioration in the degree and extent of French cooperation in regard to Vietnamese affairs. Without in any way wishing to prejudge ultimate U.S. decision this regard, we do feel that it might be useful to outline certain considerations that presumably would be taken into account in arriving at final decision on this score.

(C) As consequence we think it appropriate to give consideration to the possible implications that might be drawn from our agreement to go along with Diem’s removal at this juncture or his relegation to role approximating that of figurehead, and the probable consequence flowing therefrom. We expressed view in Embtel 2080 that Franco-American differences over Diem appear to be more fundamental than simply a divergence over how best to increase the effectiveness of the Vietnamese Government. U.S. support of Diem has taken on symbolic significance transcending Diem the individual, his virtues, his shortcomings. In French minds at least and presumably to a considerable extent in Vietnamese minds, continued U.S. support of Diem signifies U.S. determination to see that South Vietnam does not fall under eventual Viet Minh control, and obversely U.S. determination to reject any approach Vietnam which includes possibility eventual North-South Vietnamese rapprochement.

(D) As consequence in the event that U.S. should agree in course forthcoming top-level Franco-American review to replace Diem or relegate him to figurehead role, it appears almost certain that such a decision would be regarded in French circles as a major French victory in sense bringing U.S. approach to Vietnam problem more nearly into line with French approach, unless made clear to all concerned that such move involved no modification fundamental U.S. policy towards Vietnam. As we have indicated previously we regard the French approach to Vietnam problem as a flexible and opportunistically be shaped according to developments, and particularly by degree of success obtained by Sainteny in north. [sic] Our estimate of the probable future course of French action with respect to Vietnam was contained Embtel 2080 and developments since dispatch that telegram have tended confirm its conclusions.

(E) Although we not in position to judge from here or to estimate probable impact, on basis our contacts with Vietnamese in Paris, it appears that any indication U.S. might be inclined to move closer French approach Vietnam would almost inevitably lead certain of them to conclude that U.S. like France adopting policy with sufficient elasticity so as not to exclude possibility eventual acceptance policy North-South accommodation.

If such a conclusion were to become current in Vietnamese circles, they presumably would act accordingly.

I. To refer to Bao Dai in this context, we have indicated that he appears to be supporting Diem at present for reason he under impression U.S. taking firm and unequivocal stand on Free Vietnam. As consequence we under no illusions here that if Bao Dai were to conclude U.S. taking more flexible line toward Vietnam than in past, he will not only not consider taking more active role South Vietnamese affairs but will tend revert role more nearly approaching that of attentiste.

II. French approach Vietnam problem.

(A) If Franco–American differences over Diem are indicative of a more fundamental divergence of views and if possibility exists that an interpretation such as that indicated above might be placed upon Franco-American agreement to replace or circumscribe drastically Diem’s present role, then it would appear that any such agreement should be preceded by top-level discussion with French regarding their longer term objective Vietnam.

(B) Since we have taken position U.S. may be increasingly faced with prospect France moving along a path in Vietnam which we might consider as conflicting with our ultimate objectives there (Embtel 2080), such a top-level discussion might well be appropriate occasion to ask French for their views on general elections Vietnam 1956. It will be recalled that in recent assembly discussion IC, Mendes was criticized for having accepted principle general elections Vietnam 1956. While those expressing opposition to Mendes this score did not seem think there much hope saving South Vietnam from eventual Vietminh control, it was evident however they had no alternative to offer nor did they suggest denunciation Geneva accords or rejection elections (Embtel 2630).⁵

(C) While we agree that Asian countries like India would take unfavorable view Vietminh taking over all Vietnam by internal violence (para one Deptel 2324), it also appears logical to conclude that this also reason why Asian countries like India may insist on strict adherence terms armistice and particularly on the holding of general elections 1956 as offering best means resolving peacefully Vietnamese problem and avoiding any possibility resumption hostilities. As indicated Embtel 2080, we have no evidence that France in final analysis likely to oppose holding of such elections.

III. Continued U.S. investment Vietnam.

We agree fully that U.S. investment South Vietnam justified if only to buy time within which shore up free world defenses Cambodia, Laos, and balance SEA (para two Deptel 2324). There is also the possibility, however remote that within this same time factor, France may become disillusioned with respect to ultimate possibilities being able to work out longer term modus vivendi with Vietminh. While many French officials are frank to admit at present that they feel much as we do re possibility being able to do business and get along in future with Vietminh unfortunately these size [same?] persons appear share private view that exploration this possibility offers perhaps only hope however slight of keeping Vietnam eventually outside Chinese Commie orbit and of avoiding resumption hostilities. On other hand we feel equally strongly that if implication should gain currency that U.S. adopting flexible stance on Free Vietnam (para two Deptel 2324) and that U.S. continuing its investment South Vietnam in order only buy time shore up defense elsewhere SEA, we inclined think placement of such an interpretation on our objectives and intentions could undermine all our efforts elsewhere in SEA.

Dillon

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.
2. For telegram 2585 to Saigon, Dec. 24, also sent to Paris as telegram 2324, see p. 2419
3. Dated Dec. 26, p. 2425
4. Ante, p. 2246
5. Telegram 2630 from Paris, Dec. 20, not printed, summarized the discussion on Indochina which occurred at the afternoon session of the National Assembly that day. Following the debate. Premier Mendès-France won a vote of confidence by 310 to 172. The 1955 civil budget for the Ministry for the Associated States was thereby approved. (751G.00/12–2054) The Premier’s defense of the government’s Indochina policy at the morning session was reported in telegram 2624, from Paris, also Dec. 20. (751G.00/12–2054)