Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/12–2754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

top secret

Washington, December 29, 1954—7 p.m.

2644. Saigon 2460 repeated Paris 744.²

1. In connection Secretary’s estimate Deptel 2585 to Saigon³ and your acceptance, subject certain qualifications our reservation regarding Bao Dai’s return based on following:

a. Regarding threat posed by opposition of sects wonder if fact U.S. will shortly begin direct budgetary support for defense purpose, including funds available for payment of sects’ armies will not constitute powerful lever in Diem’s and our hands? Assume sects not liable turn to Viet Minh for subsidies and that French direct payments to them will cease by end of year. From reports appears sects susceptible persuasion through financial considerations. If Diem confronts them with alternative of either supporting him and having their armies incorporated into National Army and eligible receive payments through U.S. aid, or on other hand that sects withhold cooperation and receive no financial support, appears to us Diem would be in stronger bargaining position.

b. From our point view above solution preferable reliance on return of revitalized, reformed Bao Dai which problematical at best. Our experience with him over period years disappointing particularly whenever hoped for sudden reformation. Although his recent handling of Hinh case was most helpful, dislike having rely on fortuitous continuation such cooperation. Asian reaction to Bao Dai’s return would be strongly negative.

2. Agree your estimate contained paragraph 6 that attitude French Government will probably result in lack of French approval your agreement with Ely regarding organization and training Vietnamese forces by January first. We must await and see what developments in Paris will bring and hope that delay will be purely temporary. However our extension direct military aid in form of budgetary support for Vietnamese National Army will proceed as planned on or about January first, regardless French failure agree to proposed memorandum of understanding.

3. Future French political situation indefinite whatever happens Paris Accords. We should anticipate here and Saigon contingency there may not be French Government for several weeks able make fundamental decisions regarding Indochina or elsewhere. In interim, and since there always chance Mendes Government will fall with resultant power hiatus, request you look into possibility our entering into some form of de facto arrangement with Vietnamese Government along lines your memo of understanding with Ely. We might through this device be able work out mutually satisfactory bilateral arrangement giving us majority of elements of Ely memo, with tacit French approval. Presume secret defense treaty between French and Vietnamese may be limiting factor but this unclear. Would like your views on this possibility.

4. Regarding proposal made in your paragraph seven to sound out Diem concerning return of Bao Dai, would prefer you combine question Bao Dai’s return with proposition outlined paragraph one-a above. Feel it important in raising question Bao Dai’s return it is made clear to Diem we thinking only of such return in connection with assisting Diem in solution real problem of control of sects. It may be possible for Diem, for urgent internal political reasons give special consideration to subsidizing sect armies even pending their absorption into single national force. Believe this would fit in well with concept temporary over strength force you outline in Saigon 2453.⁴

Dulles

1. Drafted by Hoey of PSA. Repeated to Paris for information as telegram 2359.
2. Dated Dec. 27, p. 2428.
3. Dated Dec. 24, p. 2419.
4. Dated Dec. 24, p. 2415.