Office of the Historian

751H.5 MSP/12–2854

Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) and the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young)

top secret
[Washington,] December 28, 1954.

I am rather disturbed by Admiral Radford’s message regarding the establishment of a MAAG in Cambodia (Navy Message 271919Z received Dec 27).1

In particular, I am apprehensive that a written engagement for ultimate withdrawal of French instructors will create a major problem for us with the French, which will affect their cooperation across the board in Indochina. I strongly disagree with Admiral Radford’s statement that our aim must continue to be to eliminate any French military influence in the country. It seems to me that we are treading on dangerous ground if we adopt this concept, and I believe this should be discussed with the Secretary before we move forward on it. In particular, there was no reservation from either Deputy Secretary Anderson [Page 2434] or Admiral Radford when Mendes-France indicated that the French planned to keep about 500 French officers in Cambodia to assist in training.

I repeat, this all-or-nothing approach with respect to elimination of French influence in Cambodia can have very far-reaching repercussions which can affect not only our ability to assist in maintaining the independence of Laos and Cambodia, but could very vitally affect our fundamental policy objectives in Europe. I continue to feel that this is a matter which the Secretary should discuss with Secretary Anderson.

Douglas MacArthur II

  1. The reference telegram read in part as follows:

    “I agree with Ambassador McClintock’s appraisal of situation in regard MAAG arrangements with Cambodia and recommend strongly that he be permitted initiate bilateral MAAG negotiations at once with additional requirement of separate written engagement for ultimate withdrawal of French instructors as he suggests.

    “Our aim must continue to be to entirely control training and organization of Cambodian army and to eliminate any French military influence in the country. This I believe we can do by proceeding as Ambassador suggests. We must realize that French have in a sense stolen a march on us by recently negotiating with Cambodians for a training mission. It seems to me that they have violated their agreement to keep us informed but be that as it may it is an accomplished fact and we were informed by Mendes-France at Paris meeting. We have an excellent chance to succeed in Cambodia but I am convinced that early action is necessary.” (751H.5 MSP/12–2754)

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