751G.00/12–2354: Telegram
The Minister in Laos (Yost) to the Department of State
[Received 6:49 a.m.]
198. Rptd info Saigon 285, Paris, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Reference Deptel 132, repeated Saigon 2280 [2283], Paris unnumbered, Phnom Penh unnumbered.1 Department’s support has proved most salutary. When I called on Prime Minister today on another matter, he had before him letter from Ourot of which he read me excerpts expressing Department’s approval my position on Pathet Lao participation in government. Katay thereupon took great pains to reassure me regarding his intentions, adding he had asked Foreign Minister to send communication along same lines to Washington and other Lao diplomatic missions.
Prime Minister said we could be certain his government’s policy is to rely exclusively (he emphasized this word) on close collaboration with great powers of free world. There is no intention whatsoever to admit Pathet Lao to participation in government. His reference to this possibility before National Assembly had been designed merely to win votes of certain waverers and thus bring to end prolonged political crisis.
[Page 2414]Negotiations with Pathet Lao are, of course, necessary to bring about “political settlement” envisaged by Geneva Accord and to reestablish authority of Royal Government in Sam Neua and Phong Saly. We will, however, be kept fully informed of course negotiations which have not yet commenced. At present Prince Souphannouvong has agreed to send delegation to Vientiane, probably December 26, composed of Phoumi, Vouhak (see Legation’s despatch 20, October 13, 1954),2 and Singkapo, and has promised to confer later with Katay personally. Prime Minister added he still does not believe Souphannouvong, whom he knows well and who is deeply insulted if not addressed as “Highness”, is a real Communist, but Katay for first time volunteered that fact Prince’s power depends entirely on Communist support makes him, nevertheless, dangerous.
I expressed appreciation for Prime Minister’s assurances and said we, of course, had confidence in basic policy his government. I pointed out, however, one additional feature of Pathet negotiations which concerned US, i.e., likelihood Pathets would demand integration their armed forces into Royal Army. It seemed to me incorporation Pathet units would be extremely dangerous and that these people should be demobilized and returned to prewar civilian status. Prime Minister agreed but said this issue is more difficult to evade than that of Pathet participation in government. If Pathets refuse to demobilize, they may have to be given some provisional status and isolated in some way so that they would not contaminate others. I urged that he press hard for complete demobilization, which he said he would.
Comment: Katay’s explanation of his statement before Assembly re Pathet participation in government is, of course, ex post facto but it would appear he is now sufficiently impressed with inexpediency this step so that he is not likely to accede to Pathet demand. As to point raised preceding paragraph, our financial support Lao armed forces provides us with excellent means to prevent incorporation therein of Pathet units.