Office of the Historian

751G. 00/12–2254

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)

top secret
[Washington,] December 22, 1954.

Subject:

  • Major Problems Involving Indochina for Secretary’s Consideration

The following major questions require decision as a result of General Collins’ recent recommendations and the Secretary’s discussions in Paris:

1.
The first concerns our fundamental approach to the three Associated States. The trend of General Collins’ recent telegrams is more and more discouraging. If this trend continues he will possibly recommend the replacement of Diem and the return of Bao Dai to Viet-Nam, or the gradual withdrawal of American efforts in Viet-Nam and a revaluation of our plans for assistance in Southeast Asia. Mendes-France has conditionally supported Diem on the understanding that Ely and Collins will recommend a time limit for expecting results from Diem or getting a successor. Involved in this general approach is the question of holding up U.S. commitments on specific aid programs. I recommend that as a matter of policy the Department of State advise against the rigid timetable concept, the notion that we can easily and quickly disengage from Viet-Nam, and the proposal to substitute Bao Dai for Diem. The attached draft telegram1 is an effort [Page 2412] to assemble the basic factors which the U.S. Government should take into account in its approach to the problem of evaluation and decision on political matters in free Viet-Nam.
2.

Related to the above general question is the matter of proceeding with the Ely–Collins agreement on the U.S. training of Vietnamese forces. This agreement looks adequate from the point of view of Washington agencies. The first question is whether the French Government will approve it. I suggest that we take this up with the Secretary to get his concurrence on sending a telegram to Ambassador Dillon asking him to raise this with the French Government in the event it has not indicated its position to us by that time.

Then there is the subsequent problem of approval by the Vietnamese Government. General Collins has raised the question of force levels and over-all security with Diem a few times but not in detail. Of course the press stories on the Vietnamese reduction and the application of the Manila Pact have been widely circulated and the Vietnamese are fully familiar with our concepts. However, they have carefully reserved their position. I foresee a difficult negotiation with them on this subject. Therefore, I suggest that we recommend to the Secretary that we call in the Vietnamese Ambassador on this matter after the French have agreed to the Ely–Collins memorandum.

3.
In Cambodia we may be working at cross purposes with the French to such an extent that a basic conflict of policy and operations may soon arise. The French want to keep a large military training mission in Cambodia. We want to establish one. Training of Cambodian forces can be done either under French or U.S. responsibility or by a combination of single responsibility and joint staffing. Since September we have not brought up this problem with the French for various reasons. The little country of Cambodia is squeezed in between France and the U.S. on this issue. I have in preparation a separate memorandum from you to the Secretary on this question of U.S. training in Cambodia.

  1. The draft telegram does not accompany the source text.↩