Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

651G.001/12–2054

Memorandum by the CIA Member of the Special OCB Working Group on Indochina (Bissell)¹

top secret

[Washington,] 20 December 1954.

Subject:

• Truce Violations and the Scheduled 1956 Elections

1. The importance of ferreting out, documenting with good evidence, and exploiting to the maximum Viet Minh breaches of the Geneva cease-fire agreement has long been clear but the matter of truce violations and their handling has been raised to a new level of significance by current considerations of alternative U.S. policy assumptions with regard to the elections scheduled to take place in 1956. As matters now stand and appear to be progressing, there seems to be a substantial likelihood of a Viet Minh election victory, and the consequent loss of all Vietnam to the Communists. Perhaps the only course by which the Western signers of the Geneva agreement could concert to circumvent or avoid the elections would be through the accumulation of extensive, well-documented and persuasive evidence of Viet Minh violations of the agreement. In this manner the whole question of legality might be placed in a new perspective. It seems apparent that a fresh and serious effort to present the evidence of Viet Minh violations must be made in order to create a more favorable climate of world public opinion and to build up a case for postponing or cancelling the 1956 elections.

2. This effort should not be considered as a counter-offensive or anti-Communist in a narrow sense, but rather as a major campaign directed toward the single objective of postponing or avoiding the elections. To achieve such a goal must involve much more serious and persuasive evidence of Viet Minh truce violations than such relatively minor matters as timing of troop withdrawals. The primary dangers to Free Vietnam come from the underground which the Viet Minh left behind and which in places functions as a shadow government; from regular troops out of uniform who act as guerrillas; from caches of arms; and from similar activities which violate the Geneva agreement. The Viet Minh may be expected sedulously to observe the letter of the Geneva agreement with respect to the withdrawal of troops and such procedural details. It is in the field of violations of the spirit of the agreements that the Western effort should be concentrated, particularly in regard to matters which would make elections a farce. To achieve success the U.S. will obviously need assistance from the French and British as well as any others who are in a position to help us, for example, the Australians, the Canadians, and of course the Vietnamese. The timing of the use of such data may be left for future decisions.

3. In Washington, we have achieved a satisfactory degree of interdepartmental coordination on the Indochina problem. But we need in this proposed effort to achieve a hard-driving interdepartmental program for action in the field backed up by the OCB Working Group on Indochina and involving the use of all kinds of media to press home the charges of truce violation with evidence to be developed in the field. In Washington our effort might be directed toward close guidance and support for the field effort particularly when the declassification of intelligence data may be required before evidence can be aired. In the field it is considered advisable that an over-all field coordinator should be appointed. That he should be acceptable to all departments and agencies concerned, active and forceful, is obvious. In addition, he should be familiar with the general types of activities conducted by the various U.S. agencies in the area and empowered to call upon their representatives for assistance and support.

4. The field coordinator’s duties would be:

a. To create a more favorable climate of world and UN public opinion for postponing or cancelling the 1956 elections by building up a persuasive, well-documented case of Viet Minh violations of the Geneva agreement. (Primary objective.)

b. To obtain the maximum assistance from the French, British, Australians, Canadians, Vietnamese, and others by direct liaison in the field.

c. To obtain aid as required from other U.S. representatives in his area of activity.

d. To help in coordinating the Washington interdepartmental program which would involve the use of all kinds of media and outlets to press home the charges developed by the field coordinator and his team.

5. It is recommended that the Special OCB Working Group on Indochina and its subcommittee on truce violations consider this proposal at their earliest convenience.

1. The memorandum was addressed to the Working Group.