Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

120.251G/12–1554: Telegram

The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Saigon, December 15, 1954—9 p.m.
[Received 10:12 a.m.]

2285. Sent niact Paris 717. Paris for the Secretary. From Collins.

• Part I.

  Ely reviewed with me fifteenth conversations he has held past two days with Deputy Defense Minister Minh, and Generals Soai and Phuong re possible appointment of Quat as Defense Minister.

  1. Ely stated Minh will not serve under Quat nor will Minh accept any other cabinet post than Defense. Ely believes Minh sincerely thinks he has army in hand and that Quat’s appointment would cause new army crisis. Moreover Minh believes he has influence over Diem in spheres other than military; that he has averted other difficulties which could have plagued government, such as serious trouble with sects; and that he has kept thing moving.

  2. Generals Soai and Phuong both voiced profound objections to Quat. Soai would prefer to leave government if Quat were appointed. Phuong was less clear cut in expression but gave Ely to believe he fears Quat’s Dai Viet party would put squeeze on Cao Dai if Quat were appointed.

  3. I asked Ely if all this were true where we should go from here. He answered he had posed same question to all three men, but had not received conclusive reply. Ely himself had no names to suggest within existing frame of reference. I asked whether sects were represented in cabinet in proportion to their real population strength. Ely said he was uncertain whether their numerical representation was equitable, but that sects were over-represented as far as capacities went. I asked Ely’s opinion as to whether we should drop Quat for time being, or continue urge on Diem. He said he felt sure Diem was not using sects as pretext to avoid naming Quat and that genuine difficulty exists owing Quat’s past hostility to sects. I told Ely I had learned Diem was prepared promote Minh to full ministerial rank and asked whether we should accept this solution. Ely said he thought we should go along with this decision but not accept proposition Quat may [be?] permanently set aside. I agreed.

  4. I asked Ely whether he was satisfied with government under new formula, or whether he thought we should try strengthen it further. He replied he was not satisfied although government would be somewhat improved if Minh were named Defense Minister. There is need strengthen Interior Ministry soonest, and Ely sees only two candidates: Tam, who has administrative machinery ready put in operation, and Bay Vien, who is energetic and able, despite his unsavory reputation. I commented to Ely that solution to major problems reached here must be acceptable to Vietnamese, French and Americans and if effective government cannot be constituted, I must consider whether or not to recommend US withdrawal from Vietnam. Ely said he had been reluctant to see Diem appointed in first place, as he is not competent to organize a government. I replied that is now past history; question is what can we do now. Ely answered that solution he would propose would go beyond my terms of reference, which are to support Diem as he himself has been ordered to support present government. Ely said we should see what develops in next two weeks and then consider at that time whether other solution should be sought. I asked what such other solution might be. Ely answered that there are no pat solutions to problems here and that we should have to consider a whole range of possible alternatives. I said that of course without instructions I could not officially explore this matter, but informally I wondered who Ely thought could form a government without meeting the same difficulties as Diem and also be able to counter the appeal of Ho Chi Minh. Ely replied that Diem has lost prestige and is now supported only by himself and me. The sects, although in government, do not really support Diem and were induced join government only under French pressure.

  5. I asked Ely whom the sects would support. He replied only Bao Dai himself. However, if the chief of state returned, he would have to do so under strict conditions set before he arrives, after which he must be given absolute political freedom to run government. Principal conditions Ely would impose are that Bao Dai bring his family, live in Saigon, and take political responsibility for government’s operations. He said that he would not have made any such recommendations three or four months ago but speaking now as a Frenchman, he must say the French have been wrong not to have played “Bao Dai card” sooner and to better effect. Ely said of course Bao Dai would be our last card to play. Ely commented that there are various possibilities within Bao Dai’s solution; for example, Diem could remain, possibly even as Prime Minister, if Bao Dai were at hand to impose on all who might otherwise be disposed make trouble, a truly representative and effective cabinet. I replied that direct aid scheduled to begin January 1 and decision to undertake training and give such aid must be made soonest. Solutions other than present Diem government would take time, and nothing we had said in informal exchange of views should be taken as signifying any alteration in US support of Diem.

  6. With respect to immediate situation, I asked Ely if we should try secure appointment of Bay Vien as Interior Minister. Ely agreed that we should make such an effort and offered to speak both Bay Vien and Diem in this regard. Bay Vien would probably accept, and while Diem might say that Sects would object, Ely believes objections would be insignificant.

• Part II.

  7. Diem told Fishel December 14 that Thai, Cao Daist Information Minister, informed Prime Minister Sects could not be reconciled to appointment of Quat. Diem believes threat Sects may rebel is genuine and since army not prepared meet threats, latter must be seriously considered. Diem believes army needs month or two of training before ready enforce Government’s will upon Sects, should that prove necessary. Diem said he felt American belief Sects did not constitute real threat was derived from French, since latter would like to see Sects rebel, defeat nation [garble] and cause government to fall. Diem said further that when Sects were no longer needed in government he would appoint Quat Defense Minister.

  8. Diem told Fishel he had offered Ministerial rank to Minh and assured him of full authority in Defense Ministry. Minh replied that since Generals Vy and Ty were learning new jobs, it would be better if his appointment as Defense Minister were postponed perhaps one month. Under pressure from Diem, Minh agreed accept post in two weeks. Morning 15th Diem said he had persuaded Minh accept post of Defense Minister at once and that he would take office 15th or 16th.

Kidder

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.