751J.5/12–1054: Telegram
The Minister in Laos (Yost) to the Department of State
174. Repeated information Saigon 250, Paris, Phnom Penh, Bangkok unnumbered. Current review proposed Lao military budget and forces basis makes appropriate reassessment position Laos from viewpoints Southeast Asian security and US interest.
[Page 2358]We wish avoid competition among SEA states for largest possible slice US aid and invidious comparisons as to which is most important, most defensible, or most likely to succumb to subversion. Each is important, each is likely to succumb to subversion if unaided, and each should be supported by US to full extent feasible under circumstances. On other hand, requirements of each should be examined realistically in relation to (a) its capacity to utilize aid, (b) immediacy and proximity of threat, and (c) strategic importance to defense of its free neighbors. Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to theory that, if one state falls to Communists, others must inevitably follow. If free world reacts in healthy fashion to Communist successes, as it has in Europe, loss or threatened loss of any single southeast Asian country should reinforce determination and efforts to buttress its immediate neighbors.
With the second consideration in mind, we invite particular attention to following factors regarding Laos:
- (1)
- Laos, like Vietnam and Burma, is directly adjacent to Communist area and hence most exposed to infiltration. Like Vietnam, it was subjected by Geneva accords to contractual disabilities which give Communists privileged position within country. Its security would be further jeopardized by any new unfavorable developments in neighboring Vietnam. Threat is therefore immediate and proximate.
- (2)
- Fall of Laos would have most serious effect on security of free neighbors, particularly Thailand and Cambodia, which would thereby acquire extensive common frontier with Communist bloc. vis-à-vis both armed invasion and infiltration, mountainous jungle area separating Laos from Viet Minh and Chinese presents far less penetrable frontier than would Mekong. Laos therefore of prime importance to strategic defense Southeast Asia as whole.
- (3)
- Because of small population, primitive economy and dearth trained civil servants and military officers, Laos does not require and could not absorb massive aid. Pending completion fuller examination now under way, we consider that for calendar 1955 40–50 million dollars should be earmarked for military support, in expectation Lao armed forces might during year be reduced moderately and gradually, and that for same period 12–15 million dollars should be earmarked for economic aid, in expectation expenditures for this purpose will increase during second half calendar year. Assuming French and other foreign aid to Laos will not be substantial, except in providing military and civilian advisors, US aid in approximately these magnitudes will be essential to maintain and gradually to reinforce security and stability.
- (4)
- Potential threat to Laos is four-fold: (a) Armed invasion, (b) renewed military action Pathet Lao with clandestine Viet and Chinese support, (c) legal and illegal political action Pathet Lao under Viet direction, (d) internal political and administrative difficulties arising from quarrels among non-Communist leaders and too hasty expulsion French advisers.
We consider these threats can be successfully met if, primarily, US and, secondarily, France and Laos immediate neighbors, particularly [Page 2359] Thailand and Cambodia, provide necessary support. As to point (a), no amount of aid could enable Laos to resist large-scale invasion and reliance must in this regard be placed on Manila Pact and Communist fear of provoking general war. At least for near future, we consider no invasion likely to occur. As to point (b), if Pathet should renew hostilities we believe presently constituted Lao armed forces, US financed and French trained, could at least contain within two northern provinces, and at best eliminate, Pathets, if latter not substantially reinforced by Viets. If Viets reinforce, violation of Geneva Accords would demand attention both Geneva signatories and Manila Pact members. As to point (c), economic, propaganda and security activities projected by Lao Government should, if necessary US and French aid forthcoming rapidly and Lao authorities can be stimulated to act with vigor, suffice to counter Pathet–Viet political action. Prompt staffing, elaboration and implementation FOA and USIS programs essential to bring aid to bear and to stimulate Laotians. Thailand and Cambodian collaboration would be most helpful in these fields. As to point (d), while latent dangers exist, we believe authority of Crown Prince and Conservative leaders, supported from time to time by discreet but firm exercise US and French influence, should be adequate to hold dangers within bounds.
On basis this analysis and without indulging in complacency, we believe there is reasonable prospect meeting four-fold threat if each constituent element our side, Laos, US, France, Laos neighbors, energetically does its part. Situation in this area, still fluid but freezing point is approaching and in whatever form it freezes it is likely to remain for some time. Laos is basically inhospitable to Communism and to Chinese-Annamite influence and spiritually attached to its Buddhist neighbors and western friends. It can, weak as it is, be made into buffer between those neighbors and Communism. The first prerequisite, however, as so often elsewhere, is prompt, firm and adequate US support.1
- Despatch 40 from Vientiane, Dec. 11, provided detailed recommendations for a U.S. program in Laos. (611.51J/12–1154) The Legation also submitted an assessment of the political situation in the country in despatch 42 of Dec. 14. (751J.02/12–1454)↩