Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

120.251G/12–654: Telegram

The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State¹

top secret
niact

Saigon, December 6, 1954—6 p.m.

2108. Repeated information Paris 665, Vientiane 101, Phnom Penh 157. Limit distribution. From Collins. At end of first month in Vietnam I submit herewith my current analysis of situation here:

1. Progress of negotiations with French in developing agreed programs outlined in Embtel 2004² has been satisfactory. Substantial accord has been reached in broad policies in all fields. Ely wishes further discussion 6 December on means of strengthening Diem government and organization of propaganda and public information. Same date we will discuss minute of understanding on training. We may have some difficulty in getting French to agree to clear-cut responsibility of Chief MAAG for advice to Vietnamese on organization and training of Vietnamese armed forces and to placing all French as well as American advisors and trainers under direction of O’Daniel. I consider these points essential.

2. Ely has assured me that he will see that Franco-American policy of actively supporting Diem government will not be sabotaged by subordinates, many of whom are still strongly anti-Diem. He has taken definite steps to influence local French press and radio accordingly talking

3. Diem still presents our chief problem. My initial impression of his weaknesses has worsened rather than improved. It has been impossible to date to get him away from petty details of administration of army which has warped his views and absorbed bulk of his time and effort to exclusion of matters of far greater import. He has wavered back and forth on appointment of Quat as Minister Defense but has now made firm promise to appoint him. Actual appointment still awaits negotiations to find Cabinet post for Hinh [Minh] who refuses to remain as Deputy Minister Defense under anyone. No real progress toward stabilizing situation in armed forces and putting army to work of pacification can be made until Defense Minister is appointed with authority to act for the President. Diem promises action this week. We shall see.

4. Meanwhile, Diem, acting under instructions from Bao Dai which we feel certain were stimulated by Diem and brother Luyen, will announce 6 December appointment of General Nguyen Van Ty as army Chief of Staff and General Vy as Inspector General. I protested fact we were not consulted on these moves which we feel sure Diem knew would be contrary to recommendations of O’Daniel. O’Daniel feels Vy is far abler man than Ty. Latter has had practically no experience or training for higher military command. Diem still suspicious of Vy, who like Hinh has dual French–Vietnamese citizenship, and army commission. We fear Diem’s action may harden opposition of army elements which had followed Hinh leadership. To cope with this we have urged Diem to announce his faith in army under new leadership and to promise no reprisals against Hinh adherents. He has promised to do so and we have seen draft proclamation scheduled for issue 6 December.

5. To facilitate projected MAAG training mission and make full use of such talents as Vy does possess we are trying to persuade Diem to broaden authority of Inspector General to include supervision of organization, training and operational side of army leaving to the Chief of Staff duties largely of administrative nature. Quat willing and anxious to do this but duties of Chief Staff and Inspector General are fixed by edict of Bao Dai who, as Chief of State and Commander in Chief, retains control of such military details, even though Diem supposedly has been given full civil and military powers to run the government. Diem may be persuaded to assign training responsibility to Vy but little else, and it will take bolder action from Diem to do even this than he has displayed so far. But we still have hopes.

6. The influence of Bao Dai is still effective in other fields and unless somehow reduced will continue to retard if not block progress. In to Dr. Fishel, who is a valuable addition to my mission, Diem and brother Luyen say they are ready to assert increasing independence of Bao Dai but fear that US and French, who seem to regard Bao Dai as only legal source of authority in Vietnam, will not back up Diem if things come to a showdown. It would be well for State Department to give prompt consideration to this problem if policy not yet formulated.

7. Time may be approaching rapidly when some thought should be given also to possible alternatives to Diem. Next two weeks may tell whether we can really depend on him to take action in fields outlined in Embtel 2004. Progress is definitely possible in all these fields but Diem must delegate to his Ministers authority to negotiate directly with us. He promises to do this and we will proceed to test this out at once. He has taken no action as yet to appoint a Minister of Interior or new Minister of Information. It is true that he is under conflicting pressures from Bao Dai, the sects, the Binh Xuyen, and members of his own family, to say nothing of the French and Americans. His greatest strength, irritating as it is at times, is his stubborn tenacity which permitted him finally to defeat as formidable a foe as General Hinh. And he does have basic integrity and a certain spiritual quality which could be built into a valuable asset in combatting the phony but insidious religion of communism. There is no one in sight to take Diem’s place at the moment, but time is running out, and it will take a lot of doing to make him into an effective leader.

8. Postscript. After above paragraphs were written following information has come to light. It is recounted in some detail to indicate conditions under which we and Diem government are operating here. Luyen arrived December 4 with decree appointing Ty Chief Staff and Vy Inspector General. Ty has agreed accept post but asked Diem not announce appointment until Bao Dai had decided what punishment if any should be meted out to a certain Lieutenant Colonel Houang who recently revolted against military superiors in favor of Diem Government. Luyen says he may have to go to Paris to see Bao Dai personally to get this affair settled. Situations such as this in which appeals, legitimate or otherwise, are made direct to Bao Dai in Paris are intolerable to effective government. It seems to me that two courses of action with respect to Bao Dai are possible: (1) He could return to Vietnam to take full charge of government or alternatively (2) he must be forced at once to relinquish his control over armed forces and made to delegate full authority to Diem to act without interference from Bao Dai, pending development of a constitutional monarchy. Since there appears to be general agreement that (1) for many reasons is undesirable, thought should be given promptly to means of implementing (2). I recognize that as long as Bao Dai remains Chief of State he will serve as focal point for all non-Communist elements discontented with operations of government and accordingly must be handled with skill. I urge Department give prompt consideration to instructing Embassy Paris to discuss this problem with Bao Dai, making clear our point of view that long distance wire-pulling is no longer admissible under circumstances and must be eliminated.

9. Conclusion.

(A) It is still within realm of possibility that Diem may develop effective government capable of resisting Viet Minh encroachments and of holding the south, given stout US and French support and guarantees against external aggression by Manila Pact. However, there remain many hazards still to overcome, and prospects at this moment are only fair at best.

(B) There are some hopeful elements in situation: We have established satisfactory working relations with French and feel that at local level we are moving in same direction. Worst of National Army-Government feud is probably over and way is cleared for Diem to act if he will. Diem and brother Luyen have both said they feel optimistic for first time in many weeks.

(C) If we are to consider with French alternative to Diem, which both Department and Embassy have firmly resisted so far, delays and difficulties, possibly major in character, are inevitable. More time might well be lost in seeking candidate acceptable to Vietnamese, French, Bao Dai and ourselves than we can afford and in the end the search might prove fruitless. Nevertheless, we shall be forced to this expedient if Diem has not demonstrated by about January 1 that he is capable of governing.

Kidder

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.
2. Dated Nov. 29, p. 2315.