751G.00/12–354: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
2346. Repeated information Saigon 337. During discussion with La Chambre last night, he outlined some of his thinking regarding Indochina problem which seems of considerable import.
He said that critical date for French was next January 15. Unless a stable and strong government was functioning in South Vietnam by that time, he said, French would have to take the decision to evacuate. A stable and strong government could either be a re-organized Diem government with competent individuals functioning as Ministers of Defense and Interior or it could be a new government. It could not be a mere continuation of the present situation.
La Chambre said that the French estimate the civilian population to be evacuated will run to three or four hundred thousand. This total includes French families and their dependents, and those Vietnamese who were (1) so compromised because of their pro-French attitude as to be unsafe in the event of a Viet Minh takeover, and (2) wished to be evacuated. Because of the long distance to be covered between Vietnam and France, it would take until the latter part of the summer to complete such an evacuation. Only after it had been completed would it be possible to evacuate the French Expeditionary Corps. If the operation were to begin in March, the decision would have to be taken around January 15 in order to mobilize the necessary shipping, and the whole operation could not be completed much before the end of the year.
I was not able to pursue the subject further and it was not entirely clear to me why La Chambre felt that the evacuation had to be completed by the end of 1955, rather than the early spring or summer of 1956, which would make it possible to put off the beginning of the [Page 2336] operation for a few months. We will attempt to follow this up in further talks with La Chambre. In any event, discussion indicates that French consider complete evacuation must precede any possible takeover by Viet Minh and that such an evacuation will take nearly a year to carry out after initial major decision is taken.1
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In telegram 2433 from Paris, Dec. 8, Ambassador Dillon reported that Clarac, La Chambre’s Cabinet Director, had linked the withdrawal of the FEC to the decision of the United States to provide one-third of the funds necessary for its maintenance. Clarac stated that with the withdrawal of the FEC by the end of 1955, it was expected that several hundred thousand civilians would desire evacuation. Clarac also indicated that there was no relationship between the probable French decision to accelerate the withdrawal of the FEC (which would necessitate the civilian evacuation), and the political situation in Vietnam including the fortunes of the Diem government. (751G.00/12–854)
Dillon reported a somewhat different view of French policy in telegram 2434 of the same date, based on discussions with officials of the Foreign Ministry. It was their position that unless the Diem government had given evidence of improvement by mid-January, it should be replaced. However, the new regime would be given a chance to succeed before France made a final decision to withdraw its forces and civilians who wished to leave. (751G.00/12–854)
In telegram 2448 from Paris, December 9, Dillon provided the following analysis:
“We believe French for most part sincerely convinced that unless either Diem Government profoundly modified and strengthened or alternative strong government established by sometime during January at latest, Vietminh erosion in South Vietnam will have proceeded to point where Vietminh can reasonably expect to become principal force present in south by time July 1956 elections. However, we wish refer this context our comments Embtel 2080 regarding fundamental issues involved Vietnamese situation which we feel transcend and tend aggravate more immediate, though critical, problem achieving political stability South Vietnam.
“We do not believe French decision accelerate withdrawal Expeditionary Corps Vietnam and to evacuate those French civilians and Vietnamese who wish leave as result thereof, will affect appreciably French activities Laos and Cambodia, or French desire to maintain its influence maximum levels those two countries, particularly economical and cultural fields, so long as it appears reasonably certain Cambodian and Lao borders are to be held by force if necessary against possible future intensification Vietminh penetration.” (751G.00/12–954)
For telegram 2080, Nov. 15, see p. 2246. For the full text of telegram 2448, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 809–810.
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