Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/12–154: Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi (Corcoran) to the Department of State¹

secret

Hanoi, December 1, 1954—3 p.m.

467. Sent Saigon 598. Department pouch Paris. Brief end November survey Hanoi political situation follows:

(1) General atmosphere Hanoi still one of Viet Minh military occupation. Large numbers troops on or off duty seen everywhere. Few autos in town apart from ICC and Viet Minh military vehicles. Viet Minh police efficiently direct traffic which includes many bicycles but fewer cyclopousses than before French departure. Many Communist trappings of take-over times such as triumphal arches, banners, flags and huge portraits have disappeared but there are still processions uniformed children, outdoor exhibits, propaganda photos, song fests and pep rallies for troops. Much excavation and paving in progress at intersection avenues Briere de Lisle, Puginier and Paul Doumer near Botanical Gardens. Western observers generally believe Viet Minh are constructing “Red Square” that site. Only one acceptable restaurant (Ritz, Chinese) and two bars remain open to public. Movies show almost exclusively Viet Minh and Russian films.

(2) Military and Administrative Committees still run local government although new Administrative Committee formed under Tran Duy Hung (1946 Viet Minh Mayor Hanoi) effected take-over eventually. DRV Central Government remains in Thai Nguyen. Ho, Giap and other leaders make few public appearances. Viet Minh [garble] functionaries have taken over most public buildings near Petit Lac. Some French observers here express opinion Viet Minh display less competence than anticipated in running city. Most French technicians still attached municipal services expected depart soon. About 70 Poles not attached ICC reported to be in town and some may be destined for municipal services. An ICC source reports that Russian, Chinese Communist and “pure” Viet Minh influences prevail in varying degrees from one branch of DRV government to another. No Western observer claims yet to have figured out exact power structure of Viet Minh regime.

(3) Viet Minh seem to be maintaining excessively strict security measures. Cannot tell whether this result lack of self-confidence or just force of habit. 11 p.m. to 5 a.m. curfew still in force and frequently applied before 11 at whim of military sentries and patrols. Army sentries guard Viet Minh government buildings, ICC quarters, Maison de France, Russian and Chinese Communist Embassies and sometimes US Consular residence. Police keep close watch US and UK Consulates. Infantry patrols and police bicycle patrols cover city at night. Travel outside city, even for ICC personnel, requires advance Viet Minh permission.

(4) ICC under Chairmanship Desai displays preoccupation preservation appearance unity of views among members and still seems more often than not to be “neutral” in favor of Viet Minh. Desai, under triple pressure from French, Viet Minh and Indian Government not in enviable spot. Nevertheless Indian position as he reveals it, if not clearly biased, at least predisposed in Viet Minh favor by Indian feeling of obligation to new Asian nations whether Communist or not. Polish delegate, Ogrodzinski, is 100 percent Communist agent. Canadian delegate, Lett, says only question about Ogrodzinski is whether his primary loyalty is to Moscow, Peking or Hanoi. Ogrodzinski has had some legal training and likes preface remarks with “according to generally accepted principles of international law”. Lett says he has challenged this statement several times and Ogrodzinski never able satisfactorily to define principle nor cite authority therefor. Lett finds own position extremely difficult and feels obliged act in good faith carry on ICC work and feels ICC has heavy responsibility since it is creating precedents in International Law by its operations. His outlook and principles are Western and completely different from those of Polish colleague and of Viet Minh. He has no illusions about either of latter and no intention changing own outlook or compromising with own principles. Therefore he does not know how long ICC can continue operate without reaching impasse.

(5) Positions foreign representatives differ widely. Russians and ChiComs have full diplomatic status and Indian Consulate completely under wing of ICC chairman. Sainteny at present enjoys almost completely regularized diplomatic status in relations with Viet Minh. He is very ambitious man with strong sense of mission in regard to ICC and apparently strong desire compensate for failure his previous mission here. His “team” is closely knit group of generally “left to center” persuasion with high degree personal loyalty to Sainteny. They frequently stress “reality” of Viet Minh power in North Vietnam and deprecate “mess” in Saigon. They have uniformly high regard for Mendes-France and apparently keep in close touch with his government. They appear to be thinking in terms of vague sort of Titoism based on traditional Vietnamese fear of Chinese domination and on need for French economic and technical assistance. They seem to take for granted spread of idea of “peaceful coexistence”. Negotiations are now in progress re maintenance French economic “presence” after Viet Minh take-over of Haiphong. British ConGen enjoys “provisional recognition” as consular officer and, subject to [garble] has freedom, to send and receive consular mail and to enter and leave Viet Minh territory. He is nevertheless subjected to minor harassments although to a lesser degree than American Consul. Viet Minh attitude towards American Consul so far indicates intention eventually to force us out by multiplication minor harassments. Apostolic Delegate avoiding identification with foreign community and stressing religious function. Only reported hostile Viet Minh act towards Delegate, according to Delegate’s secretary has been newspaper attack on anti-Communist speech Delegate made in 1951.

(6) Press and radio continue follow general Communist line with US primary target. Allege US intention violate Geneva Agreement and attacks aid programs as economic aggression while seizing every pretext stress apparent divergencies views between US and France or UK. Render obsequious praise to Russia but accord only secondary status to ChiComs. Trumpet praises for alleged Viet Minh accomplishments in economic, cultural, political and military spheres. Express approval activities ICC. In attacking French generally concentrate on military and avoid attacks Sainteny or, with rare exceptions to date, Mendes-France.

Brief economic survey will follow.²

Corcoran

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts. On Dec. 8, Assistant Secretary Robertson forwarded a copy to Under Secretary Hoover as an attachment to a memorandum summarizing its basic points. (751G.00/2–854)
2. The economic survey was transmitted in telegrams 470 and 471 from Hanoi, Dec. 2. The conclusion, set forth in telegram 471, was that there was evidence of economic hardship in Hanoi. However, the hardiness of the Vietnamese population and the authoritarian nature of the Viet Minh regime permitted the absorption of considerable hardship without the development of a serious economic crisis. (851G.00/12–254)