Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

120.251G/11–3054: Telegram

The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State

secret

Saigon, November 30, 1954—6 p.m.

2024. Repeated information Paris 651, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. From Collins. Embtel 2004.¹

1. General Ely and I, together with small staffs, held first of series of meetings designed to canvass 6 major programs referred to in reftel, plus additional point on educational and technical training matters added at Ely’s request. Today’s meetings, in which General O’Daniel participated, devoted to reaching broad agreement on stabilization, organization and training of Vietnamese Army, and to employment of army in pacification programs.

2. Following are major results of discussion:

(a) Ely agreed very reluctantly to size and composition of Vietnamese armed forces along general lines my recommendation contained part 2, Embtel 1830,² previously furnished him as annex to minute of understanding contained Embtel 1854.³ Ely stated Vietnamese armed forces of around 85,000 insufficient, particularly in light reduced US support FEC. However since he recognized that US was only source of financial support of Vietnamese armed forces he would have to agree, although military risk is great. We agreed element of military risk involved and that we would so inform our governments emphasizing importance of Manila pact. We agreed that our respective military staffs would discuss further details and work out manner of approach to Vietnamese, who have already registered unfavorable initial reaction to so large a reduction from present force level.

(b) Ely submitted his redraft of our minute of understanding on development and training of autonomous Vietnamese armed forces (Embtel 1854). Although he states he agrees that chief MAAG will have full responsibility for training under his overall strategic direction, he has difficulty with wording our paragraphs 3, 4, and 5. We are studying his redraft and at staff level will attempt arrive at agreed language. I emphasized I could not recommend any US participation in training unless chief MAAG had real authority to direct training subject to Ely’s broad responsibility as Commander in Chief. I believe agreement can be reached on this point.

(c) Ely agreed that full autonomy would be given Vietnamese forces by July 1, 1955.

(d) Ely agreed to prompt placement of 3 or 4 US officers as advisers in Vietnamese Army staff and would like see that number augmented even from the start. His staff has worked out plan for introducing US officers with minimum difficulty. It was agreed General O’Daniel will contact Minh, Deputy Defense Minister, immediately to discuss plan with him and get his concurrence.

(e) Ely agreed with our concept that 1 or 2 Vietnamese Army battalions of territorial forces should promptly be put into field in each province under pacification program. We agreed it would be desirable to persuade Diem that Minister Defense, preferably Quat if appointed soon, undertake direction of program.

(f) Ely agreed to sign today minute of understanding on return of excess MDAP equipment (text in Embtel 1793⁴ as changed by Deptel 2023).⁵

3. In course of discussion on size of Vietnamese forces, Ely stated US and France were assuming equal responsibility for security Vietnam, implying US responsibility is based on US decision not to support Vietnamese forces and FEC at levels that in themselves would provide adequate defense against external attack. I pointed out with great emphasis that I could not accept Ely statement that US responsibility is equal to that of France, and that US accepted responsibility only for giving aid and for assuming obligations under Manila pact.

Kidder

1. Supra.
2. Dated Nov. 15, p. 2250.
3. Dated Nov. 16, p. 2259.
4. See footnote 7, p. 2256.
5. See footnote 6, p. 2280.