Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

120.251G/11–2354: Telegram

The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State¹

secret

Saigon, November 23, 1954—5 p.m.
[Received 7:28 a.m.]

1935. Repeated information Paris 631. Department pass Defense. From Collins. In meeting 22 November with Ely, following were major subjects of our discussion:

1. Assumption by US of training responsibility: I referred to brief preliminary information I had received thus far re Washington talks as contained in Deptel 2046,² suggested that without awaiting further instructions we move ahead, and proposed that Ely submit his specific changes in minute of understanding on development and training of autonomous Vietnam armed forces (Embtel 1854).³ Ely said he would prepare his changes at once.

2. Machinery for coordinating aid:

(a) After referring to Ely’s memo to me of November 17 contained in Embtel 1919,⁴ I restated US position saying we intend to coordinate our efforts, but that US must have full responsibility and control over its own aid programs, and cannot agree to committees for regulation of aid. I explained that in our view there should be informal discussions with French and Vietnamese as program progresses rather than formal machinery and that each of us should designate appropriate officials in various fields to engage in such discussions. I would designate Barrows, for example, in economic aid field.

(b) Ely said it was clear present US concept somewhat different from that during Smith La Chambre talks, but that in any case French did not question right of each country to give aid as it sees fit, and did not intend that committee should have power to control aid.

(c) Since it seemed to me we were in basic agreement, I suggested our representatives discuss each aid project on its merits, and call on Ambassadorial level to discuss projects on which major differences arise, final decision remaining with country giving aid. Ely agreed to designate Bordaz as contact for Barrows to canvass entire aid problem, and similarly to designate officer as contact for General O’Daniel or his representative in matters of military aid.

3. Resettlement of discharged Vietnamese soldiers: Reference Ely memo to me on size and composition Vietnamese forces contained in Embtel 1920,⁵ I agreed progressive discharge about one half armed forces would present major resettlement problem, and suggested that as soon as instructions were received from Washington we form study group consisting of representatives French, Vietnamese, and US (MAAG and USOM) to determine what needs to be done. Ely agreed.

4. Recovery of excess MDAP equipment: In accordance with instructions in Deptel 2023, I handed Ely revised minute of understanding on return to US control of certain MDAP equipment.⁶ In brief discussion of problem of US recovery of excesses Ely mentioned inventory of equipment now in progress, and fact that FEC should retain 2 to 3 month reserve stocks on hand in case of resumption of hostilities. I suggested MAAG and EMIFT officers get together promptly to work out recovery procedures. Ely reacted favorably to oral translation of minute, but asked time to study written version.

5. US advisers in Vietnam Army staff: I told Ely that Minh on 19 November had said he was replacing 4 Vietnamese officers from Army staff, and asked if a few US officers could be promptly introduced as advisers to the new Vietnamese officers. Ely agreed that 3 or 4 MAAG officers (now earmarked by General O’Daniel) be placed in advisory capacities in Vietnamese Army staff but before agreeing to their immediate introduction he wanted to study further the full program for integration of US and French trainers and advisers.

6. Removal of US-financed equipment from Tonkin: I reiterated to Ely importance US people and Congress attach to preventing all US-financed equipment, whether publicly or privately owned, from falling into Communist hands. Ely replied this was one of his principal preoccupations and that he intended evacuate from north all MDAP matériel, except that in hands of troops, by January 31. His representatives are now studying minimum requirements of civilian public services which Geneva accords provide must be left in operating condition. Ely foresees some difficulty in removing two USOM financed steam shovels from Charbonnages Du Tonkin, but proposes move ahead on this issue anyhow. He said he would welcome advice from US representatives in Haiphong re any equipment we think should be removed. I repeated that to abandon to Communists any American aid equipment, civil or military, could have profound effect on future US aid.

7. Internal politics:

(a) I reminded Ely of our agreement reached during first conversation at Dalat that I would approach Diem re strengthening government, and outlined my conversation of 19 November with Diem (Embtel 1906).⁷ Ely replied that he considered Quat one of ablest men available and at an earlier period would have been glad see him as Prime Minister. Now, however, his profound incompatibility with Hinh [Minh] is impediment to Quat’s becoming Defense Minister. Later in conversation I repeated that for better or worse Diem had declared he would discuss with Quat possibility of latter’s taking Defense. Ely agreed that if Hinh [Minh] remained as deputy, he and Quat as a team might make a go of it and avoid serious clash with army. Otherwise it might be preferable to name Quat Vice Prime Minister and promote Minh to head Defense Ministry.

(b) Ely said that while Minh appeared to wish to adopt conciliatory measures toward army, Diem is giving evidence of wanting make clean sweep of all Hinh supporters. Minh and General Vy are now in Central Vietnam attempting to settle new and dangerous phase of quarrels which have raged for several weeks between rival army factions supporting respectively government and Hinh. Gestures of appeasement by Diem might bring peace, but Ely fears Diem on contrary may goad his opponents to violence. Ely has inkling that Vy may have sworn loyalty to Hinh and his policies and feels that if Prime Minister presses too hard, present Diem Hinh dispute will only be replaced by Diem Vy feud. Already Ely has noted indications that Minh, for supporting Vy, is becoming suspect to Diem I agreed readily to Ely’s suggestion I continue urge Diem follow conciliatory course in dealing with armed forces.

(c) Ely said he would continue support Diem as long as I did so, and remarked that Prime Minister’s two great qualities are honesty and firmness of purpose; however, latter tends turn into stubbornness and so becomes fault. None of his subordinates is delegated sufficient authority to work as Diem wishes do everything himself. However, his government could be rendered valid if he were content remain as head while handing over operations to two Vice Prime Ministers, one of whom might be Quat. This change plus appointment strong Defense and Interior Ministers would suffice as a beginning.

(d) I told Ely I had discussed Interior with Diem, but had got nowhere. Ely reviewed his argument in favor of Tam and said he believed that if Diem insisted on retaining this portfolio, all would be lost. I told Ely I had mentioned Tam’s name to Diem who had flatly rejected it, and that I had no intention of raising Tam’s name again. I asked Ely what other possibilities there were for Interior. He replied there were Binh Xuyen candidates, but none he could recommend. This phase of conversation ended with Ely’s remark that if I could not sell Tam to Diem, no one could. He agreed to furnish me with list of possible candidates for Interior in order of probable effectiveness.

(e) Ely said that on 21 November he had lectured General Vy on necessity for cooperating with government. Vy agreed, but said he thought Hinh would return in two weeks. Ely told Vy Hinh’s premature return would be contrary to national interest. He said to me it would be catastrophic if Hinh returned too soon. I told him of my request that Embassy Paris intervene with Bao Dai to end that Hinh remain absent several months (Embtel 1917),⁸ and asked Ely if he would take similar steps. He agreed to do so. Ely went on to say that Hinh had tried unsuccessfully to establish means of sending coded messages to National Army, and that it appeared Hinh had left order that army should take action against government unless he had returned or sent appropriate message in two weeks. Ely intends confront Vy with this report 23 November.

(f) I referred to National Army radio attacks against government and told Ely we had word certain French officers might have been involved, together with UP stringer, Jean Barre, in providing material for these broadcasts. Ely agreed take action against any French officers implicated.

(g) As an afterthought, Ely said Diem’s family was very bad influence on Prime Minister, especially brother Nhu and wife.

Kidder

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.
2. Dated Nov. 19, p. 2271.
3. Dated Nov. 16, p. 2259.
4. Telegram 1919 from Saigon, Nov. 21, containing the text of a note from General Ely to General Collins dated Nov. 17, concerning machinery for coordinating economic aid programs of France and the United States, is not printed. (751G.5 MSP/11–2154)
5. Telegram 1920 from Saigon, Nov. 21, containing the text of a memorandum transmitted by General Ely to General Collins on Nov. 20 regarding the reduction of the size of the Vietnamese army, is not printed. (751G.55/11–2154)
6. In telegram 2023 to Saigon, Nov. 18, General Collins was authorized to transmit to General Ely an amended version of the draft minute of understanding contained in telegram 1793 from Saigon, Nov. 10. (751G.5 MSP/11–1054) On Dec. 1, Collins and Ely signed the minute of understanding, the text of which had been delineated by telegrams 2023 and 1793. The minute provided for immediate U.S.-French consultation at Saigon to establish procedures for the return to U.S. control of excess MDAP equipment. Collins reported the conclusion of this agreement in telegram 2076 from Saigon, Dec. 3. (751G.5 MSP/12–354)
7. Dated Nov. 20, p. 2272.
8. In telegram 1917 from Saigon, Nov. 21, not printed, General Collins contended that it was important that General Hinh not return to Vietnam in the near future. Collins requested that Bao Dai be asked to find Hinh a suitable mission which would keep him abroad for several months. (751G.551/11–2154)