Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

120.251G/11–1654: Telegram

The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Saigon, November 16, 1954—11 p.m.
[Received November 17—1:55 p.m.]

1854. Department pass Defense. From Collins.

• Part One.

  1. I met with Ely this morning at his request. He desired to discuss US assumption military training responsibilities and general French–US policy here.

  2. First he discussed minute of understanding which I mentioned in part three, Embtel 1830.² Minute which I proposed follows:

  “Minute of understanding on development and training of autonomous Vietnam armed forces.

  • “1. With respect to fulfillment by the Government of the United States of a program of direct aid to the state of Vietnam, the parties to this understanding are in accord that the initial Vietnam force structure to be attained by 1 July 1955, and maintained by the United States for one year thereafter, will be as shown at enclosure A thereto (see part two, Embtel 1830). The United States agrees to support the Vietnam armed forces while the current strength of those forces is being reduced, through self discharge as far as possible of the least effective personnel, until the structure defined in enclosure A is achieved.
  • “2. It is agreed in connection with the foregoing that full autonomy will have been granted by France to the armed forces of the state of Vietnam by not later than 1 July 1955. (For the purpose of this minute ‘full autonomy’ is understood to mean actual command of all units of Vietnam armed forces by Vietnamese personnel.)
  • “3. The parties to this understanding further agree that full responsibility for assisting the Government of Vietnam in the organization and training of its armed forces will be assumed by the United States on 1 January 1955. Exercise of this responsibility will be entrusted to the Chief of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).
  • “4. Utilization of French personnel to assist in the training of the Vietnam armed forces is recognized as both necessary and desirable for some time. To this end it is agreed that French personnel thus employed will receive their direction from the Chief of the MAAG. Nothing in this arrangement will serve to alter the over-all authority of the Commander-in-Chief in matters relating to the strategic direction of the military efforts of the French and Vietnam armed forces and the Commander-in-Chief’s over-all responsibility for the military security of Vietnam against external aggression.
  • “5. Since attainment of the full training and advisory capability of the MAAG is dependent upon progressive introduction of US personnel, it is understood that initial reliance will be placed largely upon French training and advisory personnel. Once the full MAAG capability has been attained, it is agreed that French training and advisory personnel will be phased out on gradual basis. The time when this will be accomplished will be the subject of further negotiation based on experience as the program develops.
  • “6. It is understood that the arrangements and agreements set forth herein are subject to the consent of the Government of Vietnam”.

  3. Ely agreed to procedures enunciated in minute, except for one important point. He said that he cannot accept principle, as stated in paragraph 5 of minute, that all French personnel be removed from advisory positions even though this is done over a period of months. He maintains that no. French Government or Assembly would agree to having US personnel completely replace French in training Vietnamese armed forces. In my opinion this touches on a basic difference in opinion on future French role vis-à-vis the Vietnam armed forces.

  4. I used all arguments at my command to dissuade him from this position. I even modified the minute to indicate that date for withdrawal of French [garble] would be negotiated here at some future time. I pointed out need to convince Vietnamese that French really intend to give up influence in armed forces. All to no avail.

  5. Ely intends to notify Mendes-France of basic difference between [garble] US on this point.

  6. Recommend that this subject be discussed with French Premier and strongly urge US adhere to position taken in the minute of understanding in paragraph 2 above.

• Part Two.

  1. Ely then raised subject of general policy being pursued by US and France towards Indochina. US policy, he said, now revealing two tendencies:

  (a) First, is that Vietnam Army should have limited strength capable of performing mission only of internal security, whereas previously US seemed to want France to build up Vietnam Army to replace FEC. He agreed with concept of smaller Vietnam Army, not because he believed in its limited mission, but because he felt Vietnamese could not provide resources and trained personnel to raise force of two hundred thousand.

  (b) Second tendency of US policy was to expect FEC to defend Vietnam territory against external aggression during critical next two years in face of growing Viet Minh strength which would be three to four times greater, while at same time US was reducing aid necessary to maintenance of FEC. US solution seemed to be only to urge ratification of Manila Pact while not suggesting how military action of Manila Pact powers could be concerted and brought to bear.

  (c) He wondered whether US was turning to Churchill policy of accommodation with communism, or whether there was contradiction between US policy and US actions here.

  2. I outlined my view of concept underlying US policy in this area:

  (a) First I assured Ely US was not pursuing policy commonly known as appeasement. I expressed opinion that basic assumption in US was that Communists were not likely to renew overt aggression in Indochina, although of course such action was not impossible. Therefore large army forces in Vietnam, which in any case would not alone assure defense of Free Vietnam, were not essential, since major reliance for deterring attack and countering it would have to be placed on collective action under Manila Pact. Naturally, if basic assumption was questioned by Ely, as the Commander-in-Chief concerned with security of his forces and responsible for the security of Vietnam might be inclined to do, his conclusion might be different.

  (b) I said I appreciated his point of view and for that reason had recommended to my government that US provide some support for FEC for some time to come, and that Vietnam army include a combat corps capable of blocking action in conjunction with FEC against attack.

  (c) Concept as I saw it was to develop such minimum blocking forces as would convince enemy he would be opposed and could not attack cheaply and easily overrun territory before the signatories of the Manila Pact could take action against the aggressor.

  3. Ely stated that French supported the Manila Pact, but pointed out that unlike NATO area no US troops are stationed in Indochina. Communists could not be sure US reaction would be automatic here as it would undoubtedly be if Western Europe were attacked. I conceded that two situations are not identical, but element of risk cannot be eliminated, and that concept of US policy outlined above was as I understood it.

  4. Ely as the responsible Commander-in-Chief indicated that he felt the risks inherent in the US concept were too great. However, he said Mendes-France, in light of his world-wide perspective, may agree to reductions in FEC and to small Vietnam force structure under US concept as I outline it.

  5. The above may be useful to State and Defense as background in forthcoming discussion with Mendes-France on subjects outlined in Part 6 Embtel 1830, 15 November.

• Part Three.

  Subject: MAAG Personnel Ceiling.

  General Ely agreed that he would permit US to introduce added military personnel for MAAG, above 342 figure now considered by some as top US limit under overly strict interpretation of Geneva accord. Yesterday he indicated that as Commander-in-Chief he would assume responsibility to permit US personnel to fill vacated French spaces if this were done quietly and over a period of months. This would permit US to have as many trainers as we need to do the job here. Ely requested that we go slow on this however and of course consult him as need for added personnel arises.

  I submit this solely for Department’s information. Ely stated he would prefer Has to refer this question to Washington and I strongly recommend that it not be discussed with Mendes-France. If subject arises suggest that Department state that it is a matter which can be worked out here between Ely and me.

Kidder

1. This telegram was transmitted in three parts.
2. Dated Nov. 15, p. 2250.