Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/11–1554: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Paris, November 15, 1954—7 p.m.

2080. Repeated information Saigon 298 London Moscow unnumbered. Limited distribution. Probable course French action with respect Vietnam (re EmbDesp 282).²

I. General. It is becoming increasingly evident that a fundamental divergence between French and U.S. approach to Vietnamese problem exists and may be accentuated in coming months. Franco-American differences over Diem government are more fundamental than simply a divergence over how best to increase effectiveness of Vietnamese government. Complexity and pace with which internal Vietnamese political situation has evolved since Geneva has tended to obscure this fact. We feel it essential, therefore, that what appears to be probable future course of French action with respect to Vietnam be recognized now for what it is—and not as what we might hope it would be—in order that it may be taken into account in determination of future phases of U.S. policy with respect to Vietnam and not, through misunderstanding, become basis for future charges of bad faith and recrimination. Pattern of forces taking shape in France in this regard appears to be similar in its broad outline to pre-Geneva pattern and dilemma confronting U.S. at that time may be posed again.

Furthermore, we think French approach to Vietnam problem will increasingly tend to reflect broad lines of French approach to overall problem of East-West relations and degree of success encountered on either plane may be expected to have its impact on, and give impetus to, its approach on other.

II. Probable course French action Vietnam. We believe that Mendes, his entourage, his government are, for most part, favorably disposed to explore and consider a policy looking toward an eventual peaceful North-South rapprochement in Vietnam. However, this probable course of French action has a broader base and deeper roots than Mendes and his entourage. At risk of oversimplification, we think French tend to feel there are only two possible realistic solutions to Vietnamese problem: An eventual peaceful North-South rapprochement on terms likely to be favorable to Vietminh—since Vietminh as military victor unlikely accept anything less—as opposed to an ultimate military show-down with Vietminh and Communist bloc in an effort to prevent reunification taking place on terms favorable Vietminh in line policy to retain South Vietnam as free world bastion. In light of what we have learned in France in recent past, it would appear unrealistic to expect France to adopt latter course. While much is said regarding necessity of developing sufficient strength in South Vietnam in order to attract a majority of Vietnamese voters in the July 1956 nationwide elections, there appears to be a lack of conviction, particularly on part of those in France most familiar with Vietnamese scene, that this represents anything more than a pious hope. We think that it must be recognized that the present French Government, and we think generally, anticipate and expect nationwide elections to take place in Vietnam in 1956 and that they would consider a policy designed to reject them a violation of spirit of Geneva agreement which they are not prepared to accept. We think as well that French prepared to go along with results of such general elections however academic that exercise may eventually prove to be. French would expect to be supported by India and probably U.K. in this respect.³

Such approach is consistent with Mendes’ position as outlined to the Assembly last July to effect that France intends to aid South Vietnam to extent possible to prepare for the elections although responsibility for outcome rests with Vietnamese themselves. As we said at time, we gained impression that Mendes’ attitude was essentially “let best man win”. Although broad lines of such a policy might well be expected to be clearly established within expectant life-span of Mendes’ government, we are inclined to think it likely that pressures that developed in France to force settlement of the I.C. war on the best terms available may be expected to reemerge and force any possible governmental coalition that might be formed in France to adopt an approach to the Vietnam problem looking toward eventual North-South collaboration. Although there may be occasional efforts made within France to deflect such a course of French action, we think these would prove to be temporary diversions only and would emanate essentially from those groups who would wish, as a price of maintaining South Vietnam free of eventual [omission] a continuation of a large measure of French control and influence in the south. Although this might prove preferable to eventual Vietminh control, we believe French themselves discount such an approach in longer term knowing that Vietnamese in south are probably not prepared for the most part to accept it and that many might turn to Vietminh as a consequence. Against such diversionary efforts that may be made to deflect French policy must be balanced wide-spread receptiveness in France to any indication of progress registered, however slight, by Sainteny in North Vietnam and frequent reiteration of magnitude and inexorable nature of the Vietminh drive toward an eventual absorption of the south.

We think Vietnam presents Mendes with a situation ideally designed to test bases of his fundamental political philosophy which appears to regard “peaceful coexistence” as a possibility to be explored, and we inclined think Mendes may prove to be principal architect and exponent of a policy looking toward the achievement of a peaceful reunification of Vietnam. It would appear that Soviet and Chinese Communist encouragement of such a French approach could easily be given since the eventual result in Vietnam would likely be at a minimum a Communist-oriented or neutralist Vietnam in the Nehru pattern. Such encouragement could also pay dividends for Soviets and Chinese Commies on broader plane in contributing to “normalization” of East-West relations.

Thus we think the present French situation permits our drawing the following tentative conclusions:

(1) That French will insist upon holding of nationwide elections in Vietnam in 1956 on theory of abiding in spirit of the Geneva settlement even though outcome of such elections may have become academic through process of erosion beforehand;

(2) That the French do not really believe that any given South Vietnamese governmental combination, with all the technical and economic resources that could be usefully exploited, can overcome present apparent political and military imbalance between the North and South in time to win any general election;

(3) That French fear that a threat of overt Vietminh military aggression will arise if any attempt is made to thwart the holding of nationwide elections in July 1956;

(4) That the French are no more willing now, and may be expected to be increasingly less so as time goes by, to risk a resumption of hostilities in I.C. and a general Asian war as an alternate to eventual North-South Vietnamese collaboration;

(5) That the French do not consider SEATO either as framework or instrument that could properly be used in support of policy designed to avoid elections and hold 17th parallel against eventual Vietminh attempt to reunify country by force;

(6) That the French do not believe that the U.S. is prepared to intervene militarily on the ground in Vietnam in an effort to establish South Vietnam as a free world strongpoint and make the 17th parallel another 38th, nor do the French think that the South Vietnamese militarily will be in a position to swing it alone or carry lion’s share of burden;

(7) That the French appear to conclude from the foregoing that it is possible, and in any event that it is worth the risk, to attempt to bring about a peaceful reunification of North and South Vietnam and try keep a Communist-oriented Vietminh-controlled reunified Vietnam outside Communist orbit, and at least neutral to free world.

As consequence, we think that the French may more and more speak of the desirability of the U.S. adopting a sympathetic view of Sainteny’s efforts to reduce dependence of Ho and his government on Commie China and bring Vietminh closer to free world. We may expect that this approach will be portrayed as offering the only real chance of avoiding an inevitable military show-down in Asia with which the U.S. approach to Vietnam is becoming increasingly identified in French minds.

III. Impact U.S. aid. Although it appears that an early cutoff or substantial reduction in U.S. aid for the French Expeditionary Corps would only further accelerate French trend toward a policy of collaboration with the Vietminh, we do not believe that continuation of U.S. aid for the Expeditionary Corps at substantial levels through at least 1955 would do more than slow down this trend. We do not think that it would reverse or appreciably modify this trend.

IV. Present lines U.S. approach Vietnam. Our recent exchange of views with French on Buu Hoi tended underline and make clear to French that U.S. not prepared to accept an approach in Vietnam that might eventually involve, or look toward, a policy of possible collaboration with Vietminh. At a minimum we think it can safely be said that the present French position with respect to Vietnam encompasses such a possibility. As a consequence, we are inclined to think that U.S. is currently faced, and may be increasingly faced, with prospect of France moving along a path in Vietnam which we might consider as conflicting with our ultimate objectives there.

V. Conclusion. We think it unrealistic to expect France in longer term to follow a course of action in Vietnam which it feels might involve it in an eventual military show-down in the Far East. Psychologically, France might have accepted such a show-down during the final days of Dien Bien Phu. However, that time has passed and the trend that led to the conclusion of the I.C. war on terms by which the Vietminh could one day peacefully take over all of Vietnam, has only gained momentum with the passage of time. Hence it would appear that when reference is made hereafter to harmonization of Franco-American policy with respect to Vietnam it will become increasingly necessary to examine our respective objectives in Vietnam and how we intend to achieve them if we are to avoid serious misunderstandings arising in months to come. To speculate, it would also appear that if South Vietnam is to be retained as a free world bastion in Southeast Asia, the burden, i.e., military, may tend fall principally upon U.S. aided by such military force as can be developed in South Vietnam beforehand, and that the implementation of such a policy inevitably will encounter resistance from French and neutralist elements on overall plane as well as an anticipated step-up in the overall Communist coexistence campaign.

Dillon

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.
2. Not printed.

3. Telegram 2498 from London, Nov. 24, commenting on Paris telegram 2080, read as follows:

   “Embassy concurs view expressed reference telegram UK would, under present circumstances at any rate, be unprepared accept policy designed to reject nationwide elections in Vietnam in 1956 as violation of letter and spirit of Geneva Agreement. UK takes position it entered into agreement in good faith and in absence compelling reasons to contrary it has no recourse but to support agreement. To do otherwise would stultify Western position regarding elections in Germany and Korea. Even though UKG might be willing consider contrary course it would be faced with severe criticism from imposition and tremendous pressure from India. If, however, there were flagrant Communist violation of terms of agreement demonstrable to other signatories, especially India, UK would doubtless be willing review its position, and perhaps support move postpone elections indefinitely.” (751G.00/11–2454)