751G.5/11–1254
The Acting Secretary of Defense (Anderson) to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: This letter is in further response to your letter of 11 October 1954 on the subject of the development and training of indigenous forces in Indochina. The views of this Department on the training of Vietnamese forces were contained in a letter to you dated 20 October 1954.
With reference to the levels of indigenous forces that should be developed in Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reconsidered the recommendations contained in their memorandum of 22 September 1954, subject: “Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina” which was made available to you under letter of this Department dated 28 September 1954. This reconsideration was conducted in light of the views expressed in your letter of 11 October 1954.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the ultimate objectives of the military forces of the Associated States should be:
- Viet-Nam—To attain and maintain internal security and to deter Viet Minh aggression by a limited defense of the Geneva Armistice demarkation line.
- Cambodia—To maintain internal security and provide for a limited defense of the country.
- Laos—To maintain insofar as possible internal security. (It is recognized that Laos does not have the capability to defend against overt aggression.)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed the view that the VietNamese and Cambodian forces considered as the minimum required ultimately to carry out the above objectives are as contained in their memorandum of 22 September 1954, referred to above. The Department of Defense concurs in this view.
While it is true in a general sense that the military establishment of a single state within a collective security group need not be so large as would be required if that nation had to act alone to defend its security against external aggression, there would nevertheless appear to be merit with respect to Viet-Nam and Cambodia in the maintenance by these countries of forces in excess of those necessary for the strict requirements of internal security:
- a.
- The problem of internal security in Viet-Nam is particularly acute, and exceeds in magnitude that normally to be expected in a country of its size. Considerable numbers of Viet Minh guerrillas and sympathizers are known to be active within the territory of free Viet-Nam. These organized groups present a threat to the Government beyond that which could be met by internal security forces in the conventional sense. The Government of Viet-Nam has announced an intention of requesting the phased withdrawal of French forces by 1956. The withdrawal of French forces, whenever it may be, would require the entire burden to be assumed by indigenous forces.
- b.
- Indigenous forces in Viet-Nam and Cambodia organized, trained, and equipped to provide a limited capability to carry out the mission of resisting external aggression would contribute to the development of national confidence and stability. The absence of such a capability, and a military establishment suitable merely for maintaining internal security, would tend to create a sense of weakness and insecurity.
- c.
- With respect to the threat of external attack, indigenous forces, although not capable alone of stemming and repelling an aggression, could provide immediate resistance to an attack which might otherwise proceed with relative impunity, and could complement with ground forces whatever other military efforts might be exerted through collective action.
In the development of indigenous forces in Viet-Nam and Cambodia, the U.S. interest and practical necessity would require that the build-up be in phased increments dependent upon continued resistance to Communist encroachment by the Governments concerned consistent with:
- a.
- French willingness to accept U.S. training responsibility.
- b.
- Capability of the Associated States to develop effective and reliable forces.
- c.
- The ability of a limited U.S. MAAG to conduct training.
- d.
- The continued availability of MDAP funds without detriment to other programs.
Such a phased development of indigenous forces would tend to make the costs of training and maintenance less during the initial periods than after completion of the development program. This would similarly be reflected in U.S. budgetary requirements during the early phases.
The estimated cost of training and maintaining indigenous forces is that contained in the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to above. Under the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement, the introduction of foreign military personnel into Laos is limited to specified numbers of French personnel. In view of this limitation and the resulting prohibition of establishment of a U.S. MAAG to supervise such MDAP aid as may be granted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made no recommendations at this time as to force levels for Laos. However, Laos is capable of supporting armed forces of 12–15,000.
An examination of the estimated costs involved in creating and maintaining these forces will reveal that approximately $240 million for Viet-Nam and $54 million for Cambodia, is for pay and allowances of the indigenous personnel. This is computed at the prevailing national scales and may be reduced but only through negotiations with the respective governments to reduce pay and allowances. Slight savings in the first year maintenance costs may be possible also if sufficient quantities of spares and replacement equipment become available in Indochina. This can be determined only after completion of an inventory following the evacuation of the Tonkin Delta. Despite any major reduction that may be accomplished by these means, U.S. support to this area should not be allowed to impair the development of effective and reliable allied forces elsewhere.
Under the assumption that the United States Government considers it desirable to proceed with efforts to sustain the remaining territories of the Associated States against further Communist encroachment, the Department of Defense believes such efforts, once undertaken, should be effective. It therefore considers that the levels of indigenous forces recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are proportionate to the task to be accomplished.
If, however, indigenous forces are to be developed with the military objective merely of providing internal security, the force levels recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum of 22 September 1954 might be reduced. In this connection, and pursuant to NSC Action No. 1250, 22 October 1954,1 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been requested to submit their recommendations concerning levels of [Page 2244] indigenous forces that should be developed to attain a military objective confined to the maintenance of internal security.2
Sincerely yours,