751G.13/11–754: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State1
1756. Repeated information Paris 584. No distribution outside Department. On eve of General Collins arrival I must state my belief that deadlock between Diem and Vietnamese Army command under Hinh can be solved; that there is a good possibility that under Diem, with French and American unity and support, government can be formed which will enjoy authority and loyalty in free Vietnam and can state “free” elections in free Vietnam which will either confirm Diem government or will return equally non-Communist, non-collaborationist government to power.
There are two reservations and several conditions to such a prediction. First reservation is that in spite of unified Franco-American support and pressure on government to set up popular administration, Diem, despite his integrity and intense patriotism, may not be up to job. His lack of personality, his stubbornness, his narrowness, and dislike of bold action may be greater than all support and guidance we give him and a possible successor must be sought. If necessary I believe acceptable successor can be found given a little time.
The second reservation has to do with “free elections”. I put “free elections” in quotes. If, as one can be certain, there will be no free elections, as we understand the term, north of seventeenth parallel, that is, elections wherein non-Communist parties would be permitted to campaign several months prior to elections, with perfect freedom of movement, full facilities and with no overt or covert terrorization of electorate by Viet Minh authorities, then there is no reason why free Vietnam should allow Viet Minh or Communist candidates or electioneering in its elections.
One condition to building up solid regime in south, certainly for year to come, is unity of view and loyal cooperation between French and Americans. I believe that that is attainable to practical degree. It will not be attained if, because of our financial contribution, we try to run show 100 percent, in our American way. It will not be attained if MAAG and personnel of FOA and USIS are imbued with idea, as too many of them are now, that nothing can be accomplished here until presence and influence of French are reduced to zero. French expeditionary corps and French cultural and economic interests are present and if we try to ride roughshod over them we will find a very effective resistance. In our relations with French officials and French interests here we will have to use same cooperation which President enforced so effectively on his allied force during war. We can sympathize with [Page 2222] nationalists but we should not be dissuaded from cooperation with French for vocal anti-French sentiments which one hears from official and private Vietnamese. In contrast with these anti-French statements one will find any number of intelligent nationalists here who realize fact that French are necessary factor here for some time to come and that there must be modus vivendi between Americans, French, and Vietnamese Government. Cf. my telegram of conversation with Huyen (Embtel 1728, repeated Paris 575)2 for example:
I have said I believe we can obtain French support for Diem experiment in spite of their prevailing belief that Diem is political dodo and despite their resentment at rabid Francophobia of certain Diem officials and adherents. Diem who is stubbornly against changing his ideas has in past four months also begun to realize that there are good French elements here and that his troubles with French are frequently less than those with his own people.
Obviously one necessity for obtaining loyal French cooperation and support of our policy is some contribution during calendar year 1955 to cost of French expeditionary corps. Amount will have to be decided by high authority and it certainly will not be anything like contribution we made while war was still on.
If cooperative understanding with French is essential at this time to preserve free Vietnam, it is essential that Hinh be prevailed upon to absent himself from his command and from this scene for several weeks at least. It would be better if he left for good, for while he is most dynamic and clever officer we have so far observed in Vietnamese Army, to Vietnamese opinion he is Frenchman, which he is by naturalization, education, and commission in French Army. Not only does an important segment of Vietnamese opinion hold, somewhat unjustly, that he is Frenchman trying to maintain French influence here, but Hinh has also become symbol of military insubordination to civil authority. He can be gotten out of picture, I believe, and in relatively short time, although possibly not immediately. To accomplish that it will perhaps be necessary to prevail on Bao Dai to invite or order him to France on consultation. Bao Dai will take no such step without being royally paid by Vietnamese Treasury. It may be necessary to give royal expense account to Hinh himself to induce him to proceed on mission abroad. It would be worth price. It will also be necessary for French to depart from their attitude of neutrality in Hinh–Diem conflict and really to use their influence on former. French neutrality in this army-civil dispute is not true neutrality: In effect it favors military insubordination. I believe French can be brought to use their [Page 2223] influence but probably only if Hinh can be assured that he may return after time to some ostensibly higher post in Vietnamese defense forces.
Our own influence to obtain Hinh’s at least temporary departure will not be fully effective until we complete negotiations, in unity with French, for direct budgetary aid to Vietnamese defense forces and for American participation in training. Our negotiations to this end should be given maximum acceleration. Those negotiations will convince leading elements in Vietnamese Officer Corps that future of army is dependent on American aid and that Hinh’s insubordination to Diem risks loss of this aid. We should not indulge in crude threats but above idea can be impressed on Vietnamese Officer Corps.
With Hinh absent, if only temporarily, from scene both American and French influence must be exerted on Diem to insure that he take some convincing step toward agrarian reform. Diem is not radical and has no real desire to change ownership picture of rural holdings. Left to himself he would let evolution take its course with palliative measures on rents, lengthy formation of cooperatives, et cetera. That is doubtless slowest and soundest approach but against Viet Minh propaganda Diem must move more rapidly and radically. Demonstrable progress by Diem in carrying forward constructive program benefiting the people would be single most important thing he could do to capture loyalty of officers and men of National Army. Hinh’s support would wither quickly if Diem could give positive evidence of moving forward on constructive program. Army could be expected to drift away from supporting Hinh’s ill-concealed personal ambitions and to respond to a sustained demonstration of leadership on part of President.
Moreover, I agree with Daridan that Diem must put someone effective in Interior Ministry to organize solid, zealous police to extirpate continuing, even growing, Viet Minh infiltration. It does not have to be Tam, although he could certainly do job. There are other strong men that can be found. Diem does not want strong man in Interior largely because of his moral scruples against rough police work. He has too strong sense of legality and fairness to population against strong police control and altogether he shrinks from use of violence. It is possible, however, to use strong police methods against Viet Minh without terrorizing or brutalizing population, if Americans join with French in seeing that there are no police excesses. After all we control purse and there are many other things which must be done to insure success of anti-Communist regime in free Vietnam, which I think can done. Present Minister of Information is young and lacking in judgment in devising anti-Communist, pro-Diem propaganda. But at least he has certain dynamism and he will listen to American and other advice.
[Page 2224]Our USIS must be strengthened budgetwise and personnelwise. Stansbury3 is good USIS chief. From what I have seen of Barrows,4 now head of FOA Mission, and from his record he is an excellent man to handle complicated task before him. O’Daniel has drive and sincerity which should be effective in training mission, but he will need to be constantly cautioned because of his ill-concealed and not unfounded contempt for French military methods and his desire to run show without due attention to French and Vietnamese susceptibilities.…
Altogether I feel we have good fighting chance to preserve freedom and support that he has will make good start toward achieving that end.