751G.00/11–554: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
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1673. Re Paris 253 to Saigon rptd info 1875 Dept and Deptel 1594 to Paris rptd 1798 to Saigon.2 With difficulty Department has been trying … follow Bao Dai’s whereabouts during past ten days. We have been concerned at inability critical time lay before him US policy. Accordingly now that contact renewed Department desires Embassy get in touch with Bao Dai directly to insure he knows what [Page 2214] US policy is in Vietnam. Bao Dai should be given following oral statement:
- (1)
- US and France are agreed free world objectives in Vietnam can be advanced by supporting and assisting a government of national union around Prime Minister Diem. US believes effective Vietnamese action is needed to end dangerous stalemate in Saigon, consolidate a government of national union around Diem and counter Vietminh subversion.
- (2)
- To be of assistance in supplementing such efforts, US is prepared to proceed with economic and military aid. The delivery of President Eisenhower’s letter of Oct 23 to Prime Minister Diem was designed to provide official notification to the Government of Vietnam of the US policy of direct aid and to inform Prime Minister Diem that we are prepared to discuss with him as Chief of Government such a program. Gen Collins interim mission is designed to coordinate US agencies in order maximize capability help resolve critical problems faced by Prime Minister Diem and his government.
- (3)
- US Govt is willing assist Government of Vietnam as practicable, and subject to Congressional authorization, in establishing and maintaining internal stability and security. If political impasse is satisfactorily resolved, the US will be in a position to aid Prime Minister Diem and Govt of Vietnam in this endeavor. The US is prepared to proceed with an urgent limited program to help improve effectiveness of Vietnamese armed forces. The US Military Assistance Advisory Group in Saigon has received instructions to this effect provided satisfactory understandings can be worked out with Vietnamese and French military authorities.
- (4)
- These actions on our part are designed to encourage and assist the Govt of Vietnam under Prime Minister Diem, and particularly the Vietnamese military organization, to concentrate on constructive actions requiring unified Vietnamese attention.
- (5)
- However, if a government of national union around Prime Minister Diem is not formed, or if formed does not receive full support of the national army, other groups and personalities throughout Free Vietnam, or if Prime Minister Diem is effectively prevented from even developing such a government and giving it an opportunity to attack urgent problems, then the US policy of direct aid will be faced with serious difficulties. In this respect conclusions of Senator Mansfield are relevant. At this time we see no satisfactory governmental solution other than a government of national union around Prime Minister Diem, insofar as envisaging effective US assistance or forthcoming Congressional support.
For Embassy Saigon: Inform Diem of above statement after Embassy Paris notifies Saigon and Washington Bao Dai has received it.
Department has just received Paris 1908 repeated Saigon 2593 mentioning forthcoming Gibson call on Bao Dai evening Nov. 4. Department [Page 2215] still desires Embassy immediately give Bao Dai above oral statement of US policy.