Office of the Historian

751G.11/11–354

Memorandum for the Record by General J. Lawton Collins1

top secret
[Washington,] 3 November 1954.

Subject:

  • Call of Vietnamese Ambassador, Mr. Tran Van Chuong, on General Collins, 3 November 54
1.
The Vietnamese Ambassador, Mr. Tran Van Chuong, made a courtesy call on me this afternoon in the Pentagon.
2.
He expressed his pleasure at the action of the President in sending me to Viet-Nam as a special representative of the United States. He said he was confident that the Viet-Namese would welcome my assignment.
3.
The Ambassador went on to state that since we had little time he would be quite frank and perhaps brusk in his remarks. He said that while he had faith in General Ely as an honest man of high integrity, he is convinced that the French had been and still were opposed to the Government of Premier Diem. He cited, for example, that while General Ely was in Washington in September 1954 and agreeing to support the Diem regime that his deputy M. Daridan had gone to Diem [Page 2208] and given the latter 48 hours in which to appoint Tam as Minister of the Interior knowing that Tam and his son, General Hinh would be divisive elements in the Government.
4.
He stated that the only reason General Hinh had defied the Premier was that Hinh knew he had the backing of the French. The Ambassador said that the Viet-Namese look upon both Tam and Hinh as traitors.
5.
When I asked why the Premier had not relieved Hinh as Chief of Staff and if necessary have taken vigorous action against him, he replied that the Premier felt too insecure in Saigon, particularly since he felt that the French would support Hinh.
6.
When I asked whether Bao-Dai had given Diem authority to appoint and relieve the Chief of Staff of the Army, he stated that Diem had this authority and that he was the first Premier to whom Bao-Dai had entrusted this authority. He went on to say that Bao-Dai would have supported Diem in taking action against Hinh but after the first reaction to Hinh’s insubordination Bao-Dai was afraid to step in as he feared Hinh’s power.
7.
When I asked whether Hinh had any genuine following in the Army the Ambassador replied that he did not know the extent of such following. He said that the Viet-Namese who have never had the means of protecting themselves were naturally inclined to follow anyone who seemed to be acting with the support of the French. At least the Viet-Namese would be afraid to support anyone who did not appear to be the potential winner. He personally felt that Hinh did not have the genuine loyalty or support of the Viet-Namese Army.
8.
He therefore suggested that I “not be cautious” in my approach to the problem of supporting Diem. He said that the subordinates under General Ely are not at all cautious in their opposition to Diem. He urged that the United States not be afraid to take more direct action in support of the Diem Government since the Viet-Namese knew that we had no intention of remaining in Indo-China whereas they were still highly skeptical of French intentions.
9.
He indicated that I should urge Diem to relieve Hinh as Chief of Staff and that I should make clear that I would support such action.
10.
I asked if there was anyone in his judgment who might be competent to assume the post of Chief of Staff. He replied that Diem had originally appointed General Vy but that Vy was afraid of Hinh’s power and refused to take the post.
11.
Needless to say, I made no comments with respect to his suggestions nor gave any indication that I would follow them. I did say that I was going out there without any preconceived ideas but that my instructions were definitely to support Diem and his Government. I stated that I would keep in the background as far as possible, would [Page 2209] make no pronouncements and would do everything to attribute to Diem any progress that might be made in solving the complex problems that face us.
J. Lawton Collins
  1. At the direction of General Collins, his office transmitted a copy of this memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Robertson on Nov. 3.↩