120.251G/11–354: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
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1686. Sent niact Paris 563. Personal for Secretary and Ambassador Dillon. Department’s telegram 1809.1 I flew to Dalat to see Ely this morning.
I explained to Ely that I had almost completed my tour, although for obvious reasons I had not made any announcement of it. I had been informed that I was to receive another post and it was desirous that I proceed to it as rapidly as possible as there had been no chief of mission there for some time. My government was preoccupied with replacing me with a new man without experience here and it had even been considered having my successor stay a month with me before my departure.
[Page 2204]Now, however, the President had decided as interim solution that General Collins would come here with rank of, but not as, Ambassador, leaving Kidder as Chargé d’Affaires, and with full powers to coordinate all American agencies and their resources working with respect to free Vietnam. I pointed out certain advantages, that Collins had already made visits to Vietnam, and had, I knew, enjoyed most cordial relations with General Ely. I then gave latter message which Department’s telegram 1809 directed me to convey to Diem. I told him I had planned to convey this information to him yesterday, but arrival of another telegram and flying conditions had prevented it.
Ely replied that he had warm friendship and high esteem for General Collins, a statement he repeated several times. He must say, though, that sending him out here on such a publicized mission would create a very bad impression in France and in Free Vietnam, and would be exploited by Viet Minh. He said it must not be forgotten that under Geneva agreements he had to cope with Viet Minh. Sending of Collins would be certainly misunderstood. In general it would be taken as meaning that United States was going to take over Indochina. Kidder, who was with me, understood Ely to say that under such conditions he himself might not be able to remain.
Even if General Collins mission were not preceded or accompanied by publicity, effect would be bad. Only circumstances under which such a mission would not create difficulties would be for General Collins to come as he had on previous visits, remain eight days or so, but not giving up his membership on NATO Military Committee.
Ely remained firm in this position despite further arguments on our part and said that he was wiring Mendes-France and perhaps Ambassador Bonnet his reaction which he had just given me.
If the proposed announcement has not yet been released, I suggest that General Collins mission might be played down. I personally feel that as interim measure proposed mission of General Collins would be very useful, provided it is not unduly publicized. Press of course will read all sorts of things into his mission no matter what explanation is given, but absence of any fanfare about his mission will not give handle for Viet Minh propaganda, possible objections by India at least on armistice commission, and will tend to dampen unwelcome speculation in Vietnam. Publicity can occur after successful accomplishment of his mission. In any press statement made on his departure, it might be desirable to describe him as a special or personal observer of the President looking into changed aspects of our program in aiding free Vietnam, such as question of disposition of military matériel previously furnished, question of replacement of matériel under Geneva accords, economic and related problems.