Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Meetings with the President”

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)

top secret
eyes only

[Washington,] October 30, 1954.

Participants:

• The President
• Secretary of State
• Under Secretary of State
• Asst. Secretary of State—Mr. Merchant
• Douglas MacArthur II—Counselor
• Colonel Goodpaster¹

[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]

(c) U.S. Personnel situation in Vietnam

The Secretary said that the general situation in Vietnam was very confused. He had given thought to this matter and believed that perhaps the best way to get it straightened out was to send a high-ranking U.S. official to Vietnam in whom the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and Governor Stassen would have full confidence. This official would have to be one of considerable prestige and he would be given very broad authority to act so that there would not have to be constant reference back to Washington on detailed matters. The Secretary said that he believed it should be an Army officer but that it was obvious any General selected would have to have a very high degree of political judgment. He had in mind three names as possibilities: General Lemnitzer, General Hull, or General Taylor.² The Secretary asked the President if he had any views. The President replied that he thought it was a good idea and of the persons mentioned believed General Hull was the best candidate. He added, however, that in his judgment General Collins³ would be the best qualified U.S. Army Officer that he could think of. The Secretary replied that he had a high regard for General Collins and thought he had grown greatly in stature in the last two years. The President said he suggested General Collins not only because of his outstanding qualifications but also because he was on the spot and presumably could be designated quickly. The Secretary said there was a problem in that the Secretary of Defense and the Pentagon might be reluctant to release Collins from his NATO Standing Group responsibilities, particularly having in mind the New Approach question. The President replied that he felt General Collins could be spared and that General Gruenther⁴ could adequately handle the New Approach problem with our NATO allies. He also thought consideration should be given to notifying Ismay⁵ that we temporarily wished to make use of Collins’ services on a special assignment. The President then tried to reach successively by telephone Secretary Wilson, Deputy Secretary Anderson, and General Collins. Since none of them was in Washington, he directed Colonel Goodpaster to follow up on this to find out General Collins’ plans. He also said the White House would be in touch with the Secretary on this matter when they had further word from General Collins and the Department of Defense. The President indicated that he would request the Department of Defense to release Collins for this assignment.

[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]

1. Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Jr., Staff Secretary to the President.
2. Lt. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, U.S. Army; Gen. John E. Hull, Commander in Chief, Far East, and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army, in Korea.
3. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Representative to the Military Committee and Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command.
4. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
5. Lord Ismay, Secretary-General of NATO and Vice-Chairman of the North Atlantic Council.