751G.13/10–2454: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
[Received 1:56 p.m.]
1560. Repeated information Paris 515. I communicated the substance of Deptel 1678 of October 221 to General Ely yesterday afternoon. Ely was furious at statement that French had not been actively working to consolidate Diem Government. I said very truthfully that that did not apply to him, that I had continuously reported the cooperation and loyalty with which he had personally carried out the Washington understanding in support of Diem Government and that his attitude was well understood in the Department. He then went on to argue that he felt this firming up of our support of Diem was “in disaccord with the accord reached in Washington”, which specified that if Diem failed to form a successful government that France and the United States would look for a successor, and respecting latter the name of Buu Loc had been mentioned as a possibility. I said that Washington’s attitude was that as long as the deadlock with Hinh and the army continued neither Diem or anyone else could succeed in forming an effective government. Ely said he did not know what more could be done to make Hinh fall in line. I replied that the modus operandi was not clear to me but it was very clear that there must either be a reconciliation between Hinh and the Diem Government and the army’s subordination to the latter or else Hinh would have to go. Ely said he would think it over and inform Guy Lachambre.
I then went to see Diem and handed him the President’s letter and told him that as he saw the United States continued to support his government.
He expressed gratitude for the President’s communication. I, of course, did not tell him the lengths that we are prepared to go to support his government, since too much encouragement would, with reason I fear, encourage him in his instinctive tendency to reject any compromise in forming and administering his government. I remarked to him as I had to Ely that there were only two solutions, reconciliation [Page 2170] with Hinh or the latter’s departure. Regarding this alternative, I observed, there was no practical or safe way to force Hinh to leave immediately. Diem objected that if the French ordered Hinh to go he would leave Vietnam. I said that it would probably be impossible to persuade the French to order him to go and that if the order were given that Hinh would delay or refuse to obey it to save his face. Hinh would argue then he had been given unlimited congé to serve Bao Dai and could not leave until the latter released him, and Bao Dai would avoid giving Hinh a definite order which the latter would obey. While the danger of a coup d’état was lessened since Ely and I talked strongly with Hinh there was a possibility that his group of extremist officers, if attempt were made suddenly to force Hinh out ignominiously, would prefer to attempt a coup. They would succeed in the attempt or else there would be civil war between disloyal and loyal units and that was something to be definitely avoided. Diem said that he would attempt to find a solution of the Hinh problem and might speak with me today.
We dined with the Elys and the Lachambres last evening. There is no doubt in my mind that both Ely and Lachambre had planned to endeavor to convert me to the thesis that the Diem experiment was at an end and we must look for someone else. After dinner I asked Lachambre if Ely had repeated our conversation of the afternoon and when he said that he had received only a brief résumé I gave him the substance of the Department’s 1678. Lachambre took this communication fairly calmly but said he had about come to the conclusion that the Diem experiment would not work. Ely then mentioned that General Soai of the Hoa Haos had seen General Renucci2 this afternoon to say that the Hoa Haos were dubious whether they should remain in the government and asked Renucci’s advise. Renucci reportedly told them to stay in the government. General Phuong of the Cao Dais had seen Ely early evening to say that the Cao Dai’s pope was doubtful as to continued Cao Dai participation in the Diem government. I merely stated that no government could succeed without the loyal support of the army; that was something that must be achieved if American aid were to continue. Lachambre hoped there was a possibility of reconciliation between Hinh and Diem and referred to the joint telegram from Washington (Deptel 1298)3 which mentioned that possibility.
The Lachambres had planned to spend a week in India at Darjeeling before returning to Paris. Lachambre said that Mendes-France had suggested he take a week’s rest there. As a result of my communication he cancelled his India trip and left this morning at 6:30 by Air France. He expressed the hope that the Secretary had not left [Page 2171] Europe and that he would have a chance to talk with him. Diem and General Hinh were at the airport to see him off and neither spoke to the other.