751G.00/10–1354: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State1
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1434. Repeated information priority Paris 477. I saw Ely in company with Daridan this morning and conveyed substance of Department’s 1502 and 1516, October 12.2
[Page 2136]Ely defended himself and LaChambre against suggestions that they had failed to exert maximum efforts in behalf of Diem and to effect neutralization of Hinh. Re first point LaChambre and I both talked jointly with Diem the other night, a fact which in rush of events I failed to report. LaChambre in my presence strongly assured Diem of support but tactfully recommended that Diem solve his conflict with army by taking Xuan into his cabinet, a proposition with which I did not disagree. Ely insisted and truthfully, I believe, that he had gone to utmost to warn and dissuade Hinh from action versus the government. He said that although he offered to post French troops around Palace, an offer which Diem had refused, he could not expose French Expeditionary Force to a clash with Vietnamese National Army. There were thousands of French officers and non-commissioners still serving in Vietnamese National Army and in certain units French officers and non-commissioners had barricaded themselves at night because of the growing feeling in the Vietnamese Army that French were supporting Diem against interests of that army. I told Ely that I would not ask him to go to war with the Vietnamese Army but I felt fairly confident that if he and I saw Hinh together and possibly also officers from the latters staff in order make clear our firm joint position, there would be no coup d’état.
Ely had originally planned to see Hinh at 1230 and have me drop in about 1 o’clock. His reason for seeing Hinh alone first was that as Commander-in-Chief of Vietnamese Army he was going to order him not to bring additional battalions into Saigon. Such orders should not, he felt, be delivered in the presence of a third party. I said I must insist that we see Hinh together as separate interviews might leave room for misunderstanding and give Hinh opportunity maneuver between us.
Ely agreed to this without further objections. Hinh, arriving at this time, was received by both of us in Daridan’s presence. Ely seemed a little slow in taking off so I told Hinh that due to failure of various factions in free Vietnam to achieve unity in moment of grave national peril, there was growing opinion in Washington that it would be useless to spend any more money or effort in Vietnam and that it would be better to concentrate our financial help in those countries which would make good use of it. I said I could appreciate impatience some of his officers over small result to date in controlling Communist infiltration. However, if a military coup d’état occurred, the feeling abroad that it would be useless to give further assistance to Vietnam would dangerously increase. I must warn him as a friend of his, of the National Army and of Vietnam of the dangerous consequences of a coup d’état. Hinh practically interrupted me and Ely here to say, “if I understand you, you want to know whether the army is planning [Page 2137] a coup d’état. The answer is no, we have not planned to overthrow the government and we are not planning to do so. I will make one reservation to that statement. If the government fails to act against communism and we are on the eve of a Communist takeover, then the army will act since it cannot wait until it is too late.”
After this unexpected statement, conversation dropped a moment and Ely and I brought up question of army’s insistence on participation in the government. I said feeling was very strong in US and in other countries of free world that army as such should not participate in government and insistence upon such participations would be used by opponents of further aid to Vietnam. Hinh said he agreed that under normal circumstances army should not be in government. However, circumstances were not normal. Here were leaders and representatives of the sects with their private armies occupying government posts. The leaders of the sects have been given places in a National Defense Council and were already calling for army records and mixing into purely army business. President without consulting him had, he had heard this morning, promoted a colonel to general’s rank and another officer to grade of colonel. In the army, recommendations for promotion were made only after examination of officers record by promotion board. Such a board had recently recommended and Hinh had concurred in promotion of an officer whom he had previously reprimanded for having spent too much time “making propaganda for Diem. Hinh said he had concurred in promotion since officer was competent and as far as purely military service was concerned had good record. Ely and I both agreed promotions should not be made by Defense Ministry without consultation with Army Command and both said we would be glad to speak to Diem on the matter. As regards National Defense Council, I remarked that I had been assured that this was an essentially honorific council whose recommendations had no binding power over army administration, since army was not represented. Hinh said in view of Diem’s propensity for promoting officers without consultation with army staff and purely on basis of officers loyalty to Diem as against army, he felt it necessary to have Xuan as Vice President and Minister of Defense. Xuan, a former general officer, could be relied upon to protect legitimate interests of army. Both Ely and I then asked whether army had any objections against Minh, Assistant Minister of Defense. Hinh said he had no personal objections to Minh but Minh was now acting merely as an intermediary for Diem with no independent powers of his own. The suggestion was made by Ely and myself that if Xuan were acceptable as Defense Minister, Minh might continue as Deputy Minister. Hinh hesitated for a moment and said there would be no objection to such a set-up. I remarked that my understanding was that one of Bay Vien’s [Page 2138] conditions for coming into Cabinet was that Xuan was to receive a pat on back but no position in government. Hinh said that he was astonished to hear this; he had talked to Bay Vien less than an hour before and latter had assured him that he stood with Hinh for appointment of Xuan as Vice President and Minister of Defense. Ely then said he would like to see Diem with me and discuss some of the points that had come up in the conversation, and the interview ended.
I am told by Fishel that Bay Vien had made as a condition to his entering and supporting the government that Xuan be dropped but had not planned to inform Hinh of that fact until he was assured that Hinh would not insist on army representation in Cabinet.
If we are to believe Hinh, as I am inclined to do, danger of a military coup d’état has been averted, at least for time being. The fact that Ely and I together both emphatically warned him of consequences of such an act evidently made an impression, a disagreeable impression, on Hinh.
Diem Government is still not out of danger. Army-Diem conflict may be stirred up again by Diem’s intransigent dislike of burying the hatchet against anyone he feels is morally in the wrong and disloyal. Diem’s political ineptitude may again stall government and get him into trouble. This morning I learned that his brother, Nhu, had persuaded him that only way out of difficulty was for Diem to go personally to see Bao Dai in Cannes and convince Chief of State to instruct Hinh formally that army was not to participate in government. I sent back word to Diem that his departure at this time might be fatal. It would be regarded as victory for the army and would shake further the shaking loyalty of his old followers. This afternoon Diem decided to cancel his trip and to telegraph Bao Dai instead.
Diem has decided to take Quat into Cabinet as Vice President, if the Sects agree, and in any case to appoint him Minister in charge of government reform and formation of a National Assembly. His principal reason according to Fishel for naming Quat is that Diem feels himself incapable of conducting political negotiations with the Sects and other political elements in Vietnam. Diem himself said to me the other day he was “no good at such negotiations”. He didn’t like to make deals and “to buy” support by concessions and favors. He added that it had been great mistake on his part to take the Sects into the government. He should have formed a government of officials, men without regard to their political affiliations or support. I replied to him that he could govern without organized political support only if he had authority over the army and the police force but that he did not yet have such authority.
- This telegram was transmitted in two parts.↩
- In telegram 1502, the Department of State stated that the presence of La Chambre in Saigon appeared to give the French the opportunity to demonstrate their willingness to take necessary action to neutralize Hinh. In telegram 1516, Heath was instructed to seek the active support of La Chambre in this regard. Washington was disturbed by La Chambre’s apparent failure to act. (751G.00/10–1254)↩