751G.5 MSP/10–1154
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1
Dear Mr. Secretary: With reference to the enclosures from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in your letter of September 28, there are several important political and policy aspects of both the manpower and cost estimates of force goals for the Associated States totalling about $536,400,000, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reservations on the support and training of Vietnamese forces.
With respect to the magnitude of force levels and costs for Viet-Nam and Cambodia, I believe that United States policy should be based on NSC 5429/2,2 which envisages the maintenance in Indochina of forces [Page 2133] necessary to assure the internal security of the area, and upon the arrangements concluded at Manila to deter aggression in Southeast Asia. The concepts underlying the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty should make the maintenance of relatively large ground forces unnecessary in the Associated States, since the military establishment of a single state within such a collective security group need not be so large as would be required if that nation had to act alone to defend its security against external aggression. It seems to me that the mission of the Vietnamese National Armed Forces should be to provide internal security. The manpower and cost estimates in the JCS attachment would seem to be excessive in the above context.
From the political viewpoint some armed forces are necessary. If adequately trained and equipped they would give the people of free Viet-Nam some assurance of internal security and provide the Government of Free Viet-Nam with an increased sense of stability. This would produce definite political and psychological advantages and would help fulfill the objectives of NSC 5429/2. I would appreciate having your views as to the forces we should contemplate to carry out this policy as well as the amount of funds we should devote to this purpose.
With respect to the question of U.S. support and training for the Vietnamese forces there are two political aspects: purpose and timing. Effective execution of NSC policy on U.S. support for such forces can have a significant bearing on the political objective of creating a stable, capable anti-Communist government in Viet-Nam, and on assisting it in carrying out a vigorous internal program with Congressional approval. One effective way to strengthen the Vietnamese Government is to assist in the reorganizing and training of its armed forces, as I noted in my letter to you of August 18, 1954. This point was again referred in the Acting Secretary’s letter of September 7, 1954, to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In addition to budgetary support, a direct means of helping to create and maintain political stability will be by appropriate participation of the U.S. MAAG in the planning, developing and training of Vietnamese security forces. The Department of State is aware of the risks, difficulties and impediments in any such program of U.S. training and assistance for Vietnamese forces. Nevertheless, within these difficulties and limitations, I feel there are many reasons to consider a vigorous, imaginative and effective program for planning, developing and training Vietnamese security forces both in Viet-Nam and perhaps even in nearby countries or in the United States itself. We could substantially influence the development of political as well as military stability in free Viet-Nam if we had such a training project with Vietnamese forces. The provision of direct budgetary support to those forces would have far less impact if the United States eschews any participation in training those forces.
[Page 2134]Then there is the question of timing regarding the degree of political stability which the Joint Chiefs of Staff raised in their memorandum of September 22, 1954.3 I believe that potential political developments now warrant your consideration of the necessary preliminary steps for working out an appropriate U.S. training function for Vietnamese security forces.
With respect to these considerations regarding force goals and training in Viet-Nam, we need to take some decisions promptly to enable us to respond to the Cambodian, Vietnamese and French Governments concerning financial and other support for their forces in Indochina.
The President has signed a letter to the Prime Minister of Viet-Nam authorizing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with him an intelligent program of direct American aid to assist Viet-Nam.4 A similar letter has already been delivered to the King of Cambodia.5 In the meantime the Vietnamese Government has submitted a note to this Government stating that it is considering increasing the Vietnamese army to a total force of 230,000 men in order to “guarantee the internal and external security of the country” and requesting United States assistance in this endeavor.6 The French Finance Minister in his recent talks in Washington expressed a desire for U.S. financial support for the French Expeditionary Corps in Indochina, which the French contemplate retaining at an average strength of about 150,000 men during 1955. The United States representatives indicated that we would strive to give some indication to the French Government of our thinking on these matters by December 1, 1954. The plans of the French and the Vietnamese both seem to me to be beyond what the United States should consider feasible to support for maintaining the security of Free Indochina at this time.
In view of the political considerations and the requirements of timing, it is imperative that the United States Government prepare a firm position on the size of the forces we consider a minimum level to assure the internal security of Indochina. This position will also have to include the amounts of money we will be prepared to make available for this purpose, and the steps we will be willing to take to assist in the training and formation of these forces. It seems to me that we cannot realistically enter into discussions with the other governments concerned until we have made this determination. I would therefore also appreciate your views on how best we should proceed in making this determination.
[Page 2135]I am sending a copy of this letter to Governor Stassen.
Sincerely yours,
- Drafted by Young of PSA.↩
- For NSC 5429/2, “Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East,” Aug. 20, 1954, see volume xii.↩
- See Enclosure 2 to the letter from Secretary Wilson to Secretary Dulles, Sept. 28, p. 2089.↩
- For President Eisenhower’s letter to President Diem, Oct. 23, see p. 2166.↩
- For President Eisenhower’s letter to King Norodom Sihanouk, Oct. 2, see editorial note, p. 2114.↩
- The note was transmitted in telegram 1310 from Saigon, Oct. 2, p. 2113.↩