751G./10–1054: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
priority
1397. Repeated information Paris 469. Embassy telegram 1387, October 9. General Hinh came to see me last evening at my request. He was ill at ease, undoubtedly because his conscience is in same condition. He tried, however, to carry it off with a jaunty manner.
He took initiative in discussion and asked me what I thought of government and whether Diem was going to reform it. I told him I thought it far from ideal, but since as matter of practical necessity Diem had had to give certain cabinet posts to Cao Daists and Hoa Haos, whose candidates were not impressive, I understood Diem would negotiate with Vien and General Xuan and would offer them posts. I said both the latter would doubtless ask greater representation than [Page 2129] they probably were entitled to, but neither could at this time expect to have vital positions in government. Xuan had entered government first accepting post and then resigning forthwith, afterwards applying again for vice presidency, all this accompanied by critical public statements against government. Le Vien had undoubtedly many good qualities but he would have to dissociate himself from gambling monopoly and other unpleasant interests before he could occupy greater position in public life. I added I understood he was willing to get rid of these connections. As for Army’s demands, I told him that Bao Dai had made unmistakably clear to me that his telegram did not contemplate Army as such participating in civil government and that was very decidedly our view. Hinh protested that that was also his view, but with paucity of people in Vietnam, President should use his officers as Secretaries of State in Ministries of Defense and Youth. He had particularly brilliant candidate for Youth Ministry. I said certainly there would be no harm in suggesting to President that he use such officer but I did not believe Army should have Secretary of State in Defense unless it were impossible to find suitable civilian candidate. It was very important to maintain separation of civil and military. I went on to say while government was far from ideal, with Diem and other good men in civil branch and with Hinh in military, government could successfully attack tremendous problems facing it. I said General O’Daniel and myself thought Army should take lead in work of pacification. Hinh said he had offered plan of pacification to government but no attention had been paid to it.
(Comment: I do not believe he has prepared any detailed plan).
He said he would be glad to show it to me and I said we would be glad to see it, and insofar as possible, would detail some MAAG officers to help him on it if he wished, and if funds were a problem, would consider giving aid.
I reminded Hinh, giving him figures, that bulk of Vietnamese defense budget was defrayed by US. Hitherto this passed through French, but we would probably shortly negotiate new arrangement for direct aid. Very likely amounts previously given would be reduced, but there would still be enough to maintain adequate army. I went on to say that in more than four years here I had never interfered in internal political matters and would not call my activities for past few weeks intervention, but with the deep political divisions and unrest which had increased in last few weeks, it had been necessary for US and France to mediate. This internal strife must come to end now if Vietnam were to survive. I felt he could be sure Diem would treat Army properly and French and US would certainly use their friendly influence to see Army is not hindered in its task. He could be sure of our [Page 2130] support if Army did its own job and stayed out of politics. Hinh said he had no desire to get into politics and if government got on with work and reorganization, he would be glad to take a vacation in France. I replied there was no question of his taking vacation at this time. He had job to do.
Hinh then indulged in some criticism of Diem to which I replied that Diem had his faults as everyone had, but it should be very obvious to Hinh that there was no capable successor in sight at this moment. Hinh did not dispute that. He then criticized General Phuong of the Cao Dais and General Soai of Hoa Haos as being dishonest, untrustworthy and incapable, and said Le Vien, in spite of his reputation, was man of his word and of ability. I remarked I would not dispute any of those statements, but could hardly expect Diem, after painfully forming a new government, to throw out the Cao Dais and Hoa Haos at this moment.
Our talk closed with Hinh’s saying he and his friends would observe Diem for another forty-eight hours, but if Diem failed to comply with Bao Dai’s request to enlarge his government, Army would have to act. Hinh said in effect he had supported government because Army had power to turn it out of office. He had resisted great pressure of many interests who were urging the Army to overthrow government, and unless government really got to work, Army could not stand by. I said I had no doubt government would tackle its problems now, but that any coup de force by Army would be fatal to future of Army of Vietnam. It would be disastrous for Hinh personally.
Foregoing is a fairly complete account of our conversation. I omitted number of wild and I would say childish statements by Hinh. After this talk I am more than ever convinced he must be gotten out of picture. Unfortunately this cannot happen now. I believe talk may have postponed, but not avoided Hinh’s revolutionary intentions.1
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In telegram 1401 from Saigon, Oct. 10, Heath further reported that Hinh’s agents had abducted an officer of Diem’s palace guard and that Vietnamese Army armored cars had circled the palace grounds, menacing the guard force. Heath informed General Ely of these developments. Ely urged that the Binh Xuyen be given the Interior Ministry, but Heath replied that the time had come to stand firm against threats. Diem must be provided with a program for restoring internal security, a program which had to be forced upon all concerned, including Diem. (751G.00/10–1054)
The Department replied immediately. Telegram 1485 to Saigon, Oct. 10, read as follows: “Concur lines your approach. Clear that resolution political conflict and prevention any overthrow of Diem by force will depend a lot on ability and intention La Chambre with Ely, despite difficulties, take decisive and conclusive measures in line Washington understandings and instructions re supporting broadened Diem government and preventing Hinh extend his control over civil government. Coincidence any coup d’état with La Chambre visit could hardly escape provoking unfavorable reaction various quarters.” (751G.00/10–1054)
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