751G.00/10–854: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
niact
1382. Repeated information priority Paris 466. I saw both General Ely and Diem this morning. Ely said that in long interview yesterday Diem had been adamant that Hinh must go and Ely had been equally firm particularly in view of Bao Dai’s telegrams, that Diem, as matter [Page 2119] of practical necessity, was obliged to retain Hinh at this time as Chief of Staff.
Ely said he was seeing Hinh later in morning and would learn what Hinh’s “conditions” were for cooperating with Diem government. I said to Ely it was not up to Hinh to propose any conditions whatsoever. Hinh had acted very badly and he would be fortunate indeed to be retained as Chief Staff in view of his insubordination to government. I said that if Hinh still attempted to impose conditions on formation civil government, I would recommend to Washington we cut off further aid to Vietnamese defense forces until they behaved themselves. I told Ely I thought he should lecture Hinh on way Chief Staff should comport himself toward legal government. Ely said he would talk to him along these lines and suggested I might talk to Hinh later.
I then went to see Diem who for more than hour maintained that Hinh must be dismissed. Diem insisted Hinh would never stop plotting or mismanaging army. He asserted Hinh was increasingly unpopular both with his Vietnamese Officer Corps and troops; that if Hinh stayed Diem’s government would lose all face and prestige with country.
I replied I would welcome, as he would, Hinh’s departure from scene, but that it was simply not practical at present moment. Diem must face fact he lacks force to compel Hinh to obey his orders. French would not order Hinh back to service with a French army at this time and, if they did, Hinh would refuse to obey orders and go into open rebellion against government, justifying his action on Bao Dai’s telegrams directing Diem government to retain him. Diem then said that, if he tried revolution, it would be unsuccessful unless French forces by their inaction permitted him to succeed. I said it would be certain that French, having concluded armistice with Viet Minh, were not going to start another war with Vietnamese army, but would simply remain in their barracks as long as public order, French lives and property were not imperilled. Even if Hinh’s forces did not march into city and occupy government buildings, his allies, the Binh Xuyen, since they controlled the police, could quietly paralyze the government. I reminded Diem that on two occasions he had sought reconciliation with Hinh, using Embassy members as intermediaries. I said that if, as matter of practical necessity, which was way I saw situation, he would allow Hinh to remain as Chief Staff, he would be buying time in which to calm present temper of Officer Corps and turn their loyalty to government instead of Hinh. I said that in this breathing spell our own influence on officers Vietnamese army would be exerted to persuade them only future and chance of foreign support [Page 2120] was policy of staying out of politics and proper subordination to civil authority.
We argued back and forth for more than hour at end of which time, as I was already overdue for discussion with Wisner of CIA who was leaving Saigon within the hour, I broke off interview. We agreed I would discuss matter later in day.
Following my talk I received report that if Diem failed to retain General Hinh and take Binh Xuyen and General Xuan into Cabinet, army and Binh Xuyen would stage coup d’état against government “within 48 hours.”
Ely has since sent word to me he hopes I will resume my conversation with Diem and see Hinh as soon as possible as he also is concerned that time is running short.
I intend to tell Diem that while both France and US support his government this support is not translatable into terms of force on the local scene and without force he cannot compel Hinh to leave at this time. It would seem therefore it would be necessary for time being to leave Hinh as Chief Staff. Any prolongation of this deadlock could have only dangerous consequences for Diem Government and free Vietnam.