751G.13/10–454: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
priority
1413. Repeated information Saigon 176. From Ambassador Heath. I saw Bao Dai yesterday in Cannes. Presumably because he had been [Page 2116] advised of the French-American attitude by Ely’s visit to Cannes and my talk after arrival with Nguyen De, Bao Dai expressed no objections to Diem’s remaining in office. He agreed thoroughly that Hinh had acted very reprehensibly in opposing Diem’s orders and in taking the Army into politics. He asserted that he had told Hinh that he should have obeyed Diem’s orders and that if they were unjustified he should then have appealed to him—Bao Dai. @@De had undoubtedly informed Bao Dai of my objection to his telegrams to Diem and Hinh requesting the Army should be taken into the Government. Bao Dai said that that was a “drafting error”. He had not meant that the Army should occupy cabinet positions but that as a necessary measure of appeasement Hinh should be continued as chief of staff. He then went on to say that he had no particular confidence in Xuan’s ability or loyalty to him, Bao Dai. He thought he could rely more on Diem’s loyalty than on the other candidates for the premiership. At the same time he said that with all his virtue of honesty and sincerity, Diem was not a natural statesman nor overly intelligent. If Diem were to succeed he must change his entourage. I agreed with that statement and said that Diem seemed to have too many brothers advising him.
Comment: I personally believe that at least in the near future Bao Dai will not try to dismiss or even undermine Diem. On the other hand, Bao Dai is surrounded by far from disinterested advisers and is weak. I had dinner last night with Buu Loc and it is very evident to me that he is fairly busy campaigning to succeed Diem. Buu Loc asked me in case Diem failed to make a success of it whom I thought might undertake the succession. I replied that our thinking was concentrated on Diem’s successfully presiding [over] a government of national union.
After discussing the political crisis in Vietnam the conversation turned to Bao Dai’s possible return to Vietnam. I told Bao Dai quite frankly that he had a very bad press in Vietnam and abroad because of his absenteeism but that might be overcome if on his return he would live fully up to the responsibilities of his office of chief of state, set an example of austerity and patriotism, make frequent public appearances and exhibit a real interest in the welfare of his subjects, maintain frequent warm contacts with officers and civilians of all classes thus promoting national unity and will to resist Communist take-over. I said that I would not venture to suggest whether he should engage in actual business of governing or whether his role should be that of an English monarch but he would have to be active. Bao Dai was evidently far from pleased at my oblique criticism of his past performance. He said he of course wanted to return but that he had to look at the situation realistically. He had to be assured of some organized support should he return. At the present he had only the support [Page 2117] of the sects which was insufficient. The loyalty of his army to him was far from certain in its present temper. I remarked that if he did return with will, patriotic determination and activity that he would find support within the country and without. He seemed far from convinced or decided. My personal opinion is that while he may return if Diem or a successor succeeds in bringing some stability and unity to the country, Bao Dai is too set in his ways ever to provide the leadership or example that Vietnam requires.