751G.00/9–3054: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
[Received 9:14 a.m.]
1278. Repeated information Paris 440. I saw Daridan this morning and brought him up to date on Hinh’s counter-positions (my telegram 1269, repeated Paris 438)1 to Diem’s extremely generous peace offer to Hinh (my telegram 1250).2
Daridan said immediately that Hinh’s attempting to impose conditions, and intolerable conditions, on government in exchange for his promise to be obedient was outrageous and his threat to make coup d’état if these conditions not accepted in toto was shocking.
I qualified Hinh’s conduct in even stronger terms and mentioned Hinh had ridiculed and attacked government to foreigners and Vietnamese at receptions and had dropped publicly scarcely veiled hints that if this government did not get out army would revolt. I said that Quat and others who had been in touch with Hinh and his camarilla of young and too rapidly promoted officers confirmed that they were in mood to stage a revolution. Casting around for solution, it seemed to me that it would be necessary to call in not merely Hinh but his conspirators on General Staff as well and say to them that US and France were discussing program for build-up and support of Vietnamese Nanal [Page 2104] Army, which could only be maintained and developed through French and American assistance; that our willingness to continue such material support, indeed continuance of moral support of free world, was prejudiced by reports that army was imposing intolerable conditions on legally constituted government and threatening revolt if they were not complied with; that it was realized mistakes had been made by Diem Government in handling army but that Diem had made generous offer and guaranteed that integrity of army would be preserved and that guarantee would be backed up by France and US. I said it would be better if Ely could preside at such meeting but he would not return before October 4 and some action should be taken now. I suggested that someone from our military mission, perhaps General O’Daniel, might be present at this meeting as silent observer. He would let French General deliver sermon but his presence there would give corroboration to it. I was dubious that Salan, who in Ely’s absence was Commander-in-Chief, would be relied on to deliver an impressive warning of this kind, since at the least Salan had not discouraged Hinh and his camarilla. Daridan agreed to that and said he was afraid that Salan unaccompanied might deliver warning but would wink while he did so. I said it would be imperative then for Daridan to be present.
I remarked that ideal solution would be for Hinh to leave Vietnam but Hinh had on record President’s offer to let him remain if he ceased politicking and plotting. Daridan agreed but said that his personal solution would be for both Diem and Hinh to leave. I said I could not agree since (1) Diem’s departure would be victory for army and its resistance to civil authority even if Hinh left, (2) there was no capable successor in sight for Diem and General Xuan or Buu Loc would be the tools and not the masters of army group, and (3) both our governments had agreed to support Diem. Daridan said he understood that our governments had agreed to support Diem but he had had no final definite instructions to that effect. Without them he would of course nevertheless support Diem.
Daridan said project of calling in Hinh and officers was probably only solution but it required some study because we had to face possibility that officers would not accept warning but would get their backs up and go ahead with revolution. Hinh and his officers had already been warned by Ely that military regime resulting from coup d’état of army would not be recognized by France, US, or free world, but this had not deterred them from planning coup d’état if Diem Government refused meet their demands. I observed I understood French High Command gave Vietnamese National Army three days supply of munitions and gasoline. This was more than enough for them to attempt and quite possibly succeed in revolt in Saigon if not [Page 2105] opposed by French military force. One possible insurance against military coup would be to cut down supplies below three days. Daridan said this might be part of solution and he would examine it with Salan. He promised to let me know results of consultations by end of day.
I believe that in these grave circumstances following action should be taken: (1) President should telegraph and publish message to Diem proposed in Deptel 636 September [August] 18;3 (2) French Government should follow with some statement of support for Diem Government; (3) Daridan should be unequivocally instructed by his government to deliver warning to Hinh and his ranking staff officers along line I proposed to Daridan; (4) I should be authorized, in consultation and coordination with French, to make known to Hinh and his staff officers that we will not give one penny of budgetary support for Vietnamese defense forces if they overthrow legal government and fail to keep their army out of politics (I have already more than implied this in our discussions with Hinh).