396.1 LO/9–3054: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London1
Tosec 7. Following summary final meetings September 29 on Indochina.2 Small restricted US–French meeting held with General Smith in morning. Approved minute of understanding and top secret implementation thereof, both contained in subsequent telegrams.3 Also approved draft communiqué for discussion afternoon meeting with three Associated States representatives.
After discussion problem of providing French forces with certain necessary spare parts, General Smith took up political situation Vietnam. [Page 2099] Read Saigon’s 12704 to effect relatively effective government can be built around Diem, stick by him at this moment, but also look around for relief pitcher in case Diem does fail. Heath suggested he go to Cannes explain situation Bao Dai. LaChambre agreed this suggestion. (Orders subsequently sent Heath.)
LaChambre agreed completely with reftel. Stated in “first phase” France and US must bolster Diem without reservations and give him chance succeed. However LaChambre emphasized cannot afford long delays in seriously deteriorating situation or risk civil war. Expeditionary Corps obligated maintain order but not in Indochina for that purpose. Consequently under such circumstances US and France must envisage what steps to take should Diem fail. He rejected General Xuan as Prime Minister since puppet Binh Xuyen, but would endorse Xuan as Defense Mnister. Ely agreed this latter role for Xuan if means for reconciling Diem and Hinh. In LaChambre’s view if Diem fails despite our “real thorough assistance” must resort asking Bao Dai delegate general powers to Buu Loc to settle situation by forming government with himself or someone else as Prime Minister in government of national union including Diem in cabinet.
If Heath goes Cannes should have instructions impress Bao Dai have army and Binh Xuyen support Diem but if Bao Dai adamant against Diem Heath and deJean should ask Bao Dai give powers to Buu Loc. Smith and LaChambre agreed send additional separate telegrams respectively Heath and Daridan re tentative Buu Loc alternative to any failure Diem government. (Message concerning this matter will be available Heath Paris prior his visit Bao Dai.)5
Ely said he was ready support Diem to utmost with no hesitation and thoroughly agreed with LaChambre in case failure Diem create and maintain broad stable government. Smith agreed that while chances perhaps dubious we must both strive create strong government around Diem.
In discussing minute of understanding LaChambre pressed vigorously for agreement on establishment joint committees on aid to three Associated States, i.e., US–French, on grounds French and US paying for aid and should determine objectives, plans and implementation prior to discussion with each of Associated States. Objected to adding three Associated States on “basis of equality”. Smith pointed out mandate of Congress on direct US aid to three Associated States, and planning and coordination would require appropriate and effective machinery which might well be tripartite.
After settling on minute, etc., LaChambre concluded with appreciation for General Smith’s assistance, and understanding these talks.
[Page 2100]Final meeting afternoon 29th included representatives Associated States. Robertson summarized progress made during meetings emphasizing no decisions made concerning internal matters Associated States inconsistent with bilateral nature talks. Went on point out full agreement reached on concept complete independence for Associated States and that US budgetary support be granted them direct in future. LaChambre vigorously stressed reality independence three states and common accord with US. Pointedly alluded impossibility Indochinese provoke divergence between France and US.
Vietnamese Ambassador and LaChambre conducted spirited and rather heated exchange concerning Vietnamese release to American press 28th to effect French Expeditionary Corps should be withdrawn by March 1956. Tenor French response was indignation at ungratefulness such announcement and that FEC prepared be withdrawn “tomorrow.” Vietnamese reply along lines present government first with enough courage announce real truth of Vietnamese desires and that FEC needed more at home than in Asia.
Lao statement mild, conciliatory and gracious. Appreciated what done for them. Cambodian Amb. approved and asked if military aid would be direct. Answered affirmatively.
All approved final paragraph communiqué stating they informed of proceedings and in agreement with talk’s objectives. This final paragraph drafted and submitted during afternoon meeting.
Complimentary references by all to General Smith’s retirement 30th.
After meeting Cambodian Ambassador presented letter from Foreign Minister thanking Smith for Geneva help.6 Ely had short visit with Smith to be followed 30th by LaChambre call prior his departure 30th for Saigon via Pacific.
- Drafted by Young and Hoey of PSA. Also sent to Saigon as 1296, to Paris as 1175, to Phnom Penh as 75, and to Vientiane as 50.↩
- Minutes of the meetings summarized in this telegram are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 361.↩
- See telegrams Tosec 8 and Tosec 9 to London, Sept. 30, infra and p. 2101, respectively.↩
- Dated Sept. 29, p. 2092.↩
- See telegram 1327 to Saigon (1195 to Paris), Oct. 1, p. 2110.↩
- Not printed.↩