751G.00/9–2754: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
priority
1138. Satisfactory first meeting LaChambre–Ely–Faure on political subjects held today.2
Smith said we understand French policies with respect Indochina influenced in two directions, first opposing Viet Minh and strengthening national government Vietnam while second urges France abandon support anti-Communist groups and attempt make deal with Ho Chi Minh. We sure Mendes-France accepts first course as only acceptable one. Basic US policy is continue oppose growth Communism and strengthen governments of three states.
LaChambre emphasized joint measures needed in military, political, economic spheres. France desired joint economic aid strengthen Associated States. In free Vietnam LaChambre felt situation had deteriorated considerably since Diem and his government have little knowledge of realities. National army had resisted the government. Refugee problem had not been attacked satisfactorily. Viet Minh seized upon vacuum. In Cambodia the French have no immediate anxiety. In Laos, French expect new government soon after Savang returns.
Regarding Diem France preferred an efficient even though anti-French person to a reasonable man who was inefficient. France intends that independence which has been completed in principle will soon be completed in fact. France has abandoned colonialism. Hopes in future to have cultural, military and political missions. Native armies should be built up to insure internal stability and guard against aggression. French wish all French troops could be withdrawn but to do so invites trouble. Implications of Geneva are that no foreign powers can replace France in Indochina. France plans build up Vietnam army now 200,000 to upwards 225,000 formed in 7 or 8 divisions. In Laos present strength 31,000 will be maintained and Cambodia present 33,000 increase to 40,000 by end 1955. FEC now 175,000 be progressively reduced 100,000 by end 1955.
French contemplate formation joint France-US committees including Associated States representatives to set up economic aid programs. Any communiqué arising out of present conference should take note of agreement of coordination of US–French efforts on Indochina.
[Page 2083]Smith replied French policies will receive serious consideration. Most difficult problem Vietnam. Diem government inexperienced but with help of France and US capable being strengthened and maintained. On other hand we see no one. We insist on government both anti-Communist and free of corruption. Diem should move forward with vigorous program, acquire support of sects—and find solution quarrel with army. Also need Bao Dai support our efforts. (At this point Smith read portions Saigon telegram 1250.)3
LaChambre replied Diem’s deficiencies apparent. Viet Minh have profited by vacuum to vastly increase strength in south. Diem has help most important sects. There remains problem of national army and Binh Xuan [Xuyen]. French consider Bao Dai usefulness may end at point where Diem convenes national assembly which could assume former royal powers. We must be careful any assembly not be controlled by Communists. French still think Diem best man. France fully in agreement with US as to importance having chief of government who would not compromise with Viet Minh. Tran Van Huu, General Xuan and Tam unacceptable. Only two choices—Buu Loc and Buu Hoi. Perhaps Buu Loc could be useful as imperial delegate in Saigon but not as president. French unsure Hoi.4 General Ely agreed LaChambre views concerning Diem.
Smith stated we pleased that French agreed we can both support Diem. Asked Ely how we can handle problem of Army and Hinh. Ely replied Hinh is supple. Rather than lose position would come to terms. Doesn’t know of any other Vietnamese who could replace Hinh. General Smith stated we not far apart in assessment Bao Dai.
LaChambre had no objections views expressed by Smith.
Smith said US intends deal directly with states regarding subsidies. LaChambre said France has no objections. Smith said letter to King Cambodia would be delivered after conclusion of current France-US talks.5
Comment: We consider first phase of talks satisfactory. French indicated acceptance concept of direct budgetary support states and only small concern at US military training in Cambodia. Regarding Diem French appeared be in almost complete agreement with US. During session French continually emphasized their desire that US policy and programs regarding Indochina be developed jointly. In order formalize the degree of understanding we reached this afternoon [Page 2084] we have drawn up a written minute of understanding covering main points and will request formal or informal French assent.
- Drafted by Hoey of PSA. Also sent priority to Saigon as 1245, to Phnom Penh as 65, to Vientiane as 46, to Hanoi as 356, and to London as Tosec 2.↩
- Regarding this meeting, which was held on the afternoon of Sept. 27, see also telegram 1240 to Saigon, Sept. 28, supra. Minutes of meeting are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 361 and CF 362.↩
- Dated Sept. 27, p. 2075.↩
- In telegram 1305 from Paris, Sept. 27, Ambassador Dillon reported that the Embassy had indicated its disapproval of Buu Hoi (on the basis of his apparent pro-Viet Minh sympathies) to Raphael-Leygues, who was campaigning for him as the next Prime Minister of Vietnam, and to the French Foreign Ministry. (751G.00/9–2754)↩
- The letter was delivered on Oct. 2; see editorial note, p. 2114.↩