FE/VN files, lot 58 D 257, “MAAG—Post-Geneva”
The Embassy of Vietnam to the Department of State1
A strong foreign occupying army can protect a country, but it can also dominate, paralyze its government and even favor a “coup d’état” by its opponents.
That is precisely what the French authorities are doing just now: instead of helping the legal government to enforce law and order, they encouraged General Hinh’s rebellion by ordering Premier Ngo Dinh Diem to take Hinh’s own father as Minister of Interior, they allow Hinh to have his own way in Saigon, and, at the same time, they prevent the legal government from having in its own capital the protection of its own faithful troops.
Under such circumstances and when the Binh Xuyen police did not hesitate to open fire on unarmed refugees demonstrating in favor of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem, it is quite easy to prove that Premier Diem has no followers and is inefficient! Under such circumstances, what Vietnamese, unarmed as they are, could be bold enough to declare themselves for the legal government.
It must be stressed that General Hinh is still registered as a Lieutenant-Colonel under the number 121 in the French Air Force list. Even as Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Army, he is still under [Page 2073] the French High Command and, therefore, it would have been easy for the French not to allow, him to use armed cars to defy the government.
Therefore, the American Government should refuse to help the French to maintain their Expeditionary Corps in Viet Nam unless and until they repair the harm they have done in giving openly their support to a rebellious general against the legal government.
This serious incident proves that by giving arms and money to help the French to have a strong occupying army in Viet Nam, the American Government gives them the power to dominate the Vietnamese political situation irresistibly. It must be recalled that such a power directly benefits the Viet Minh when used, as it is now and has always been, to favor Vietnamese politicians who enjoy too much French confidence and, therefore, are subject to too much Vietnamese distrust.
That was the reason why General Hinh’s “army” was so reluctant to fight and is now rapidly disintegrating, and that was also the reason why his father’s so called “strong” government could only achieve a political vacuum which was the Viet Minh’s strongest factor of success. It would be foolish and even suicidal to have another try with such “dynamic, strong” men. We really cannot afford to keep throwing non-communist and nationalist Vietnamese into the Viet Minh’s arms!
It should be made clear that in the future American help to the French Expeditionary Corps in Viet Nam could be withdrawn at any time when it is not used for the right purposes.
It must also be recalled that the Manila Pact is a better protection for Viet Nam than any French army, that France herself needs her army for her own defense, and that the only advantage of the Geneva armistice is to make possible such a withdrawal and to proclaim Viet Nam full independence. Therefore, everything must be done to help Viet Nam achieve her independence, but not to help the French keep demonstrating at the American tax payers’ expenses and for the Viet Minh’s benefit, that “their presence” is absolutely, absolutely necessary to Viet Nam.
Indeed, after the cessation of hostilities and after the Manila Pact, Free Viet Nam needs only a real national government, a strong police and a true national army.
There can be no national army and no national government if they are headed by men who have the confidence of the French to a greater degree than that of the Vietnamese.
There can be no police if headed by such men or by gangsters.
That was why Premier Ngo Dinh Diem had to remove General Hinh who was preparing a “coup d’état”. The next step would be to replace the Binh Xuyen at the head of the police.
But for “efficiency’s sake, the French preferred to side with Hinh and his father and, of course, the Binh Xuyen who are with them for they are the “presumable” winners.
[Page 2074]Under such circumstances, the American Government would assume a very grave responsibility in helping the French to maintain their Expeditionary Corps in free Viet Nam. It must not do so without setting a very precise condition.
- The source text bears a handwritten notation by Assistant Secretary Robertson stating that he received this communication from the Vietnamese Ambassador on Sept. 27.↩