751G.13/9–2554: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
priority
1217. London for info Secretary.2 Limit distribution. Saturday morning3 La Chambre met at his request with General Smith for small private meeting with immediate staffs both sides. Frank, informal preliminary exchange of views took place on nature political problems requiring solutions Vietnam. No decisions. No discussion Cambodia or Laos.
In opening remarks General Smith welcomed La Chambre and his aides and holding of talks at this time. Smith then stressed (a) importance frank talks to reach agreement on political program Vietnam as prerequisite for assurances to U.S. military and congressional sources on future programs, (b) need for decisions on kind of Vietnamese Government both countries would support and in which event such government could survive and act, (c) U.S. views on Diem Government as best in sight though it needs help and requires more efficiency plus loyalty Vietnamese Army, and (d) difficulties in continuing intrigues and actions of Bao Dai since any change government Saigon would immensely complicate our problems. Re Diem, Smith read Mansfield telegram4 (repeated separate message to Saigon) emphasizing his views would have great influence in Congress, particularly with Democrats. Smith also referred to Communist exploitation present confusion in order subvert free Vietnam.
Responding in general agreement, La Chambre stressed (a) only French objective is complete unity of action with U.S. in North Vietnam and South Vietnam, (b) French agree and accept Diem honest, incorruptible, strongly nationalistic and also somewhat anti-French which they do not mind but they are particularly concerned he has not produced efficient government which can eliminate corruption and [Page 2071] effectively meet Communist infiltration, (c) since Geneva and Mendes-France guarantee of independence, French have transferred powers, (d) principal French worry Viet-Minh profiting by delays and making great headway with intimidation campaign South Vietnam in violation armistice, (c) must take counteraction and only Sects have actual capabilities counter Viet-Minh, (f) while Diem Government now has two Sects critical problem remains with Binh Xuyen and Hinh outside which risks further conflict since Bao Dai can unmake governments unless he agrees with us, and (g) French have been reluctant use FEC restore order and thus desire Bao Dai assent for cloak of legality. Mendes-France not desperate over situation and believes it can be resolved with US–French unity of action. Sainteny reported after visit Hanoi, Viet-Minh and Ho Chi Minh 100% Communist. La Chambre said no doubts that score.
Re future Bao Dai, La Chambre said it would be unfortunate in elections 1956 for Vietnam people have choose between him and Ho Chi Minh. We must decide what to do with Bao Dai, perhaps through some change in delegation of his powers so that he would be permanently out. As for consultative assembly there might be something in it but should be carefully examined to ensure Communists would not profit. Smith agreed in general re Bao Dai.
In conclusion Smith stressed need for positive political program to save what had been salvaged at Geneva.
Agreed meet with representatives Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos next week after bilateral talks.
- Drafted by Young of PSA. Also sent priority to Paris as 1113, to Vientiane as 44, to Phnom Penh as 62, and to London as 1749.↩
- Secretary Dulles was in London for the Nine-Power Conference.↩
- A memorandum of the Smith–La Chambre conversation of Saturday morning, Sept. 25, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 361.↩
- Reference is to telegram 212 from Berlin, Sept. 24, p. 2055.↩