Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/9–2554

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] September 25, 1954.

Subject:

• Forthcoming Talks with the French on Indochina²

I. French Intentions

a) According to the French Embassy, the French Government will undertake in these talks to (1) give us an estimate of the situation in Indochina and their general policy lines towards the three states, (2) coordinate French and US policies along definite lines towards the three Associated States and the Viet Minh, and (3) reach an understanding on as many details as possible regarding military matters, particularly in Viet-Nam and Laos. The French stress the need for common action with the US in establishing a new track following Geneva.

II. Arrangements for the Talks

a) The US and French sides have agreed to a tentative schedule of four meetings: a small restricted meeting Monday afternoon³ to discuss basic political policies, military talks Tuesday morning, economic talks afternoon, and a final session Wednesday morning. LaChambre and Ely are seeing General Smith today at 11:30 at their request for a preliminary private talk.⁴

b) Depending on the French positions, the US should reserve its position of any final decisions or commitments regarding new military and economic support programs during these talks. Congressional committees will have to be consulted in any event, also the three Associated States. The primary purpose of these talks should be to establish parallel policies toward the three states and towards the Viet Minh if possible. Some decisions may have to be taken of a limited nature, if desirable, in order not to leave a vacuum.

c) We must keep in mind the concern of the three Associated States over bilateral talks. We have kept them advised here and in the field. I saw the three representatives yesterday together to assure them no decisions would be taken privately respecting their countries and to confirm that we would keep them informed during the talks. The French have proposed a meeting Monday morning with us and the three Associated States to discuss the Protocol to the Manila Pact and Southeast Asia as a way to avoid injuring their feelings. I feel my meeting with them and by keeping them informed next week will serve the same purpose better. Or we might meet with them together with the French at the end of the talks.

d) We will send you a briefing telegram immediately after each of the meetings here so that you will be fully informed during the London talks.⁵

III. US Policies on the three Associated States

a) Our objective is to gain the greatest possible French acceptance and active support for a vigorous policy to create and strengthen free Viet-Nam between now and mid–1956 when elections in Viet-Nam might be held, and to support Cambodia and Laos. We hope the French will go along with our decisions on direct aid for supporting Viet-Nam and Cambodia and for resisting Communist Viet Minh.

b) The principal problem at the moment in Viet-Nam continues to be the development of a stable, representative government. There has been an encouraging trend during the last few days, two of the sects deciding to join the Diem government. If that government is still in office when the talks begin, we should emphasize that the facts of the matter are the Diem government, however imperfect, is the best in sight, it merits the support of the US and France now so that we all can get on with the job of creating a strong free Viet-Nam. If such a Diem government proves incompetent after a fair trial, then we can re-examine the situation since we are not wedded to Diem as a person or to the Diem Government as such. If it appears that the Diem government is being forced out in favor of such a candidate as the head of the Binh Xuyen (a gangster type faction) we would have to make clear to the French the very grave difficulty this would cause the Executive and the Congress in providing aid to such a government.

c) We should reaffirm the position taken in your letter to Mendes-France of August 18th⁶ regarding direct budgetary aid to Viet-Nam and our intention immediately to transmit a letter to that effect to the Chief of the Vietnamese Government.

d) There are a number of concrete problems which we may wish to discuss with the French to get their views, i.e., continuation of Bao Dai as Chief of State, the amendment of present juridical relationships between France and free Viet-Nam and the measures for transfer of real independent sovereign powers.

e) Regarding Cambodia, we should reaffirm our intention to furnish direct military aid and training to Cambodia, at its request, together with some economic assistance. We must also yet make our position on this clear to the British. We will proceed with the letter to the King of Cambodia and the negotiation of a bilateral agreement regarding military aid and training. (The JCS have interposed a condition that all French personnel should be withdrawn prior to our undertaking aid and training.)

f) As for Laos, we will work jointly with the French on military assistance and independently on direct budgetary support and economic rehabilitation.

g) If the French consent to the US position in principle, we could propose that French and US assistance—military, economic and technical—to the three Associated States be carried out through informal trilateral coordination in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane under the chairmanship of the local governments. Our aid will, of course, be identified as separate from the French.

IV. Military Views of the JCS Regarding Indochina

a) Viet-Nam—The JCS on September 22 recommended in substance (not cleared by Defense as yet):⁷

(1) Due to present unstable political situation, against the assignment of a training mission to MAAG/Saigon, and against indicating at this time US intentions regarding support and training of Vietnamese forces.

(2) Force levels for Viet-Nam consisting of 234,000 Vietnamese ground forces; retention of a minimum of four French divisions until phased out by trained Vietnamese units; and a small navy and air force together with French units. This will require extensive detailed training over a period of three to five years (presumably by the French, although their memorandum is ambiguous on the latter point) assuming initial cost of equipment as zero and received from French sources, annual cost of these forces is estimated tentatively at $443,400,000.

(3) Prior to assumption of any support of the forces of free VietNam, a definite agreement should be obtained from the French Government regarding the timing of their programmed phased withdrawal (this seems to contradict (1) above).

(4) US military support to that area [presumably Viet-Nam]⁸ including the training, equipping of forces should be accomplished at a low priority.

(Comment on JCS views: Their reserved, negative position may help us tactically in the talks with the French, but, if unchanged, will hinder implementation of NSC objectives in Viet-Nam, and thereby ultimately endanger Cambodian [Vietnamese?] independence.)

b) Cambodia—The JCS

(1) Offer no objection to a MAAG in Cambodia.

(2) Recommend the bilateral agreement between US and Cambodia provide that all French advisers ultimately be withdrawn in order that the US may deal directly with Cambodia.

(3) Recommend a Cambodian army of 53,600 consisting of three divisions of light infantry. Assuming initial cost of equipment as zero, the annual operating cost to train and maintain the above force would be approximately $94 million.

V. Economic Aid

a) There is a difference of opinion between FOA and State. Governor Stassen has recommended a cessation of all budgetary support payments to France. General Smith expressed the Department’s position on this in a letter dated September 21.⁹ This is a matter which should be ironed out before economic talks begin with the French on Tuesday afternoon. The Department has proposed, regarding US aid from fiscal year 1954 funds, that we tell the French that pending a final US decision regarding fiscal year 1954 aid, we will continue the current arrangements of budget support for the French Expeditionary Corps during calendar year 1954 except that we propose to suspend reimbursements, retroactive to July 21, for equipment which has not been or will not be delivered to Indochina.

b) With respect to US aid from fiscal year 1955 funds, we have recommended the following positions:

(1) Propose that the support for French forces retained in Indochina in calendar year 1955 be financed by France from its own resources. If the French object and insist they cannot keep the planned level of forces in Indochina without some continued US support, we may have to take a different position; in this case we should advise the French that no final US decision on this point can be taken at this time, since we must assess the results of the present talks, current developments in Indochina and many other factors.

(2) We will undertake direct programs of budgetary support for Viet-Nam and Cambodia, and Laos if necessary. We should ask the French for their views on the likely outcome of the current negotiations in Paris regarding future financial arrangements between France and the Associated States.

VI. Meeting with Defense and FOA at 10:30¹⁰

a) The purpose of today’s meetings with you is primarily to lay the above political policies before you for approval, and to inform you of the JCS and FOA positions. Admiral Carney for Defense and Governor Stassen will be in 5100 at 10:30 to hear the political briefings in preparation for Monday’s meeting on basic policies with the French.

b) This 10:30 meeting is a good chance for you to state the general political approach you favor, and to deal with Stassen’s wish to suspend fiscal year 1954 aid to France. It is hoped you can support the economic position in paragraph V, which reflects General Smith’s letter to Stassen, and give the broad political reasons against suspension.

c) The following agenda for the 10:30 talks is recommended:

1. Political Policies (this memo, D–1/1 and D–1/2.)¹¹

2. Aid Programs (D–3/3 and D–3/4)¹¹

3. Military Aspects (JCS views of 22 September 1954)

1. Drafted by Kenneth T. Young, Acting Director of PSA.
2. In Press Release No. 529 of Sept. 25, the Department of State announced that Guy La Chambre, Minister in Charge of Relations with the Associated States, and General Paul Ely, French Commissioner General in Indochina, would be in Washington for discussions on Indochina, Sept. 27–29. It was noted that Edgar Faure, French Finance Minister who was in Washington on other international financial matters, would also participate. The announcement further stated that the talks would be informal and exploratory in nature, and that the governments of the Associated States were being kept informed. For the text of Press Release No. 529, see Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 491–492. A memorandum of a briefing on the talks provided to the Ambassadors of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia by Assistant Secretary Robertson on Sept. 24 is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 361.
3. Sept. 27.
4. See telegram 1217 to Saigon, Sept. 25, p. 2070.
5. Secretary Dulles attended the London Nine-Power Conference, Sept. 28–Oct. 3. For documentation, see volume V.
6. See telegram 610 to Paris, Aug. 18, p. 1957.
7. See letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, Sept. 28, and its enclosures, p. 2088.
8. Brackets in the source text.
9. For the text of the letter of Sept. 21 from Acting Secretary Smith to FOA Director Stassen and other documentation on overall aid to France, see volume VI.
10. For the record of the meeting, see infra.
11. None of the background papers prepared for the talks with La Chambre and Ely is printed. This documentation may be found in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 361.
11. None of the background papers prepared for the talks with La Chambre and Ely is printed. This documentation may be found in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 361.