Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 215th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, September 24, 19541
eyes only
[Extract]
Present at the 215th meeting of the Council were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 3); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Acting Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Rose; Assistant Secretary of Defense Hensel; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
The Director of Central Intelligence reported that the situation in South Vietnam had reached the crisis stage in the struggle for power between Hinh and Prime Minister Diem. Though they had formally indicated neutrality, the French appeared to be backing Hinh. If he failed to secure control over the army, it was difficult to see how Diem could last. Bao Dai has suggested to Diem that he resign, but the latter has not seen fit to act on this suggestion. Bao Dai was in a position to exercise considerable power if he chose to, but he was, of course, under heavy French influence. The next few days will show whether Diem can stand up to Hinh. From the point of view of policy, concluded Mr. Dulles, the problem was whether the United States and France can get together and back a good Vietnamese leader.
At the conclusion of these remarks, Admiral Radford inquired whether the French could not call Hinh off. Mr. Dulles replied that undoubtedly they could, but that Hinh probably had the secret backing of the French.
[Page 2059]Mr. Cutler, after reading the conclusions of the latest National Intelligence Estimate on South Vietnam,2 inquired whether the Secretary of State had any comments to make on the grave situation indicated in this Estimate. Was it true, Mr. Cutler inquired, that the U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Heath, was being replaced?
Secretary Dulles said that there were plans to make a change in Saigon, though in the last few weeks Ambassador Heath had been doing a very good job. Until this time the Secretary had felt that Heath had been too long in this position and was too close to the French. However, he is now standing up to them, and the deterioration in South Vietnam is not ascribable to any weakness of Heath’s.
The heart of the problem in South Vietnam, said Secretary Dulles, is that we really don’t yet know Mendes-France’s game. Is he actually collaborating in some fashion with the Vietminh, as some intelligence reports suggest? Or is he so busy with other matters in France that he has permitted the direction of policy in Indochina to get back into the old colonialist channels? We cannot tell the answer to these questions yet, but we may know more after the Nine-Power meeting in London.3
Mr. Allen Dulles repeated his earlier view that the best course of action to arrest the deterioration in South Vietnam was for the French and the Americans to unite firmly in support of one local leader.
Secretary Wilson said that he thought that an even more desirable course of action was for the United States to get completely out of the area. The chances of saving any part of Southeast Asia were, in his opinion, nothing.
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