751G.13/9–2354: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State1
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1185. Repeated information priority Paris 410. In order make clear US position current political crisis and also determine their own attitudes more exactly, I sent word September 22 to Hoa Hao, General [Page 2049] Soai and Cao Dai General Phuong that I would like to see them. General Soai was reported to be out of town in Can Tho. In absence Soai, General Phuong, instead of meeting with me, requested Embassy First Secretary come to talk with him and Hoa Hao representatives at Cao Dai headquarters Saigon evening September 22.
Embassy officer conferred with me prior to appointment with representatives sects and I emphasized time had come to make US view clear and unequivocal.
Embassy officer found General Phuong flanked by two Hoa Hao representatives and two Cao Dai supporters. General Phuong apologized for fact General Soai not in Saigon and therefore two generals unable respond together to Ambassador’s request they come to see him. He enquired as to purpose of Ambassador’s request. Embassy officer replied that Ambassador had wished make very clear position of US in current crisis inasmuch as there had been conflicting statements regarding American attitude and there was danger some uncertainty still existed. He enquired as to current intentions of Cao Dai and Hoa Hao.
Hoa Hao representative said there were four elements of strength in present problem: Cao Dai; Hoa Hao; Binh Xuyen; and National Army. Sects believed that at least three of these elements must join Diem if he were to have chance form stable government. Hoa Hao spokesman said Cao Dai and Hoa Hao were now unwilling join Diem until Diem made his peace with General Hinh and obtained support and cooperation National Army. They were afraid that if they joined Diem Government, Hinh might launch armed attack on government.
Embassy officer pointed out that Hinh had been urged both by French and US not to use force in his controversy with Diem, that Hinh had not attacked government in its present position of powerlessness, that there was less reason to believe Hinh might attack government should it acquire some strength by virture Hoa Hao and Cao Dai support and participation. By joining Diem Government sects would place it in position of some strength from which it might have better chance negotiate solution of problem with Hinh. By insisting on condition Diem first resolve difficulties with Hinh prior to support of sects confessional groups were in effect condemning Diem Government to fall.
Sects wanted to know if US would give “guarantee” against use of force by General Hinh against government. It was pointed out to them no one could give such a “guarantee” but the factors working against such a move on part of Hinh were also made clear to them. Hinh was intelligent man and knew both US and French opposed use of force and would find it difficult recognize or support regime brought into office by use of force from whatever quarter. Hinh further knew that [Page 2050] his army must be fed, clothed and paid and that without outside assistance he could not expect maintain army.
Sects next raised problem Hinh’s status itself, saying Hinh must remain and President must rescind his order directing Chief of Staff to leave country. Embassy officer went into some detail explaining value placed on principle supremacy of civil government over military in democratic countries. He expressed as personal view ideal solution would be for Hinh, retaining full rank and privileges, to leave country in dignified manner for period three weeks to month. Meanwhile sects would have joined Diem Government and revised government would have had opportunity demonstrate whether or not it was capable providing leadership and strength to free Vietnam. One of Hinh’s objections to government had been its ineffectiveness and inactivity. Should government show substantial progress before his return one of Hinh’s objections might be removed. Government would further be in position of strength to negotiate equitable reconciliation with him. To expression of view by sects that this would be desirable and “good solution” but that they believed Hinh would refuse to leave, Embassy officer replied that whether or not this solution were practicable, government must be placed in position of some strength from which it could move forward at once on constructive program and that, whatever the arrangement with General Hinh, it could be worked out in meantime.
Hoa Hao representatives next raised question as to just what US policy is at this moment since “French representatives” had told them US policy was “changing”. Embassy officer replied he felt time had come to speak with brutal frankness. US believed that whoever headed government at this critical time must be honest and must be a patriot. We held no brief for Ngo Dinh Diem himself but at this time saw no one else in sight who had better opportunity, provided he had support of sects, to provide necessary leadership and program build strength in free Vietnam. We recognized while Diem honest and a nationalist, he had also up until present been inactive and ineffective. US had no intention stubbornly support incompetent or ineffective government, but felt that government headed by Diem with support and participation of sects provided best chance of success at this time. Should sects join Diem government and give it their support they must realize it would not be matter their passively accepting honors and position, but they would share with Diem responsibility for demonstrating leadership and progress. It had been policy of US to support Diem government and US was still supporting idea of Diem government including participation of sects. If such a government did not produce results and show progress within reasonable period of time, US would naturally wish re-examine its position.
[Page 2051]US does not support any Binh Xuyen plot to overthrow present government and establish Xuyen-dominated government. We believe Binh Xuyen at this time does not have qualities required by situation.
US does not support any move by General Hinh to overthrow government and establish new government based on Army. We believe General Hinh and National Army at this time do not possess qualities for successful leadership of entire nation. US does believe that Diem government with participation of sects presently offers best chance for success.
Hoa Hao then raised fear French authorities might cut off their subsidies should sects support Diem against French advice. Embassy officer said, speaking frankly, it must be recognized bulk of French efforts Indochina was supported by US aid. He made no attempt to predict French reaction and said problem could be examined should it arise.
Embassy officer asked General Phuong what advice General Ely had given him last time Phuong had spoken to Commissioner General. Phuong replied Ely had advised sects to cooperate with Diem government. Embassy officer suggested sects follow Ely’s advice. Both sects replied advice they had received subsequently from both French military and civil authorities had not been consistent with that which General Ely had given them. Embassy officer remarked General Ely had presumably not changed his own advice and certainly after this discussion US position should be clear.
Hoa Hao representatives said General Soai could not return Saigon before afternoon September 23 at which time he and General Phuong would meet to reach decision. Embassy officer enquired as to what that decision might be expected to be and what recommendations Hoa Hao representatives then present would give General Soai. Hoa Hao spokesman said he completely convinced necessity cooperation by Cao Dai and Hoa Hao with Diem government, that by insisting on prior “acts of strength” by Diem such as agreement with General Hinh before sects would participate in government, sects were in reality perpetuating “a vicious circle,” that his recommendation to General Soai would be that Cao Dai and Hoa Hao should participate in Diem government at once and give it their support. General Phuong reiterated Cao Dai stands ready cooperate with Diem.
Embassy officer expressed regret General Soai could not be in Saigon before late September 23 and reminded confessional leaders that while Diem, sects and National Army, all of whom were patriotic Vietnamese devoted to best interests their country, wasted time in unseemly squabbles, Vietnam was being lost hour by hour to Viet Minh. If all patriotic elements Vietnam did not unite promptly to work for salvation [Page 2052] Vietnam there was a good likelihood their country would be lost and they with it.
- This telegram was transmitted in two parts.↩