Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.13/0–2254: Telegram

The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State

top secret
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Saigon, September 22, 1954—6 p.m.

1168. Repeated information priority Paris 407. On returning from farewell visit Phnom Penh this morning, I was informed that Daridan wanted to see me this afternoon. After extreme difficulty we managed to get through to him with message I had to see him this morning. I finally saw him this noon. Daridan said he had just seen representatives of Cao Dai and Hoa Hao who asked his advice whether they should enter Diem Government. Daridan says he told them French interests here were considerable, but they could be liquidated, and France would not be essentially the poorer. Therefore, French were not going to interfere or undertake responsibility in such matters. He said if two sects were determined to go into Diem Government to do so immediately, and if not to say so immediately, since this uncertain situation should not persist.

Next part of conversation was not so explicit but I certainly got impression that Daridan gave his personal opinion to representatives of sects that entering Diem Government would be losing venture for Vietnam. Daridan then said if sects did not go into Diem Government they should get together on candidate acceptable to all sects. Representatives hesitated minute and said, according to Daridan, “we know our strength, we know our weakness, and our weakness is that we can never agree on one candidate to head government.” Then Daridan claimed his concluding advice to them was whether or not they went into Diem Government to “make your decision today.” Thereupon he claims they left decided not to enter Diem Government.

I said I found this very confusing since last time we had seen representatives of Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, who had called to ascertain position of US Government, which we had explained was supporting Diem as legally constituted authority, representatives said to us they had definite intention of going into Government. I then told Daridan I had more definite information now as to US stand and I gave him substance of Deptel 1144 repeated Paris 1038.¹ I said it was regrettable that here there was very definite difference of opinion between France and US as to Diem Government; that it was necessary that we should move together in interest of building something solid in Vietnam. Fact remained just as I had often said to Ely, and no one had ever been able to challenge it, that there was in sight at this time no acceptable alternative candidate to Diem as head of Government. There was no Vietnamese who enjoyed national reputation for honesty and nationalist patriotism. Two of the sects were willing to work with Diem and Binh Xuyen I hoped might go along if they were maintained in their control of police, which for moment other sects in general were willing to allow. Hinh in his press conference had very cleverly left himself loophole of conciliation with Diem Government. Diem in his press statements, and from what I understood of his present attitude, was willing to come to some compromise with Hinh. I am not sure that any such coalition would last or be effective, but I am sure that any government coming out of a Hinh-Binh Xuyen coalition was damned and doomed from start. If Diem mishandled his new government, obviously he would have to go. Certainly we should know in month. To be sure we had no time to lose, but all would be lost if an impossible government took over now.

Daridan said “my own conviction is that Diem will lose this country; he is so damned stubborn.” I said his stubbornness had been ground down considerably these days and that I gave him a chance. Daridan ended conversation by saying, rather angrily, “all right, but Diem must form his new government today because situation is explosive and furthermore any such coalition must include Binh Xuyen and Army if it is to have any chance of succeeding.”²

Heath

1. For text, see footnote 2, supra.

2. Telegram 1183 to Saigon (1078 to Paris), Sept. 23, read as follows: “Saigon 1168. Department gratified at prompt and we hope effective line taken with Daridan. Your third paragraph summary of situation, without suitable alternative candidate, corresponds views of Department.

   “We similarly hope that the reiteration of our unchanged policy Deptel 1144 in combination with urgent approach to Bao Dai directed in telegram to Paris today will influence sects throw their support Diem.” (751G.13/9–2254) Reference is to telegram 1063 to Paris, Sept. 23, p. 2052.