751G.13/9–2154: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State1
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1150. Repeated information priority Paris 395. [Name deleted] came to see Embassy First Secretary this morning to report serious new [Page 2042] developments in political crisis. Confessional leaders had met with General Le Van Vien at Binh Xuyen Headquarters at 8 a.m. September 21. General Hinh was among those present. At this meeting General Vien attempted persuade sects to join him in public announcement calling upon Diem to resign and appealing to Bao Dai appoint coalition government of sects headed by General Vien himself.
At 10 a.m. General Salan had summoned Hoa Hao General Soai and at 11 a.m. he had called in Cao Dai General Phuong,… In his talks with these confessional leaders General Salan… said General Le Van Vien had mandate from Bao Dai form new government based on coalition of sects. [Name deleted] said General Salan told them confessional groups “must join Le Van Vien and cooperate with him in their own best interests.” General Salan is further reported to have said that this change of government had full American approval as “Washington had agreed with La Chambre.”
[Name deleted] pointed out to Embassy officer that agreement by Cao Dai and Hoa Hao to support Diem and join his government was only hours away.… Meeting between leaders these two sects and Diem was set for 3 p.m. this afternoon,… News of this near agreement had been deliberately leaked to press… and small article had already been printed on front page L’Union Francaise, Saigon newspaper, this morning.
[Name deleted] was deeply disturbed that this coalition government dominated by Binh Xuyen and headed by General Le Van Vien had indeed received American approval. He was assured that this was not true. He was fearful that if sects disregarded admonitions General Salan to support General Vien and instead carried out their intention support Diem, there might be disorders and bloodshed. He feared Binh Xuyen or possibly National Army would storm Presidential palace. He suggested that if Cao Dai and Hoa Hao joined Diem Government, Diem seek refuge either “at MAAG Headquarters or with Cao Dai at Tay Ninh,” leaving Foreign Minister Tran Van Do as his deputy in Saigon. He was told that it was out of question for MAAG to grant asylum to President.
While [name deleted] spoke, General Soai and General Phuong, who had gone directly to Binh Xuyen Headquarters from their interviews with General Salan, were closeted with General Vien, but according [name deleted], were awaiting verification American attitude as reported by General Salan.
Above information was immediately conveyed to Counselor Kidder who was called out for purpose from office of Acting Commissioner General Daridan on whom Minister to Laos Yost was making official call. On Counselor’s return to rejoin Yost and Daridan, latter immediately commented that he had just had telephone call from General [Page 2043] Salan who was complaining about danger inherent in demonstrations being inspired by Diem. Daridan commented that Diem might start serious trouble and was acting irresponsibly, and said influence should be brought to bear on him to cease demonstrations, in one of which Diem’s sister-in-law had been seen taking part. (Word was subsequently sent to Fishel to ask him to call to attention of Diem that these demonstrations are serving no useful purpose but are potential sources of danger and are causing unfavorable reactions). Counselor then informed Daridan that he had just then learned from a usually reliable source report as set out above concerning alleged activities of General Salan. Daridan immediately countered by saying he could assure us if Salan had seen representatives of sects it would be for purpose of urging them to be united. He could guarantee Salan would not implicate US in any way in any conversations that he might have had. Counselor said Embassy understands Hoa Hao and Cao Dai on verge of possible satisfactory solution in support of a strengthened Diem Government and that we believe it an excellent sign. Any action to bring Binh Xuyen, an organization without popular support of any kind, into power would be serious. US would view it with concern and it should at all costs be avoided. This point reiterated with emphasis on unfavorable view of Binh Xuyen taken by US.
Daridan stated he does not believe General Hinh would start trouble but speculated serious trouble might result if deadlock reached between Diem and his followers and Hinh and any sects possibly allied with him. He twice said Diem can’t be given another chance if he is not successful today in his attempt to establish his reinvigorated government. Counselor pointed out that to encourage Binh Xuyen at this point, when two other sects were attempting to cooperate with Diem and apparently determined not to let ambitious Binh Xuyen get upper hand, would be most unfortunate.
At 1:15 [name deleted] telephoned Embassy First Secretary to enquire results Counselor Kidder’s conversation with Daridan. He especially enquired as to whether or not Daridan knew anything of reported “mandate from Bao Dai to General Vien to form new government”. He was informed that story he had told Embassy officer had been reported in general terms Daridan and that Daridan apparently knew of no such mandate to General Vien. As far as Embassy could tell, Daridan’s information as to status General Vien, remained that which General Vien had imparted to Ely upon his return from Paris, namely that Bao Dai had asked Vien study situation and report with recommendations to Bao Dai.
[Name deleted] then enquired if it were “all right for Cao Dai and Hoa Hao to go ahead with plan to support Diem“. [Name deleted] was [Page 2044] informed that Embassy saw no reason for confessional groups to change their plan support Diem if this was their intention but that Cao Dai and Hoa Hao would have to make up their own minds.2