751G.13/9–2054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State

top secret
niact

1125. Repeated information Paris 386. [Name deleted] came to see me this morning to discuss urgent problem. He began conversation by saying “General Hinh plans to carry out a coup d’etat tomorrow”.

[Name deleted] said that Binh Xuyen General Le Van Vien who returned September 18 from Paris was cautioning Hinh against use of force. Hinh was planning send battalion National Army troops to lay siege Palais Norodom September 21 and force resignation Diem. General Vien argued this would not be necessary as he had another plan ostensibly approved by Bao Dai. General Vien’s plan was to call representatives all sects together his headquarters this evening and persuade them sign message to Diem publicly calling for his resignation. In addition to Binh Xuyen, he hoped obtain support Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Catholic groups led by Bishop Le Huu Tu. At this moment, according to [name deleted], General Vien was sending emissaries to General Xuan and other members Diem Cabinet demanding they resign and threatening them if they failed to do so. Extent of progress made by Binh Xuyen leader evident from fact Diem’s Minister of Agriculture attended conference General Vien’s headquarters this morning.

. . . . . . .

… As soon as Hoa Hao General Soai arrives Saigon, possibly this evening, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao are ready reach firm agreement with Diem enter his government and give him their support. They are then ready make public declaration they are cooperating with and supporting Diem government.

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[Name deleted] is confident that Hinh feels secure in move against Diem so long as he believes confessional groups can be won to his side or will remain neutral. Once sects have made public declaration they support Diem, Hinh will be in mood to “be reasoned with”. [Name deleted] said Hinh is aware Cao Daists have fanatical followers at their disposal and will be aware “his life will be in danger” if he does not listen to reason.

[Name deleted] suggestion for resolving conflict with Hinh is that following agreement with Diem confessional generals will call on Hinh and put pressure on him. [Name deleted] believes Hinh must leave country “within a week” and that Diem must make public decree simultaneously announcing Hinh will be made “Commander-in-Chief” upon his return. In position of Commander-in-Chief Hinh will be remote from direct command, Chief of Staff can be “neutral officer” such as current Vietnamese Military Attaché Washington (described as not very effective but neutral) and general staff can become “combined staff” containing representation from sectarian forces.

[Name deleted] reaffirmed fact confessional groups not enthusiastic about Diem but see no better man to lead country at this time. He stated Diem still has high reputation among common people as man of integrity and fervent nationalist. Diem’s recent firmness in resisting French pressure appoint Tam Interior Minister and his firm refusal bow to French in this matter had, according to [name deleted], reinforced his prestige.…

I explained to [name deleted] that as Diem’s is legally constituted government of Vietnam, US has been and is continuing support Diem. French have stated they would not recognize government brought into power by force and we ourselves would find it very difficult recognize or support government created by such means.

I will see Daridan, who is acting in Ely’s absence, today and tell him we have information Hinh planning coup d’etat tomorrow, reminding Daridan he had said he would talk firmly to Hinh should such a coup appear imminent. I saw Diem this afternoon to urge him once more act quickly, firmly and personally in order arrive at agreement with sects. I told him if he did not act quickly, preferably today, it may be too late.

I believe this is first promising ray of hope we have had in recent days that deteriorating situation may yet be saved and government headed by Diem and enjoying some measure of support may yet emerge. It remains uncertain that Diem, with his hesitancy and ineptness, will be able to grasp this opportunity and give leadership to such a government.

Heath