751G.13/9–1854: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
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1103. Repeated information Paris 375. I have just had very disturbing interview with General Ely which, combined with Hinh’s retreat from his promise to leave if Xuan were appointed Defense Minister and Bai Vien’s statement to press in Paris yesterday re necessity of new government based on friendship with France, leads me to believe that Ely and Daridan as well as Paris are determined Diem must go.
Ely spoke in not very convincing tones, more of sorrow than of anger, saying that he had opposed Paris instructions, insisting instead that Diem be given another chance. In effect he had offered him another chance to form a strong government, but Diem, because of his stubbornness over Tam, had refused. Taking Xuan into government was not enough. He said Diem needed Tam. I remarked that we had certain respect for Tam’s qualities but by no means believed he was only man who could handle police. Ely then said, “who can?” Since I did not care to divulge Diem’s intentions of appointing Quat, I let conversation drop at this point. I feel almost sure word will get to Hinh from someone in Commissariat General that he can sit tight as Diem is on his way out.
Ely said thing he “feared” was that Bao Dai was going to put Diem “on the shelf” (limoger) and appoint another government. Bai Vien had gone to Cannes with “bags of gold” to aid in persuading Monarch to oust Diem.
[Page 2036]I remarked Diem could hardly be criticized for not having formed new government immediately. This has been almost impossible as long as solution was lacking for conflict with Hinh. I said if his forecast of Bao Dai’s intentions was correct, we would have to take a look at the composition and prospects of new government US was spending huge sums here and this could only be justified if a regime could be formed capable of winning battle against communism. Such a regime would have to be authentic nationalist one. If the new regime were no more impressive than preceding Vietnamese governments, it would not be good enough.
I believe that mytel 1029, repeated information Paris 3451 urging someone in Paris to sound out Bao Dai and convey this Embassy’s opinion that he should hold off forming new regime at this precise moment was sound recommendation. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to keep abreast of situation here if we are not in touch with one of principal elements therein which Bao Dai still is.
I remarked that if assumption Bao Dai intends appoint new government were correct, that would presumably mean Hinh would stay on. Ely replied that would depend on composition of new government. I recalled to Ely that we had both expressed doubts that Hinh was man to form and lead national army of caliber which both France and US desire, not to mention that he had taken Vietnamese Army into politics.
Some time ago France had agreed that post-Geneva Government must be a nationalist government. After experience with Diem’s Nationalist regime French have obviously abandoned that idea. Their former insistence on Huu and their recent insistence on Tam is evidence. No government containing either of these two men could be, by any stretch of the imagination, called nationalist.
I do not entirely blame the French for dropping Diem since latter has been irritating to them and politically woefully inept. I feel we have been right in insisting that a definitely nationalist government be created here. I feel that if French would throw their support to Diem he might possibly make a success still but that is unlikely without exertion of extreme pressure on our side. Our proposition that there is no good successor for Diem at this precise juncture remains true. Perhaps Tran Van Lam, Governor of south Vietnam, might have makings of “dark horse successor,” but he would have to be groomed for it as it is his first entrance into politics. Quat would seem to be too much the northerner and is disliked by sects. There would seem still to be extremely faint chance that Diem will be able to persuade Hoa Hao and Cao Daists to participate in new government. Against such [Page 2037] faint possibility is fact that armies of these sects are on French payroll, and that sects themselves, if they see Diem approaching end of his rope, may back off from any agreement.
- See footnote 1, p. 2025.↩