751G.00/9–1354: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
995. Repeated information Paris 336. Ely told me this morning that Bao Dai had informed DeJean last week of his intention shortly to change Diem Government. At this moment when Diem’s conflict with Hinh and his officers seems to be in way of settlement with Hinh’s presumed departure for France and since Diem is not far from agreement with sects to form broader government, it would be unfortunate if Diem ousted now. Anyone that Bao Dai is now likely to suggest would be change for worse. There is still some promise of making something out of Diem government. At least for moment, there is no one better in sight.
I recommend that someone from Paris Embassy, say Counselor Gibson, sound out Bao Dai at Cannes and say it is opinion of this Embassy that it would be mistake change Diem at this time.1
In telegram 1090 from Paris, Sept. 14, repeated to Saigon for information as telegram 121, Ambassador Dillon stated the following:
“Saigon’s 336 (Department 995) September 13.
“We fear any move made by Embassy contact Bao Dai as suggested reference telegram would be subject misinterpretation and encounter opposition in both French and Vietnamese circles, thereby doing more harm than good. We believe that any move that we might make in this direction regardless how well we might keep French informed would only be regarded by them as example clear-cut US interference in Vietnamese internal affairs and would render meaningless in their eyes all our expressions of hope that they (French) not interfere in any way in Vietnamese internal affairs. As we have indicated, French official circles currently taking position, which they state in line our expressions, that Bao Dai is Chief of State and as such he free make own decisions and to return Vietnam when he desires, and that they (French) have no intention interfere or do more than give advice when requested.” (751G.00/9–1454)
In telegram 1029 from Saigon, Sept. 15, Ambassador Heath attempted to refute the arguments set forth in Paris telegram 1090, pointing out that Vietnam was not a constitutional government but one in which absolute power was theoretically vested in an absolute monarch. The United States could not avoid intervening to the extent of giving advice to the various parties concerned, with a view to building up Vietnam against the Communist threat. (751G.00/9–1554) However, in telegram 1038 to Saigon (962 to Paris), also Sept. 15, the Department indicated that since an approach to Bao Dai was likely to have little effect, none should be made. (751G.00/9–1454)
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