Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/8–1654

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

secret

[Washington,] August 16, 1954.

Subject:

• General Ely’s views on the political situation in Vietnam.

Supplementing the Paris Embassy’s reporting on the subject, here is a summary of various points which General Ely made at a luncheon which I attended with him and Minister LaChambre at the latter’s house on August 14:

1. Ely is most disappointed with the Diem regime and is concerned over developing political situation. He indicated that the fact that General Hinh has now reached some sort of understanding with religious sects in the south makes a military coup d’état quite possible. Ely believes such a coup d’état would be a serious mistake and would greatly diminish the chance of building a stable regime in South Vietnam with adequate popular support. On the other hand Ely does not feel that he can intervene to prevent such a coup d’état since such action by the French would undermine the confidence of the Nationalists in French promises to respect Vietnamese internal independence. Both Ely and LaChambre consider Tam best available man to replace Diem or to enter into a coalition government if Diem is retained. He would have the support of religious sects and would presumably control Hinh. The possibility of finding a way of developing a new governmental formula through some sort of representative assembly based on existing bodies, i.e., without elections appeals to both Ely and LaChambre.

2. Ely stated that it is of the utmost urgency that a Southeast Asian defense pact be set up so that the people in South Vietnam will gain confidence that Vietminh overt aggression in South Vietnam would bring pact into play. He stated that of course even this pact would not minimize the growing danger that Vietminh would take advantage of unsettled conditions and lack of leadership in South Vietnam to seize power through more or less peaceful means.

3. Ely stated that Vietminh treatment of French Union prisoners had been cruel and horrible beyond belief. He stated the view that a number of returned prisoners would be way below expectation in view of the number who had died in captivity. He said, however, that it was important to avoid any publicity on this aspect until all available prisoners had been returned.

4. Ely stated that at least half of the Vietnamese national army of the north would have deserted by the end of the current month. He added that the Vietminh is making tremendous efforts through pressures on families of these men and otherwise to induce them to desert and that these efforts are being by and large successful.

5. Ely stated that the neutral commission personnel will include some 2,000 Hindus whose arrival Ely views with some concern because of the consistently pro-Vietminh attitude of the Indian Government.

6. Major purpose of Ely’s trip to Paris is to endeavor to obtain governmental policy decisions on various pending matters. One of these is the relationship between North and South Vietnam and notably on the economic policy to be followed with reference to trade between the two sections of the country. Should the south continue to help feed the north? (Sainteny’s reply is highly affirmative on this point.)

7. On the military situation previous to the cease fire, Ely stated that while he could have repelled an attack on Hanoi he no longer had enough sure troops both to defend Hanoi and to guarantee the Hanoi–Haiphong supply line.

1. Copies of this memorandum were transmitted to McClintock in FE, Ambassador Heath in Saigon, and First Secretary Gibson in Paris.